The problem of theological method: A study of Kierkegaard and Tillich by Wardlaw, Henry R
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
Tirs PROBLEM OF ÏHEÎOLOGÏCAL METHOBi
A STUDY OF KIERKEGAARD AED TILLICH,
Submitted to the University of Glasgow, for the degree 
of Ph.D. in the Faculty of Divinity, by Harry Hardlaw.
ProQuest Number: 10647439
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The qua lity  of this reproduction  is d e p e n d e n t upon the qua lity  of the copy subm itted.
In the unlikely e ve n t that the au tho r did not send a co m p le te  m anuscrip t 
and there are missing pages, these will be no ted . Also, if m ateria l had to be rem oved,
a no te  will ind ica te  the de le tion .
uesL
ProQuest 10647439
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). C opyrigh t of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected aga inst unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C o de
M icroform  Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 81 06 - 1346
PHBFACB
îhls of the of theological method ie In fact an
investigation of the dichotomy between those who nnde:^ stand the import 
of theology in terms of m^etaphysics* or • ontology* , emd those who 
understand it * existent!ally*,
Our thesis is that this dichotomy is sharper than has been 
acknowledged hy some ’existential* theologians* %us when it comes to 
the theological understanding of God for example * existential * theologians 
seem commonly to present some kind of answer to, or discussion of, 
ontological questions, rather than resting in existential formulations#
fhe line of approach to this problem has been through the 
thought of Kierkegaard and 5?illioh# We have looked to Kierkegaard* s 
writings for an exposition of the distinction between metaphysical 
(objective speculative) understanding and existential( subjective) 
understanding, and we have looked to Tillich for an actual methodology 
based on an existential foundation*
My thanks are due to all the members of the department of 
Systematic Theology in the University of Glasgow for their help in the 
preparation of this thesis, but especially to Professor H* Gregor Smith 
for his continual encouragement and interest.
HOTB
The following abbreviations are used in the footnotes:
The Goncluding Unscientific Postscript by S. Kierkegaard is cited 
as •Postscript*
For Gelf■^ examination and Judge for Yourselves by s# Kierkegaard is cited
Philosophical Frapaents by B. Kierkegaard is cited as • Fragments* 
Systematic^ Theology# Vols* X ^  IX by P. Tillich are cited as *BT I*
Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality by P* Tillich is
pAm I
Ohapter I KIERKmimD* 8 OHXTÏOT OF MAPHfSXOB p*9
Theologians of the Idealist party tried to pomprehend God and reality 
in a metaphysical system, but Kierkegaard denied that this was possible. 
Firstly reality aa a whole cannot be comprehended eyetematioally and 
eeoondly faith cannot be comprehended in the abstract categories of 
objective thought, loth emplricim and idealism fail to discover any 
absolute truth ,«** Borne fixed point of * truth* la nevertheless 
necessary na a basis for living* This truth must be found in 
subjectivity* How could such truth bo discovered^  Perhaps there is 
nothing to be dlsoovered, but only a personal integrity to be established* 
Yet Kierkegaard thinks the subject must be related to some truth outside
himself **. It is not clear whether it matters, or how it matters, what
this objective point of reference should be* There seem no clear 
grounds for discussing where truth should be found, though we may still
discuss the need that it should be found*
Ohapter II KIBBI«ââEP* B AIAblBIB OF BXISTBHOB p*34
for Kierkegaard man’s existence must be understood in terms of a life to 
be lived* Hence decision is basic to man’s existence* And man must 
relate his decision to his life seen as a whole# Decision means 
choosing between possibilities, but to be lost in possibility is not to 
be free# Freedom is the dialectioal element in terms of possibility and 
necessity* What is this ’necessity’? It is a personal limit which 
appears to have a moral character. So freedom seems to demand a standard 
by which to choose *.** If we do not accept our own personal limit or 
standard them we shall reach a point of despair* But even if we accept 
this limit, accepting ourselves as we are seems to leave no ground for 
changing what we are, so we may still despair* Thus the need for m  
Arohimedean point beyond the self is discovered*
3.
Ohapter III HAS KIBHK.mAiBD HIS GM HBTAPHtSIOAD PBB-SOPPOSITIOHS? p*4?
It has been auggasted that Kierkegaard* s rejection of metaphyeioal 
epeomlation is to some extent vitiated by hie own metaphyeioal oommitmente. 
1.) tyeohogrod euggeete that Kierkegaard effecte not a destruction of 
Hegel# 8 oategoriee, but a new juxtaposition of them# But it is not clear 
that Kierkegaard used them as ontological categories at all# Kierkegaard 
did not explicitly develop an ontological system* %schogrod* s 
criticism has another side to it, however# There may be ontological 
implications in what-Kierkegaard says, even though he does not develop 
an explicit ontology# In this case w© could discuss ontological issues 
which are implicit in Kierkegaard# s existentialism# But the fact remains 
that Kierkegaard himself would have remained outside such discussions* •# • 
it) y me 8 0 oil ins* in discussing the same issue, agrees that Kierkegaard 
tries to reject metaphysical, speculation absolutely, but Collins argues 
that this was because the idealist metaphysic was the only kind of 
metaphysic he knew# Oollins holds that the realist metaphysic of 
Thomism is able to meet the challenge of Kierkegaacfd* s existential 
critique# But Gollias fails to show how an existontially rooted system 
cm go beyond giving a phenomenological description #### Kierkegaard* a 
rejection of metaphysics seems decisive, and may be compared with certain 
trends in twentieth century philosophy#
Ohapter IV KXBHKBGAAEB AHD THE CHRISTIAN OOBPm p*63
Kierkegaard examines the problem of the truth of Ghrlstianlty under two 
heads# 1# The problem of establishing the historical truth#
2# The problem of establishing the relation of the historical truth to 
the eternal truth #*#♦ In relation to the historical truth, he suggests 
that historical knowledge is at beat approximation knowledge* But even 
if this were not so w© have the second difficulty that discovering 
historical facts cannot tell us anything about the ’eternal* significance 
of these facts# At this point all the difficulties of discovering any 
eternal truth by the method of speculation appear again #**# But apart
4*
from the spéculative (objective) method of establishing the truth of 
Christianity is there an existential (subjective) method? Does 
Kierkegaard use his existential analysis to demonstrate the inadequacy of 
all non-Christian ways of understanding existence, and does he thus 
establish the truth of the Christian understanding? This would suggest 
that his analysis was based not on his own subjective awareness of 
existence, but upon objective observations ,**« In any case Kierkegaard 
holds that something more than analysis is needed# Man stands in need 
of a divine revelation, and the authority of suoh a revelation relates 
not to the truth of a swi of sentences, but to a truth which is a life,#* 
There remains the problem of how Kierkegaard understood the task of the 
dogmatic theologian, but we have little indication of what he thought 
about this#
FABT II
Chapter 1 IHTBOOTOTOT p.?8
We are left with the problem raised in the first part* does Kierkegaard 
allow any apologetic function to philosophy and the philosopher? Does he 
reject all philosophy or only idealist philosophy? Is there another kind 
of philosophy possible which devotes itself to existential awakening 
Suoh awakening would in any case be an awakening not to the reality of 
faith, but to the possibility of faith ««# Suoh ooneiderstions point us 
towards the theological method proposed by Faul Tillich, Tillich proposes 
a correlation between existential questions and the answers of revelation, 
the question and answer being independent and yet inter#dependent •#•
The use of the words 'question* and 'answer* seem to contrast with 
Kierkegaard' s way of speaking, and might suggest a metaphysical framework. 
Yet Tillich speaks explicitly of existential questions, though he remains 
ready to enter into ontological discussions,
Ghapter II TIIihlOH’S OETOhOGY p.85
Tillioh defines philosophy m  the attempt to ask the question of being.
He thus takes his stand with the metaphysicians or the ontologists*
5.
A* How does he understand the ontological quest? 1* As a phenomenological 
analysis of structures? This does not seem to exhaust his understanding#
R* As a unified vision of reality as a whole? This does not seem to 
define his meaning exactly either# (although if we examine his discussion 
of the way in which we come to ask the question of being at all, it
that it is a kind of 'limit question*, whioh requires something 
like on imaginative vision in answer.) 3. H© sometimes speaks as if
the ontologist requires something almost like a mystical experience of 
reality How these three levels ore related to each other is not quite 
clear* Does Tillioh start with a phenomenological analysis, and then try 
to construct a unifying vision? This would ignore the leap that seems 
to be necessary to pass from an analysis of the facts to a vision of the
whole* How then could a unifying vision bo developed? At least one
critic of Tillioh (vis# u^urdeeg) thinks that it cannot be developed 
except as an expression of a subjective oonviotion# But Tillich seems to 
want to develop his ontology by a process of objective reason.
B. How does he actually pursue the ontological quest? Tillioh* s actual
ontological programme seems to take the form of a derivation of categories, 
which is closely akin to what we find in Kant* s Oritiffle of Fur© Reason*
0* How does ontology fit into the method of correlation? Is ontology 
closely related to the analysis of human exietenoa which is one of the 
correlates of this method? Mo it is not* In foot It is not clear that 
ontology has any place in this method#
Chapter III AMMJtBtn p.lia
Tillioh admits the need to explain what he means by the words * existential ' 
and ’existentialism*. He first discusses the etymology of the word 
existence - to exist means to stand out of nothingness^ , and therefore to be
grounded in nothingness***# The existentialist problem crises out of the 
recognition of the distinction between relative non-being (which is 
potentiality) and existence (whioh is actuality) # Hence a split is 
recognimd between essence and existence* This split was recognized by 
Hate and Aristotle and the scholastics, but not by Hegel * # * Having so 
dasoribed existentialism^  we mm it as a natural ally of Christianity,
6#
sinoô both exi atout lallm and obrlatianity bol lev# we live in a fallen 
world# * * This analyaia presents exiatentinliam as an ontologioal or 
metapbyaioal theory# But Tillioh diatingulshea exiatentialiat thinking 
from what he calls existential thinking* The word existentialist refers 
to a philoBophioal aohool but the word existential refers to a human 
attitude, This distinotlon la irnportmt for the under at mding of 
Tillioh* 0 oonoeption of existential analysis. Here the oomparison with 
Kierkegaard is interesting# Kierkegaard was an existential thinker rather 
thm an existentialist thinker in Tillich's sense# Awareness of existenoe, 
rather thm a theory about exietenoe was the goal of Kierkegaard* s 
thought,#. But how is suoh existential thought possible? On this issue a 
comparison with Karl Jaspers is illuminating# ■ For Jaspers there seemf,v:|é 
be sme possibility of passing from the.phenomenology of oonsoiousne.ss to 
.a ' direct awareness of exf^ .stenae, although the two may not be identified# 
This view seems closely al^ in to Kierkegaard#
Ohapter IV IM TimiGH* $ M M G D  p.141
I* Tillioh* s disoussion of revelation proceeds as follows:
A 1# Firstly some methodologioal remarks# Our approaoh to the study of 
révélation must be pWnomenologioal# But this is only t-rue with 
reservations* This phenomenological approach would nomally start by 
taking a typical example# In this ease we want not a typioal but a 
aritiaal example however#### $# Tillioh now goes on to dlsouss the marks 
of revelation: it should reveal whet is essentially my.sterious, it should
be given in a slgn-eveat, or miracle and it should be received in eootaey. 
It is not clear that these marks are in fact derived from a oritioal 
example, but we shall have to return to that later### 3# The mediums of 
revelation are then distinguished, as. nature, groups, individuals and 
finally the word* # # # 4* The dynmaios of revelation are discussed in terras 
of original and dependent revelations*
3* Having thus discussed the meaning, of revelation he now goes on to 
discuss Actual Revelation and Beality# The disousslon so far is said to 
have proceeded in the light of actual revelation anyway# (but it is not 
clear that this is so#) Of actual revelation he says: 1# For Ohristiana
7*
the revelation of Jeans m  the Ohrist is the final revelation, it la 
final because it has the power of negating itself without losing itself,
This criterion of finality is drawn from the final revelation itself,.#.
3* This event is not Isolated but has a preparatory history,, #4# This 
revelation is not to be separated from salvation (i#e* making men whole),,
5, This revelation overcomes the conflict between autonomy and heteronomy,.
6, Between absolutism md relativism,,, 7, Between formalism and 
emotionalism,,, 8, The ground of this revelation is the divine life,,,
9, The logos element in this divine life provides the key to the proper 
understanding of revelation as the Word of God,
XX, Assessment of this understanding of revelation*
Does Tillich really move from the actuality of the final revelation?
If this is what he latondsji does the form of his system belie his real 
intentions?.,, Is final revelation the only original revelation? Is 
knowing, about, the event of revelation.the same as receiving revelation?
Gan the question of revelation arise outside a specific reception of 
revelation?
XXX, How does this view of revelation compare with the view of Kierkegaard?
Chapter V THE MfROD OF COEHEhATXOH p,179
How can two factors be both independent and inter***d0p©ndent (as Tillioh 
says his correlates are)? Perhaps it is a case of partial independence.,*
In any case both the mmmm and the question are said to be enclosed in the 
theological circle, although the material'out of which the question is 
formulated Is collected independently. Sow is this material to be 
discovered then? Here let im compare our earlier discussions of Kierkegaard 
and indeed our comparison with Jaspers too.*. Awareness of existence is 
seen as a preliminary to preaching the gospel in both Tillioh and 
Kierkegaard#,, Is this 'natural th#log^ '*?,# How is this awareness of 
existence related to correct,information about the phenomenon of man?,,.
How are doctrinal formulations related to existential awareness or to 
knowledge abm%t existence?,## Has ontology a place in this whole process? 
Perhaps the fact that m m  is confronted with ultimate (ontological?) 
questions is one of the relevant facts about existence which must booms 
material out of whioh one of th© questions of theology Is to be formulated*. 
The doctrine of creation is seem as such an existential question, (The
8.
question of being as it might arise in theology)*** The oonversation 
between the theologian mà the scientist or philosopher may still be 
inevitable, but theolo^ is now seen as oonaerned essentially with 
existential questions#
Appendix to Part II, p*gOO
The present aooount of fillioh'n method is not based on a thorough 
investigation of his - whole ' sy stem, but rather on m  ©sqîîoration of his 
methodological proposals# We should perhaps fill out our account, however, 
with exposition of Tillich's discussion of the source and norm of 
systmatic theology*** The Bourses he distinguishes'are^  1# The Hew 
Temtaiaont documents t# The Old Testaient documents 3# Ohuroh History,
The first two of these must be talien up into a- Biblical thchlogy, and 
the third must be taken up into ' dogmatic s'* 4* There is yet a fourth
source in the material presented by history of religion and culture,..
These sources are received in the mediuïs of * experience-*' and they are 
submitted to a material norm which is the Mew Being in Jesus as the Ohrlst*
Conclusion p « 209
Does Kierkegaard's existentialism point towards Tillich's theological 
methodf The problem of subjectivism must be re-examined in this connection* 
Does Kierkegaard really deny the possibility of proceeding from an 
existential to an ontological analysis? In the end he does# But does 
Tillich, on the other hand# expos© an existential basis for the ontological 
quest itself? perhaps he does, but it remains a question whether suoh a 
quest can in fact be undertaken by objective reason*#* Surely Tillioh 
himself would deny the possibility of finding God by ontological reason.
But is the question of God thus reduced to the question of a subjective 
concern: a concern which is ultimate? Tillioh seems uncertain about this,.
In any case his method doqs in the end seem to leave the ontological 
questions outside the province of theology* The theologian Is concerned 
with the actual possibility, and the significance for the subject, of 
existence in faith.*, Such m  understanding is not without implications 
for theological discussion# e#g, discussions of the presence of Christ
8a#
in the ©ttoharlstÿ. or the dieeuesion of Otoiet'a person and nature##.* 
lut cm theologians confine dieouseione of the nature of God to this 
existential level? Is the thelst/atheist discussion a matter of 
indifference to theologiaal fomulation? Ferhaps if we took up ■ 
Tillioh's hint that God should 1© defined in terms of 'ultimate oonoeîWî* 
it would suggest that It is# This point seems to he explored even 
more thoroughly ' hy H# Hiohard Mielmhr than hy Tillioh# But when we 
follow Miehuhr’s discussion to its end we find he hrings us hack to the 
oonoept of being (though not perhaps to any clear ontology of 
transcendence)* levertheless.this passing glance at Miebuhr’a argument 
does seem to help us to understand Tillich's position better*##.. In 
the end Tillich's methodology does mom to point towards an existential 
theology which leaves ontology to the philosophers# And this conclusion 
mùy have real significance for the theologians#
I, KiœœAAaB*
GHAF» I $ KIIBKKGAARD’ 0 GRITlqW Of IMiUPHTSIOS#
It seems inevitable that the theclogim ^ould make some 
claim to be engaged in a rational eystematlo aotivity# To deny 
this would be to abandon the very poeeibiltty of there being any 
organized thou#t of a methodical logical kind within the province 
of theology, and In thin ease no theological dieoueeion would be 
possible. And to aooept this necessity of rationality opens the 
way to defining the purpose of the theologian m  being to discover 
the rational basis of faith, or of belief. 0uoh a definition of 
theological purpose would itself be open to widely differing 
interpretations, of oourse# Bit it may well lead on to the 
oonviotion that the real responsibility of the theologian is to 
disoover a rational systematic compréhension of reality and of God.
In other words the theologian is charged with the formulation of 
a metaphysioal system.
It would seem fair to say that this is how many Hegelian 
idealist theologians would have understood their task. For them 
it appeared to be in and through the metaphysioal system that the 
faith must be understood* And it was against suoh metaphysioal 
system-building that Kierkegaard directed his attack upon philo­
sophical theology or philosophical Ghristianity. We may distinguish 
two sides to this attack* In the first place Kierkegaard questioned 
the possibility of formulating any absolutely 'true' metaphysioal
System# And secondly he insisted that in case faith could 
not, from its very nature, be grasped in the objective oategoriee 
of abstract apeoulative thinking*
Kierkegaard saw the metaphysioian m  engaged in a thought 
project whioh aimed at diaooverlng the truth by a prooeee of pure 
reason# But he immediately saw in this situation a fundamental 
difficulty which would prevent suoh a metaphyeioian from ever 
finally achieving him object. This difficulty emerges when we 
ask ourselves how this philosophical ' truth* is to be understood#
Is it comparable with the truth of matter of - fact statements about 
the world, or met wo sw It I# in sme sense more abstract than that? 
In either case we run into difficulties, Kierkegaard thinks#
' Whether the truth is defined more empirically as the conformity of 
thought with being, or more idealistically as the conformity of 
being with thought# it is, in either case, important carefully to 
note what is meant by being' * *
Suppose- the metaphysician does define the truth for which 
he is seeking 'more empirically', can he really hope to achieve 
hie final object? Is he not reduced to describing the limitless 
process of becoming, which constitutes the empirical world?
* -EkSj P.169
II,
If being *** is understood as empirical being* # * everything must
be understood in terms of becoming# * #
#
Of oouree an empiricist philosopher might not be disturbed 
by this disclosure of the limits of his work, but this would surely 
be because he would make no claim finally to disoover the truth, 
luiyway* If we define truth empirioally as the oonformity of 
thought with being, then presumably truth is e%)ressed in tme 
statements about the world* Here one is reminded of the opening 
proposition of Wittgenstein’s fraotatus I^ ogioo^ Fhilosophioua:
’The world is everything that is the case#’ Our searoh for truth 
beoomes a matter of making a libt of all those things that are the 
ease# But if our description of being is to be complete only when 
this list of facts is complete, then we can never complete suoh a 
desoription# So long as we are dealing with empirical being 
’ eveiything must be understood in terms of beeming* ’ Since 
’everything that is the oase* is constantly changing if you could 
list it all today, then tomorrow your list would be out of date*
To this I suppose a persistent empirioist might say that we 
need not stop at listing everything that is the ease, as if it 
were all to be desoribed in static propositions* We may indeed go 
on to develop some Idlnd of logic which will enable us to predict
't Post script P*.
12*
all the future changes in what im the ease* In this event we could 
list everything that is the ease today and predict what It will he 
tomorrow and the d«^ after that and so on* Suoh a vision would 
certainly do justice to Kierkegaard's claim that erapirioal ree^ ity 
is in a state of heooming# hut for this very reason it suggests a 
prooess to which there is no end* We might feed all our faots 
into an eleotronto computer, which might go on desoriMng ever new 
states of affairs^  and if we were asked for the truth about the 
world we might point to our computer and "There it is, but 
it is not finished yet, and as a matter of fact it never will be 
finished* •'
Whether suoh overall deterministio logic could be discovered 
is not really in question heVe* ^ The point is simply that even 
if it ware discovered It would make no di#erence to Kierkegaard'a 
claim that the empirical re,aim is a res^ m- of becoming and therefore 
not a realm in which absolute truth can be discovered# Of course, 
as we have alrma# pointed out, the empiricist may well agree with 
this, for he may well reject any claim to discover truth in any 
final or absolute sense# Perhaps it is true that this road leads 
not to m  understanding of being but only to an understanding of 
the pattern of becoming; but is it not the whole point of the
# 1er is it Within the scope of this discussion- to consider whether 
some empirical principle such as the second law of thermodynamics 
m$y m#e it possible to predict an end to the process of becoming 
itself* For a discussion of this point see Stephen fcalmin' s 
essay 'Gontempcra# Scientific %thole^' in Metaphysical Beliefp* 
edited by Alistair McIntyre (SW Press)*-
u #
Cmpirioist position, that the attempt te imder#and being itself 
is a mi'etake#
This debate with empirieiem la never worked out in hll its 
detail by Kierkegaard, however* Be 1# much mere ooneemed with 
the oritique of the absolute .idealism of Hegel* , The Hegelian’ & 
olmim to have oomprehended the absolute in him #stem was a claim 
whioh Kierkegaard oould not aoeept# This does not neoesimrily 
mean that he tejeoted the meaningful elgnifioanoe of terms mioh as 
’being’ or ’the absolute’, but he oertainly did think they were
 ^ - V , ■ '
being mieueed and mieunderstood by idealist philoaophere* The 
way in which Kierkegaard himself may have been prepared to use 
such philoeophio# -oonoepte ia something which we may hope will 
emerge in the eowee Of our disouseiom of hie thought.,, but for the 
moment m  i^ ould rather ■ oonoonttate on hie critique of the olaime ■ 
■of idealim#
T&atever the empirioimt may achieve in hie pursuit of 
knowledge, he does not in the end comprehend being, but only 
becoming* We muat therefore understand th# word ' being’ moh more 
abetraotly# It i# in this abstract eeneo that the word is used 
in the idealist formula that truth is to be defined as ’the 
oonfotmity of being with thought#’ But Kierkegaard complains that 
this formula reduoes ’being’ to a product of thought i that is a 
product of th# thought'with whioh we say, by definition it must.
omform# 'Being* is what thought assert# it t#.. be and the 
definition of truth a## no mom than that truth i# the eonfomity 
of our thought with our thought# And so wo are loft with a 
tautology# Eogol’# oomprahonding of reality ha# thus been 
aohiovod by equating reality with thought thus loaing all touch 
with the fact# of the world.
To thi# it might he ohjootad that im from losing touch 
with the fact# #f the world, Hegel produced a logio whioh he 
applied to all the fact# of the world# Henoe it may he olW.mad 
that for all it# .aWtraotion Hegel’# aYOtem 1# just a# much 
related to the f#t# of the world a#, for example, any system of 
geometry# Huolid developed a geometry which could he applied to 
the spatial rel#tion#hip# of thing# a# they mi#, in the worlds 
a Spatial geom##y# itgel developed a geomot# which oould he 
applied to the whole of reality, to heing itself# Ferhap# an 
Hegelian might want to Oidl it a geometry of oxi.#enoes an existential 
geometry, altho%h in Kierkegaard* # teWinology this would he a 
eeriou# mienwer# %n Kierkegaard* # teminolog' it should rather 
he called a gemet# of essences an essential geometry#
Of course we omnot assume that any geometry will have any 
real application until we have tested it again# the realities of 
the existing world# An a .prior^  assumption that it can he 
applied can he made neither for the spatial geometry of Euolld
1$.#
nor 'for '#o emaernW#! geomotiy of Hogel'* Hm#e if #o #o mally 
to undoratand Hegel* n logic mo m kind of motmphyoloml geometry, 
mppliomblo to mil exietmoe, then we must test it to see how it 
mpplies and wtethor" it works or not# furthermore suoh a gemetry 
will tell u# nothing about the aotuml faots of the world, even if 
we decide it has m genuine area of application# Euclid's 
geometry o-an, within the sphere of its own application, tell us the 
possible ways in %#ioh things may be spatially related to eaoh 
other, but it oanmot tell us the aotual things the?© -are in space# 
similarly if Hegel* s- logic is to be understood as being this kind 
of abstract geometry it will tell us nothing of the facts of 
reality# It will, tell us only of possible patterns of existenoe#
It sots aside the aotual facts of the world* This seems to be 
what Kierkega#d had In mind when he wrote that ' abstraot thought 
considers both possibility and reality# but its oonoept of reality 
is a false refleotion, since the medium in which the concept is 
thought is not mallty but possibility* Abstract thought can get 
hold of reality bnly by nullifying it# and this nullifioatlon of 
■reality consists of Iransforming it into possibility**#
Kierkegaard aWts that abstract thought does pmserve a relationship 
to the reality from which it-abstracts* But in 'the end it only 
describes the patterns the possible patterns 'Of existence# or
# Postscript F#gff
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the patterns of hecoming# Such ahetraot thinking la really no 
different from that development of a predlotive loglo whioh we 
auggested the empiriolst would he quite prepared to erohraoe. But 
at this level we oould hardly claim to have dealt with the question 
of * being’ in any final and absolute sense# The ’abstract problem 
of reality’ is not the problem of grasping the absolute, but 
merely of understanding the patterns of possibilities* But to 
raise th© abstraot problem of reality ’is not nearly so difficult a 
problem as it is to raise and to answer the question of what it 
means that this definite smething is a reality’ for ’this definite 
something is just what abstract thought abstracts from*’ *
Here Kierkegaard is raising a problem which he believes cannot be 
solved either by statements about what is the case or by logical 
expositions of ’possibility*, for neither of these will really 
penetrate the inner reality# or the ’meaning* # of oonorete 
particular existence*
As to what Kierkegaard really means by the comprehension 
of the reality of ’ this definite something* # we may hope that this 
will emerge from our further analysis of his thought. For the 
moment We may soy that whatever he wanted# he did not find it in 
the speculative system of He#l. He admitted that the Hegelians 
claimed to go beyond the realm of abstract thought an we have 
considered it so far# for the system must be understood as reaching
* Postscript P.
IT*
beyond ’abstract thought' and entering the realm of ’pur© thought’# 
But it is just at this point# Kierkegaard hold©, that the Hegelians 
lose all touch with reality# ’The relation which abstraot thought 
still eustaiu© with that from which it abstmote# is something 
whioh pur© ' thmght innocently, or thoughtlessly ignores# Here 
is rest for eveasy domht, here is the eternal positive truth and 
Whatever else one may he pleased to say# That is# pure thought 
is a phantom' *'
Whatever aooount the Hegelian may give of his ayetem# 
Kierkegaard denies that he has suooeeded in grasping, or fully 
understanding, the contingent unique reality of particular existenoe# 
Indeed# since the Hegelian is moving in the realm of the eternally 
neeessary truths of pure reason# he omnot aooount for the 
contingent heooming of the ©mpirioal world* The movement from 
premise to oonolusion within a logioal system is no real movement 
in the sense in whioh we understand movement in the realm of 
contingent events# for in the logioal system the oonolusion is 
already implied in the premises# ’In the oonstruotion of a logioal 
system it is neoessary first and foremost to take oare not to 
inolude in it ai^thing whioh is swhjeot to m  existential dialeotlo# 
anything which is only heoause it exists, or has existed, and not 
simply hooause it is# from this it follows quite simply that
w Fostsoript f#278-279*
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Hegel's unparalleled discovery, the ambjeot ef m  unparalleled an 
admiration# nmely the introduction of movement Into logic # la a 
sheer oonfueion of logical eoienoe #*, it ia surely strange to 
make movement fundamental in a sphere^  where movement in unthinkable* * * 
thus the claim of a logical s^yatem (any logical oymtem). to 
incorporate into itself the category of ’m.ovment', in order that 
it might aoeeunt for contingent existemoe, met be rejeoted*
We may by now be ready to oonolude, despite anything that 
has been said to the oontrary# that Kierkegaard* s thought leads 
inevitably# and perhaps in spite of his own intention# to a rejeotioa 
of every attempt to taow the Truth in a# final sens© of the word#
When a man asks the question of truth in an ultimate sense he does 
not know what he is asking* If he turns towards abstraot truth 
then the most he can hope for is to develop a complete logioal 
pattern, revealing all the possible modes of existenoe* If he turns 
toward oonorete reality he may set out to list everything that is 
the ease in all its partioularity# If this is ’metaphysios* then 
it turns out to be no more than the kind of tMng whioh is 
systematioally undertaken by the emplriO'al soiontisti the developing 
of structural geometries and the oataloguing of true propositions*
Guoh metaphysics oould oertainly disoover endless facts and oould 
dimover patterns of relations between f'aotsi thus the metaphyeioian 
oould make endless judgments' whioh were tme, but this would never
# Pestsoript PP#99*^ 100*
m m  to add np to anythlmg'- which oould b# #W,l#d 'Reality# '
This kind of aaalyeie of metaphyeios might well point 
towards a radical empiricist, or even a poeitiviet oonolueion, hut 
we muet etill ineiet that Kierkegaard does not draw such aonolusione 
from hie argument# He certainly rejected the poeeihility of finally 
penetrating to an understanding of ’being* by way of apeculative 
reason, hut for all that he did not conclude that the desire to 
comprehend reality was of m  importance. The quest for some kind 
of ultimate truth was for Kierkegaard a matter of the greatest 
importance, for he held that we need such truth m  a hasls for 
our living* Thus the question of truth is m m  m  the question of 
'the truth upon which I can has© my eternal happiness*-’ But such 
truth can he found neither in collecting true propositions nor by 
completing a speculative system* tn the moat general eense we 
might say that Kierkegaard’s question is the question *?Hcw should 
I live?", and it Is In the end heCause the Hegelians claimed that 
their system contained the answer to this question too# that 
Kierkegaard launched his polemic again# tkm# One can readily 
see how this concern to find a basic for living dominates all his 
writings* He analyses different levels of living - the ’ Stages
on ïiife’.s - In order that he may penetrate .further Into this
problem; he ■criticizes the lack of seriousness of the scholar who 
cm pursue his researches in the indifference of objectivity, 
hooause the conclusions reached by such scholarship are of no vital
20#
-significance for how mkolm should live mow# And in the 
awe spirit he launohoe an attack upon the very erudition of the 
biblical m&kolm)p who dofondo himself ag#nst God's Word by hie 
ooholarShips, by oonoontrating on the variant readings and the view# 
of all the different oommantatora# so that he never faeee the real 
question ■’■lave t done this? do t act aoo<^ dingly?*  ^ ' And it I# 
as part of thi$ name quest that we must understand hie critique of 
metaphyeioe# The epeoulative philosopher at beat offered an 
objective eyetem# which in all its objectivity and complet one as 
(if it ever really could be complete) failed to concern the 
individual person with this immediate and paaaionate queetlom 
’low efeall I live now? On what can I base my eternal happlneaa?’
Having recognized this background to Kierkegaard’ a attack 
upon Hegel# w# may now understand better hie refu.eal to 'rest in a 
relativiatic ompirielm* ■ For if -the empiricist claims that there 
is no way of going beyond a final relativism this etill leaves 
Kierkegaard’ a question untouched# ■ If we cm know nothing beyond 
an Indifferent collection of empirical facts, then we still I'sck 
that ’ Archimedean pcimt’ which' 'Kierkegaard maintained was necessary 
&& & basis for life#
m  James Gollin# im his book .Kierkegaard notes that
in his early notebooks Kierkegaard groups his reflections around 
certain strM%lmg images, and key notions# m# standing among which 
is the symbol of the Archimedean poipt* which recurs in the early 
entries in the Journal" entries and Î04 in howrie’ s
selections from Kierkegaard’s Journal)
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Hence Kierkegaard wishes to change the direction of the 
philosophical qaeet# We may question whether he finally rejects 
the endeavour to understand ’being’ or ’reality’ in what he might 
himself have called an ’eternal* sense, but we should certainly 
have to admit that if he does accept such an endeavour he re-crientates 
it completely* To develop a complete speculative system is to 
lose touch with existence* But the only reality to which man 
sustains a real relationship is his own existence and it is in 
discovering a basis for thi,s. reality that we shall have discovered 
the ’truth’ about ’being*. Hence Kierkegaard’s aim is quite 
different from the aim of the metaphysician* He starts with the 
need to discover a fixed Archimedean point which may form a basis 
for his life, or his personal existence; a point which is not only 
the truth; but ^ he, way the tr^ th and the lifp# But this means that 
he must start from the very point at which he knows existence: 
in his own existence as a subject* And so he enunciates his 
principle that subjectivity is truth*
But how is the discovery- of this- truth which is known in 
eubjectivity posaibl#? Am we to Investigate' the life of the 
subject according to the methods of the anthropological sciences 
and perhaps especially according to the method of psychology?
# In the MstMTlPl, he argues*
could give reality in the sense of actuality and not 
merely validity in the sense of possibility it would also have the 
power to take awey existence and so take away, from the existing 
individual the only reality to which he sustains a real relationship
namely his own#." (cp-#eit* F#295)
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Glearly thia wmlâ to misa the point. 8noh pgyohologioal tmth 
is still within the %*ealm of ohjeotive knowledge and to know all 
the facts relating to psychological and physiological mechanisms 
Is not to come to tcBme with the snhjectivity of ony own personal 
#5cistence.^  Tst if we not to discover? this * snhjeotive' tmth 
hy means of an anthsfopological investigation how shall we discover 
it? Oan there he some new kind of philosophy# for example# which 
will replace thO' speculative metaphysics of idoaliem and will lead 
us to the auhjective awareness of existence? 3?#rhaps we might 
suggest that the discovery of the *#chimed##x point* will itself 
emerge from this mh#otive awareness# or m  the other hoed that a 
genuine suhjective awareness will emerge from the discovery of an 
*irehimedean point*# hut in mw case we seem to he concerned with 
an awareness of existence which is more fundamental thm% the 
discoveries of '*objective knowledge#* But might this not mean 
that it is more fundamental, or perhap# more primitive# than any 
conceptual knowledge whatever? It could he suggested that this is 
why lierkegaatd so often speaks of * being in the truth* rather than 
using the more usual phrase • knowing the truth* .
Kierkega^d is not himself unaware of this difficulty, hut 
he does not in the end reject thought, as if we must he left to has#
w Br. ^ysenk in his hook speak# of
psycho-analysts who *c<msSlously rejdct'''''scientific methodology 
in favour of mihjectivity*, and it may he claimed that such, 
analysts mm moving in the same area as Kierkegaard in his aim 
to establish the truth which i# subjectivity# In the present 
context I refer only to psychologists who would claim that 
their work is based on the objective methods of the natural 
sciences however.
cur lives m  a kind of imexpresmed style# which finds no expression 
in our thought foms at all# Be rather suggests that if one would 
grasp the truth# in his sens# of truth, then one* s thinking must 
have that oharaoter about it which will unite It with the real 
basis of personal existenae# It is indeed preoisely in this sens# 
that truth is suhjeotlvlty# Suhjeotive tefleotion is a refleotion 
which is united with# m  which, we might arises out of the 
most passionate personal concern of the thiïtori and it is just 
this relationship between reflection and the hasio passion of the 
thinker* s existence which places such a thinker in the truth# 
Kierkegaard puts this point at its strongest when he writes;
*when the question of twth is raised suhjcotively., reflection is 
directed suhjeotlvely to the nature of the individual’s relationship^  
if only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the 
individual la in the truth, even If he should happen to he thus 
related to what is not true#’
Wo have suggested that Kierkegaard* a conception of truth
here la net something quit© independent of, or more primitive thm%, 
our thought g since to he in the truth requires that one’s thinking 
has m certain character about it which will mite it with the basis 
of subjective existence#- But can we really ape# of txtith as 
something relating to the character of a person* # thiiîklng
# Postscript p.#Its.
(In a footnote he reminds us that what is at issue her© is 
essential truth i the truth which is essentially related to 
existence#)
without my reference to the content of what in thought?
Kierkegaard eeeme to think w# #an, if w© are to aooept the above 
quotation- from the Bostsoript* But- in this-, ease we might thi#: it 
more honest and lees oonlUeing to stop using the word * truth* 
altogether* If to hold a eonviotion with suffloient passion i# 
in itself fluffioient to he ’in the ,truth’ then the question whether 
the paoflionately held oonviotion is in fact true m  longer mmm 
' to arise.#- Hero the idea of truth meema to have been abandoned 
altogether#
At this point we may want to r##.fltate mx auggeetion that 
the truth Kierkegaard apeaks of is more primitive than thought.
What we might eay now la that it ia more primitive than any oontent 
of thought. It la more primitive than any oonoeptual formulation 
of belief* Hence we may in the end deeoribe the truth which is 
subjectivity aa a kind of paaeionate peraonal integrity, which 
informs our living me we grapple with the concrete complexity of 
existence» but which has nothing whatever to do with any objective 
question of truth#
For Kierkegaard, however, the matter does not end with 
perflonal inte#ity, as if he had no interest in the object of truth, 
that is the object in which the passioamte believer actually believes, 
After all his problem in the end is the problem of becoming a 
^hristian and in his journal we find him writing that * truth from 
A I the ^hristian point of view does not lie in the m;bject (as Socrates
understood it) but in a revelation whiak must- be proclaimed#* ^
tWn is this aoaount of Christimi truth tO' be rao.onolled with 
the principle that ##jwtivity is t.ruth? If truth does not lie 
in the' suhjeot» ho# can we apeak cf raising the question of truth 
subjeotively in much a way that *'if only the mode of the individual’s 
relationship la In the truth, the individual la In the truth?*
Perhaps we might try to solve this dilemma by suggesting 
that while Kierkegaard himself, from the maturity of his faith, 
realised that * truth from the Ohriotian point of view does not lie 
in the mhjeot, lohannee Climaous, the imaglmsy author of the 
Postscript did net share this maturity of faith» and was opposing 
ohjeotlvity #n philoeophioal ground^ which were independent of the 
Christian viewpoint# Wo might even suggest that Eierkagaard used 
the person of yohanms Olimaoua deliberately to overstate his ease#
It is doubtful whether moh explanations' are aooeptable, however, 
since he moerds in his jm%mal that Cllmaou# himself saw the need 
for an ohjeat of faith#. *Im all that is usually said aboi# dohennes 
dllmaous being purely subjective and so on’ » he writes, * people 
have forgotten» in addition to everything else oonoreto about him, 
that in one of the last seotione he ahowe that the curious thing is i 
that there is $ ’how’ which has this qt^ ality, that-if M  ic truly 
given, then the ’what* is also given; and that It Is the *how* of 
’faith*.* Here quite certainly we have inwardness at its maximum
# journals IK A B# (howrie Ho*
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proving to bo objootivity one# again# And this is an aopeot of
tho prlnoiplo of subjootivity whioh, so far m  X know, has never 
before been preeemtod or worked out.* *
%ne wo can certainly say that for Kierkegaard, md alee 
it eeemo for his peemdonyra Johannoe Glimaoue, the object of faith 
io not dlaraioaed aa a matter of indifferenoe* If we merely 
asserted that for Kierkegaard there has to be some object of faith, 
this would not in itself be enough to defend him from the charge of 
pure subjeotivism, for it may be a matter of complete indifferenoe 
what the object should be# So long as the ’how* of my faith had 
the right quality the question of the ’what* of my faith would be 
unimportant and ohoioa of a particular object of faith would 
be an entirely subjective matter# Tot the extract we have just 
quoted from the j^ ournal at least suggests that faith cannot begin 
with m  entirely arbitrary ohoiee, for Kierkegaard speaks here of 
the ’what* of faith as being something given# and it is given 
together with the passion of subjectivity# fhis might suggest 
that the passion is, as it were, generated by the true object of 
faith# Kierkegaard* s view is not as simple as that, however, or 
he could hardly contemplate the possibility of the subjective 
thinker being related, in this subjective mode, to what is not true# 
Tot he does explicitly entertain this possibility (i#e# through 
the thought of Glimaous) # He not only refers to the possibility
# Journals X t A (bowrie Ho. 1021)
27#
of a man being in the tmth, even though he is related to what ia
not true, but he go## on to illuetrat# thia possibility by
ooneidering the Ghriatian and the idolater at prayer. *If one 
who lives in the laidat of Ghriatendom goe# up to the house of God,
the house of the true God, with the true oonoeption of God in hi#
îcnowledge, and preqr#, but pray# in a false spirit| and one who 
live# in an idolatrou# oommunity pray# with the entire paasion of 
the infinite, although hi# oyea rest upon the image of an idol i 
where ia there most truth? fhe one pray# In truth to God, though 
he worship# an idol; the other pray# falsely to the true God, and 
henoe worship# in fact an idol*’  ^ It i# quite clearly euggeeted 
here that the true passion of subjectivity may in fact arise in the 
pfesenoe of m  untrue idol; not in the absence of any object at 
all to be sure, but in the presence of #n object which i# 
inappropriate*
It i# hard to know what is Kierkegaard* # final solution 
to this dilemma* We have already seen tbat although he speaks in 
hi# Journal of inwardness at its maximum preying to be objectivity 
again, ho nevortheles# regards this as *an aspect of the principle 
of subjectivity which so far as X know has never been worked out,’ 
and we may well fool that it is,an aspect which Kierkegaard himself 
never fully worked out* We may have one further indication of the
* Postscript P*l79-loG* 
w* Ibid.
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direction of hi# own thli^ing about thia matter in the aeoond volume 
of Bither/Or where he write# ’therefore, even if n man were to 
ohooae the wrong he will nevertheleaa diaoover, preoiaely by reason 
of the oner# with which he ohoee, that he had ohoaen the wrong.
For the ehoioe being made with the whole inwardneaa of his 
personality, hi# nature is purified and he himself brought into 
immediate relation to the eternal Power whose omnipresence 
interpenetrates the whole of existenoe#’ #is passage certainly 
seems to bear on the case of the man who, though he is * in the truth* 
by virtue of the mode of his relationship, is nevertheless related 
to what is untrue* It seems to suggest that he will oome to 
reoognise the untruth of what he believes in, or perhaps will even 
begin to see beyond his limited object of faith towards that whloh 
is indeed the truth* Does this mean Kierkega#d,. looking from hi# 
Ohristian viewpoint, would have held that a Buddhist, who related 
himself to the Buddha in all the passion of subjeotivity, would 
inevitably reoognise that the way of the Buddha Is untrue? It is 
by no means clear that this is his view and on# would hardly be 
justified in asorlMng suoh a belief to him on the basis of this 
quotation from Bither/Om. In the end w# »st oonolude that this 
is something that he never worked out with suffioient oars himself#
Althou# Kierkegaard may never give a final and clear 
reply to those Who m m m  him of sheer subjeotivism, however, oertain
# Bithe^er, #1# II. F.141
facts about hiu position have emerged ftaa tbim âieoueaion which 
we might now attempt to eumm#ise.
First ef all the mbjeotive believer is certainly 
represented as believing in aomethlng. His passion is not to be 
understood merely as an enthusiasm for life# It relates him to a 
partioular object of belief# At the same time the belief in this 
*objeot* is not founded on objeotive reasons# It is ’an objective 
unoertainty held fast in m  appropriation-prooess of the most 
passionate inwardness#’ ^ And we might add here that it is 
important that this ’objective uncertainty should be maintainod»
For this very uncertainty seems to contribute to the intensity of 
our belief# ’fhe sum of all this is an objective uncertainty’ 
he writes, and adds ’but it is for this very reason that the
inwardness becomes as intense as it is I
does not mem, however# that he Is thinking of a 
kind of subjectivity in which the subject is quite free to find the 
truth in any object that takes his fancy# For he does speak as 
if the truth in some sense resides in the object# We have already 
quoted his own Journal to this effect, and here we mi^t add c\ 
sentence frm his book on Adler in which he says that the object of 
the Christian’s faith (namely that the eternal once came into 
existence in time) is ’not something which mm are to test’ but
# Postscript# F»1$B
On Bevelation and Authority# P. 98
'the paradox by which men are to be teeted#'
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Whatever be the final answer of Kierkegaard to this 
charge of eub|eetlvism, one thing surely emerges quite clearly from 
this whole disoueeion, namely that Kierkegaard believes there is a . 
challenge facing eve?^ person to engage in the most serious possible 
way in the task of discovering the truth and committing himself 
whole**heartedly to this discovery* And this 'truth' is something 
which emerges from the engagement itself# the point is well put 
by Hermann Diem who writes that 'truth is no longer to be conceived 
as an objective statement about certain relations of being, but as 
a form of existence in which such relations are actualized* Hence 
truth is "not something objective suggesting that the knowledge of 
it is ooncemed with what is to be found in existence as m  object, 
but implies rather that knowledge is something related to the knower, 
who is essentially an existing individual, and that all real insight 
is essentially related to that which exists mû, to existence itself# " 
Being in truth therefore implies a process which is never complete'*
Here Biem suggests (in the last sentence of the quotation) 
that for Kierkegaard to be 'in the truth* means to be embarked, to 
be ' in the way' # And this leads us on to one further contrast 
with objective truth# Objective truth is reached at the conolusion 
of an investigation or an argument, but this subjective mod© of
* On Hevelaticn and Authority, ?.g8*
** Hermann Biemi Kierkegaard's Bialegtic^  of .lxiste,nce * P#3S 
(Diem's qaotaticn 'here''is from W e  P P*i77 of the
English translation)#
truth does not seem to achieve the final status of a oonolusion 
at all* to this it might he ohjeoted that though the ’truth* for 
Kierkegaard had not the final statue of a oonolueion it had 
nevertheleee a final statue i the status of a #o,nvereiqn*
Kierkegaard was certainly prepared to speak of the oonversion of a 
disciple hut I think it is clear that this was not intended to 
suggest that the oonvert had now reached the end in his search for 
truth* Thn life of the disciple, as Kierkegaard understood it, 
had to he lived in the mode of subjective inwardness which was the 
mode of the aonvorsion itself* thus the moment of conversion must 
be present at every mment of the dlsaiplo’s life and the truth 
must eonstantly be disoovered and appropriated anew* We get a hint 
of this in a footnote to the Pqstsor;ipt in which he say© that 
’ even the most oertain of all things, a revelation, so ipso beooiaes 
dialeotioal whenever I attempt to appropriate it# Even the most 
fixed of things, an infinite negative resolve, the infinite form 
for God’s presenoe in the individual at onoe becomes dialeetioal#’ 
Thus it seems that even our confession of faith must parthka of 
this dialeotiOGà oharaoter#
a© far wo have discussed the truth whiqh is subjectivity 
both in its relation to its own ’ ob|eot’ and in relation to ordinary 
objective truth# There is on© question we now put which oould 
serve to shm^ em. some of the dlsoussion which has gone before*
Is this truth of which Kierkegaard speaks disoumsible? If truth
i2.
is a way to W  lived then it saem® whether it can be
diSQueeed* We dan I suppose talk about the mode of our living,
and we might even dleoues whether it is an appropriate mode, but if
dlsooverlng the truth is a matter of living 'in the way’ then the
discovery itself is made in living rather than in talking about livings
If this is so then muet we not $ay that truth is a private matter,
to be disoovered by the individual? * And surely this remains true
even if we give due weight to the fact that our living itself has
##communal and historioal dimensions# To insist that my existence 
is set in the context of a world, a oommunity md a history is not 
to deny that it is nevertheless existence. Her is it to deny 
that my living relationship to anything which I call ’the truth’ 
is a relationship which is rooted in gr living and choosing and 
deciding#
At this point it would seem that whether we think 
Kierkegaard’s position ia lost in irrational subjectivism or not, 
the fact hm emerged that for him there is no place left for 
philosophical discussion in detemining the truth on which I can 
base my eternal happiness# But we should also remember that he did 
not reject the possibility of talking about the importance of such 
truth# This truth could not itself be discovered by discussion,
# We have already had occasion to question the appropriateness of 
using the word ’truth’ in this ’mbjectiv#’ sense* (above P# 24) 
but we are here using the word as we believe it is used by 
Kierkegaard himself#
A fact that we m#y swetimes think Kierkegaard* with his emphasis 
on ’the single ono’^ is inclined to forget#
but we could, and Kierkegaard did, disouee the need for moh a 
truth t the need fm what he called an Archimedean point* Hence, 
while Kierkegaard rejected the path of metapîiyeioal epeoulation, he 
still embarked on a dieodeaion of the nature of man' s exietenoe, 
in order that he might dieoover how man' a eubjeotivity is to be 
understood and what it ie that puts him in need of a fixed point 
on which to base hie life* And it is to this dieoussion of 
exietenoe that we must now turn*
H*
ûHAPm n# K i m c m M m ’ s ahadtsxb m  bxxstbhge*
tn #e preceding Ghapter we have given, a preliminary 
aeeount of Klerl###d’ s critique of speeulatlve thou#t from which 
he conclmâee that metapî^ eical speculation is incompetent to diecover 
any truth upon which m  may haee our lives* At the erne time we 
recognized that it ia precieely the need for thi# kind of truth on 
which living may he haeed which is the central concern of all hie 
thought* This in turn led ue to recognize the place Kierkegaard 
gave to analysing human existence in order that he might, as a 
reault of hie an#yeie, understand better the nature of man’ 0 need 
to dieoover some b.acic truth in which to live*
Whether thia analyele of existence Should be called 
peycholcgical or phenomenological, ontological m  simply existential 
we shall not at thia point to decide# It ie argued by Michael 
fyechogrcd that Kierkegaard in fact impliec m  mtclogical position 
which must t#e it# place within the olaesical tradition of 
metaphyeica* but this ie a point which we shall take up later, after 
w# have given some account of the actual analyeie with which 
Kierkegaard confronta ue#
To present a full review of Kierkegaard’a analyeie of 
perecnal existence would mean tracing his thought through all his 
works from the thesi# on irony* through ^ iBithey/Gy* #hq #ams. on 
life’e %%ay to the ,!^en;cppt qf and the unto ^ atl^ *
# %e hi# bock Kierkegaard and Heidegger* which we shall have 
occasion to refer’to in'mr further discussion#
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And. of this Hit Is. still far from, complete# Ho moh
complete review will be attempted here. , Yet without pretending 
to do jmotioe to the riohee of hi#: thought, I #%11 attempt to 
penetrate - a ■ oert.ain m m  of hie walyelo in order that we might see 
.something of Its nature#
It has dreedy been mggeeted that Kierkegaard is not 
oonoemed with relming questions moh me those Inveetlgated by the 
empirlernl eotentiete # the bioohemlet or the netiro-phyeiologiet, 
or even the emplrleml peyehologlet (although the relation of hie 
mmlymim to that of the peyohologiat is more oomplioated perhaps), 
let he ie interiited $h the oonorete reality of man* s exietenoe am a 
eubjeotf And ftom the mbjeotive side man’s exietenee le^ understood 
in terms of a life to be lived, net juet to be offered. This point 
eeeme to be eo obvloue. that, it hardly need# to- be. ar-gued.- As 
mbjeot# wo not only mffer experienee# Wt we eloo perform deliberate 
dote* We m#e mw meponses to the demand# of the world and they 
are our response#.# Any kind of dete#ini# which fail# to do 
justioe to thia-, falla to do juatioe to the everyday reality of 
peraonal experieno#* And it i# juet thia reality which is at the 
heart of our notion of mbjeotivity*
In view of thia it ia not .mrprielng to- find that a 
preoooupation with the Importanoe of deoieion i# central to 
Kierkegaard* a thought about exi#enoe* Of oourio he ia not
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concemi# with examining the pattern ef actual deeisipna, as one 
might examine the pattern of uome organism* n reeponae to stimuli*
It is not the overall pattern of the multiplicity of human ieaielone 
whioh inter©at# him, hut rather what it mnmn that we are responéihlé 
persona of whom deilslon ia in fact demanded# What does it mean 
that we are responalhle for 'our own deoiaionat And indeed what 
does it mean that we o w  apeak, of .qu.y, own #Eiatmnoe at all?
In claiming that we di mover personal exietenoe ae our 
exietenoe, we are claiming that there ia a unity in our life and 
hence in our reeponilhility, Thie unity ie more than the temporal 
ompirioal unity of an otganiem pereisting in existence for a oartain 
period of time* It includes alee the wlf-omeoioua unity of one 
who toow.e hie- past and must relate present teoieione to past and 
future, in a récognition of the wholeneoi of life* ’to have been 
young and then to .grow older and fin.ally to die is a very medioor# 
form of human oximtewe; this merit belongs to eve.ry animal* But 
the unifioation of the different, stagee of life in simultaneity is 
the task set for Umm beings#* * fhie unity of every sphere of 
life and eve# period of life demands more than a number of diaorete 
dwioions, it demand# a deoieion relating to our life m  a whole.
If our deaieiona degenerated into oompletely uneon#idered response# 
to the demands of the moment, then it would #em that we had 
abandoned deliberate action altogether and that our existence had
* PO*t$ù#p# Pfjll
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Î!@«»ome less gememea# «A man who tes m  wàll at all la ao
Kierkegaard certainly rooognlaee that there le a certain 
kind of aesthetic existence in which one may actually decide to 
react spontaneously to the desire of the moEwmt, and this decision 
may he renewed at evexiy moment with wilful deliheratioa, hut in 
such a case there is at any rate a deliterata .decision In regard to 
the aesthete’s «latence as a whole, even if it seems to he a 
negative decision* In the ahaenoe of any such decision at all the 
self would he disintegrated» 'In so far as the self does not 
hecome itself it Is not its own self.,' ** Hence there 1» a senee 
in which if 1 ao to he a person in the full sense of the word, I 
must estahlish myself, my own eristence, m  sarae foundation, and 
this demands a personal decision* ®he foandatim is not simply 
given,, hut Ï must grasp it in decision* . .
Ï0 Kierkegaard then, personal existence means existence 
in the face of many possibilities from which a man must choose, 
and this not only in the relative choices of daily life, hut in 
regard to life as a whole* 5fet having said this he sees that a 
man may very well become lost in contemplating these very 
possibilities, 'PcasiMlity heaemes more and more intense - hut
* ’ Sickness unto Death* f*4l-4»
m  Ibid. P,44.
mlj in the mnm of poasibllltar» mt im tM '0m #  of w#al#gr; 
foj? in $W mnm ©f ■ the mmning nf le that at
leaet aomethlag ©f that #hlah ig pemelhle baoomae aatual-# At the 
Imgtamt that mwethlmg mppa#m poeslhl# mià th#% a nm poaaihiHtj 
makeg It© appéatmae» #  laat thle phmitamageH# mavea m  s^ apidl^
that it ia m  it -Wetjthiag wax© p&aaihl© *
fhig aitaatiohf whioh Kiexke^aa# daaaMha# m  a tom of 
deapai^ i might be theaght te ho a aontltlea- ef fmeâem pueheA to 
it# vei^ ' limit I ImeAem puehed to the point whem all thing# eeem 
peeeihle# Bat in taet he Aeaiee that my fxeedem ia imnà hnm at 
all» eince fmedem oan only he nxnmimû, in delihexate oholoe# 
whioh mmn heyoad the gxasp ni the man ?&o ia loot in poaalhiXity* 
’The aelf% he ##$#% He #medem. Bat fxeedom la the disleetioal. 
element in the tern# poealhillty and neaeeeity#’
lew ahonid we iinde3?atand thie ###$# definition of 
freedom? Whatever may he the xelatlonehip between fxeedm and 
peaeihllity* the si?elationehip between fmodom and neoeselty at flxet 
eight eeeme nMm enomgh# Savely neoeaeity le the negation of 
freedom* Inamwh m  one’ e life le oontvolled hy neoeeelty* one'e 
freedom le ouvtailed# How then oan Klevkegea# epo:ek of fveedo© 
m  the âlaleetloiÂ element in tevme of paeaiMHty and neooeelty?
* SlekHsas auto Bsatb, F«55 
«» ÎMd. P.43*
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■fevhapg we ehenlcl nndevatm# 'him m  defining the «ea'ln wMah 
hmman îmnûm mtnhlly opevatoe» vathev them '###ving a definition 
whioh will teaoh vtn how to mn the wovd ’freedom' oovvectly* We 
ate in. faot oonfwonted with iravioue poeeiMlitie# and we oan mt 
thie way -or that w#', md  aotaalize one of them poeoiMlitiee*
Bat hmrimg aotoA» having aotaalimed one pavtioalav poeeihility and 
having vejootod the vont» thi# aotaalization ia now mhjeoted to 
the neoeeelty whioh oontvole events in the physical wovld# ^
That is to s#- hy mx Ohoiqe we Mnd owselves to all the implioations 
of the mt we choose* The mnmim of freedom is thns placed on 
the fvontiev between the contemplation of possibilities and the 
binding implications of mtion* And the *despaiv of possibility* 
which is 'due to lack of neoessity’will aocoWing to this analysis 
be a despaiv weising oat of an anveadiness to aabmlt to the 'necessity* 
involved in vealiming one possibility» at the expense of vejeoting 
all the othovs $ the dsBpaiv of Hamlet fm Mhm the 'native hue of 
vesolution* was ’sioklied o*©v with the pale oa# of thought.’
. Bmk i##soli% tion seems to  be in I^svtegaavd* s mind when 
he says that ’wh# the s e lf now lacks ia  m w ly  m a llty  -  so one
a#would commonly say m  one says of a mm that he has become unveai.*
^ It seem tmnigu to Ilevkogaavd* # way of thinking to speak 
of necsEsity ## in my sense controlling cmorete events» but 
this point nmk not concern us in the contomt of the present 
discussion# We need only say that without m  element of 
’necessity*» in the sense of regularity» in the pattern of events» 
the ground- of choice would be undermined#
*# GiWmess unto Death# F#I5#-
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in the further disousslon of necessity in this same passage a 
new note is intvoduoed» beyond what we have suggested so far# We 
may say that what m  irresolute man laeks is reality» but» Kierkegaard 
insists» ’upon closer inspeotion it is really necessity the man 
lacks# For it is not true» as the philosophers explain» that 
necessity is a unity of possibility and actuality# # » #Hor is it 
merely due to a lack of strength when the soul goes astray in 
possibility at least this is not to be understood as people 
commonly understand it# What really is lacking is the power to 
obey# to submit to the necessity in oneself» to what may be called 
one’s limit#’ ^ Olesrly the * necessity’ of which he speaks here is 
not just a necessity imposed upon us by the external conditions in 
which we realise our decision# or as we might say the conditions 
into which we cast our action# This could indeed be called a 
limiting factor necessarily imposed by our realising one possibility 
and rejecting others# but it could hardly be called ’the necessity 
in oneself’# nor I think ’what might be called one’s limit’. How 
should we understand this ’necessity in oneself’ then?
At first sight it may seem that Kierkegaard is here 
thinking of the Way in which a man is limited the limits of his 
own ability# of hie own personality# or even of his own status. I 
cannot hope to achieve what a much stronger man or a much more 
accomplished mm than I am could achieve# Her can I do what a person
* Sickness unto Death P#55**î
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in a much more Importmt social position oould do* In oontemplating 
the poaaiMlitie# of any situation I must take thaee personal limits 
into aooount. I must realize that the possibilities for me are 
limited to those things which I may hope to achieve•
mrely this is not the personal limit to which 
Kierkegaard refers* If he did mean this he would perhaps have spoken 
of ’what might be Called one’s limits’ rather than referring to one’s 
limii? in the singular* .In any case whether we recognize these 
limits of possible action or not# we are still left contemplating 
only possibilities# Admittedly it will make the difference between 
contemplating gggl possibilities and .contemplating fantastic 
(impossible) possibilities# yet recognizing this does not solve the 
problem of the man who is lost in ^ possibility», and is faced with the 
need to choose* Kierkegaard seems to suggest that what is lacking 
here is a personal limit on which an actual decision may be based*
This ’necessity in oneself’ seems to be a Hnd of personal basis 
of one’s own existence in accordance with which one may decide i 
what we might call a fundamental orientation*
The misfortune of the man who lacked necessity is therefor#
that he ’did not become aware of himself# aware that the self he ia,
#
is a perfectly definite something, and so is the necessary**
And this ’perfectly definite smething’ includes a definite standpoint,
* Sickness unto Death, F*56*
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a fundamental orientation# We have a further indication that this
is indeed KierkeguWPd’ e view when we read that *a oaee analogous to
poeeihility is when a child is invited to pa#ioipate in some
pleasure or another i the child is at ome willing, hut now it la a
question whether the parents will pemit it and as with the
#
parents so it is with neoessity’ # At this point we may say that 
this personal limit has something very like a moral oharaoter.
When neoessity is lacking 'what really is lacking is the power to 
obey#’ One is reminded here of the neoessity which is laid upon a 
man who say# "I just oould not treat my employee# the way he does," 
meaning he oould not, beoause he is not that kind of person, and his 
personal limit# would not allow, it#
This analysis of personal existence now seems to suggest 
that some personal #t#idard is a. basio factor in the human 
situation# 0ne is in fact reminded of the personal need for an 
Arohimedean point, whioh played so importât a part in all 
Kierkegaard’0 thinking#- It is not surprising that we should have 
oome onoe again to this need# since the analysis started by 
reoognizing the fundamental importanae of dooision# It oould quite 
well be argued that without some standard of value no decision 
(and ineidentally no real freedom# which pre*»suppo-ses deoision) 
would be possible at all# %e would be left to react to the 
stimulus o.f the moment without any deliberate decision even to do
^ Siotoesa unto Death# P#g6,
43*
this* Bttt we might also feel that in this analyaie Kierkegaard 
haa gone further thàn recognizing the need for a standard, for he 
has identified the standard with the neoeaalty which is in the self.
So the values that inform my deal alone are in some way related to 
the self that I am. And perhaps we might want to add that this 
self is something that is given to me in my existence, and part of 
the task before me is to know myself# At the same time we should 
remember that Kierkegaard also suggests that part of the task before 
me is that I Should beoome myself, or ohoose myself, so that perhaps 
we should say the foundation of personal existenoe is not just 
supplied, but it is to be established by personal decision.
It is in this way that KierkegawPd understands human 
existenoe in terms of-possibility mâ neoessity #d defines human 
freedom m  the dial#oti#al element between these two terms* And 
in this same sontext he exposes the despair which he believes is 
fundamental to man’s life* this despair may appear as self^ rejeotion 
or as an autonomous self-affirmation with no re,al foundation* If 
wo do not aooept the basic terras of our personal ©xleteme, we may 
deliberately reject ourmelves, Kierkegaard believes, and then go on 
to live either in m  immediate relation to our present wishes and 
desires, or else build up a kind of personal facade, an image of 
what we would like to be, but are not. There is, he suggests, a 
fundamental d#pair at the basis of all such existence#
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The course wouXtl seem to be to- relate ny
personal doolsiom» or my fundamental molf-affirmati-on, to the 
*necessity given In my existonoe*’ But inaemoh as this ’necessity’ 
refers to the personal limitation given to me in my existence, 
thia may in the end lead to a etatio attitude in which I aooept w  
mit juot m  it i% and deliberately ohOope to maintain even those 
elements of which I do not fully approve, fhie raieee a question 
aa to whether I really oould disapprove of my of the elements of 
own personal neoeaaityi ainoe this ’neoeaaity’ has appeared to he 
aomething very like my own personal atandards, and henoe the very 
things which hy definition I approve of# Kierkegaard* s answer 
would probably be that the self oan never finally rest in its 
present reality* For personal neoesaity, while it may have a 
moral oonnotation, Is related to the moral actuality of what I m  
and not to some trmeoendent ideal of what I ought to be# And 
this self, even this self in its moral aspeot, stands in need of 
self-development# Honoe a kind of negative resignation completely 
lacking in possibility of self-development is but another form 
of despair#
Suppose i#r self-affirmation is more dynamic however, may 
I not then transoend this despair of which Kierkegaard speaks?
The difficulty then becomes precisely the need for an Archimedean 
point on which Bay self-development may be based and which therefore 
must transcend my present personal necessity# *If the despairing
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self is aotive* it really is related to itself only as experimenting 
with whatosever it be that it undertakes, however great it may be, 
however astonishing, however persistently carried out* It 
acknowledges no power over it, hence in the last resort it lacks 
seriousness and is able only to conjure up a show of seriousness when 
the self bestows upon its experiments its utmost attention*’ ^
Much more could, of course, be added to this account of 
Kierkegaard* s analysis of man* s existence* %e could, for example, 
make a list of his most characteristic categories or concepts and 
attempt to show the part that each one played in his thinking. It 
has already been pointed out, however, that such a review is not 
part of isy present purpose. And it may perhaps be pointed out 
that the understanding of personal existence in terms of the need 
for decision seems basic to all Kierkegaard* s discussion anyway, 
it lies behind the freedom which confronts Mam in the *alaming 
possibility of bein^ able*, as we read in The Concept of Dread* and 
it creates the possibility of the fear and trembling of Abraham*
Wo have here followed the analysis largely in terms of 
possibility/necessity, as it appears in The Sigkneas Hnto Death*
It might help to fill out our account if we draw attention to the 
fact that Kierkegaard places this alongside a parallel analysts in 
terms of finttude/infinitude* Without repeating in any detail the
* Sickness Hnto Death, F*110
46#
analyals already attempted w© need only say here that this dialeotio 
of fInitude/Infinitude points ua to man as having a perspeotiv© whloh 
riaes above the finite, inamuoh ae he oan view the eequenoe of events 
as a whole, against the baokground of abstract (’timeless* or •infinite*) 
possibilities# Yet unless this same man realises his vision in 
relation to the finite facts of his present reality in the world, 
then he will be lost in fantasy#
This perspective is well àmmmimû in the opening of the 
panegyric upon Abraham in .fear. ..and .Trembling# *If there were no 
eternal oonsoiousness in a man, if at the foundation of all there 
lay only a seething power which writhing with obscure passions 
produced everything that is great and everything that is insignifioant, 
if a bottomless void which was never satiated lay hidden beneath all - 
what then would life be but despair?* Here again Kierkegaard 
analyses sxistenoe in such a way as to show the need for some 
foundation upon which a man may base his life*
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Q K m m  III - HAS KXBRKmAABH HIS OWN H1H?APHTS10AL HRE-SÜPî>OSIfIOHS?
So fa» we have reviewed Klerkegaa»4* a of the
Hegeliaa eyetem# hie attempt to dlaoover the limits of ohjeotive 
reason* his oonoeptlon of suhjeotivlty as truth and to some extent 
his analysis of personal existenoe* hot us now return to a question 
whioh is raised hy more than one oritlo of his thought, namely this # 
does Kierkegaard* s thought really suooeed in reaohing an existential 
position free from metaphysioal pre*-auppositions? James Oollins 
writes that * Kierkegaard* s oommitments oonoeming heing and exlstenoe 
stand in uneasy relation to his anti^ -ipeoulative and anti-^stematio 
oampaign* His speoulative analysis of existenoe is at odds with 
his general attaok upon philosophioaX speoulation* * * Jind a very 
similar oritioism is developed hy Miohael Wysohogrod in his hook 
Kierkegaard and Heidefc^ er#
In a footnote to Sein und gelt Martin Heidegger has said 
of Kierkegaard that ’as regards his ontology he remained oompletely 
dominated hy Hegel and hy anoient philosophy as Hegel saw it* ** 
and in disoussing this note %sohogrod says that ’Kierkegaard’s 
polemio against Hegel’s pure Being restriots itself to an attaok on 
the identifloation of the thinker’s point of view with that of 
pure Being#’ And he goes on to say that ’the undesirable result
w James Gollins ^he Mind of Kierkegaard# P-
m  Sein und Zeit (8th edition) p.235 note, oited by Wysohogrod
op# oit# F*12?# fhe quotation here does not follow Wysohogrod’s 
translation, but the translation of Sei^  und igeit by Maoquarl© 
and Robinson#
48.
of this, aooording to Kierkegaard, 1» that though the ay stem whioh 
the thinker oonetruote is parfeotly valid for m  ahetraot non-exieting 
being, it has no relationahip to the situation in whioh the human 
thinker finds himeelf# Thus Kierkegaard’ e attaok ia directed at 
the identification of pure Being with the aituation of the thinker 
and not at pure Being itself. On the contrary It is the thinker’s 
relationship to it, as the point at which pure Being meet» the 
temporal, that constitutes the nature of his existence. Kierkegaard’s 
effort is therefore not a basic destruction of the ontological 
categories of Hegel, but a new juxtaposition of them, having as its 
purpose the ’yielding of the tensions of existence#’
We give this somewhat lengthy quotation from Wysohogrod, 
not that we ndght discuss whether it is a justifiable ’ deciphering’ 
of Heiddeger’s meaning, but rather to ask whether it is a justifiable 
comment on Kierkegaard’s own thought# Is it a satisfactory 
interpretation of Kierkegaard’ a protest against Hegel to say that 
it represents a new juxtaposition of Hegel’s categories? Would it 
not be better to say that the categories themselves have undergone 
a change at his hands? Wysohogrod suggests that ’ Kierkegaard’s 
attack is directed at the identification of pure Being, with the 
situation of the thinker and not at pure Being itself’. If this 
means that he did not dismiss the concept of ’pure Being’ as a 
meaningless oonoetpt. as some more recent opponents of metaphysics
w Wysohogrod op. oit* B#127,
have done, this la m  doubt true# But if be nevertbéleea rejected ' 
the poealbillty of comprehending ’pure Being’ through any ayetematic 
thought-*project, then surely he was rejecting the whole ontological 
enterprise, and therefore was rejecting the ontological categories 
of Hegel# fo be sure %schcgrod could find support for hie 
contention that in Kierkegaard* s view the system which the thinker 
constructs ^  valid, for an abstract non#^ exlstent being, but surely 
this is simply Kierkegaard* s ironical w ^  of exposing the system as 
fantastic nonsensei However he may have used the Hegelian categories 
he did not use them in the service of an ontological system, and 
therefore he did not use them as ontological categories#
'Phere is mother side to Wyschogrod’s argument, however#
This suggests that what ever may be Kierkegaard* s explicit attitude 
to ontology, he cannot escape the ontological pre^ suppositions which 
are implicit in his thought. At certain points Wysohogrod thinks 
this becomes Very obvious# When Kierkegaard discusses the distinction 
between factual and ideal being, for example he surely betrays an 
interest in the question of being i that is, in the ontological 
question# In a footnote in the Bhilosop%iCdl. I^agments Kierkegaard 
writes that ’in the case of factual existence it is meaningless to 
Speak of more or less of being# A fly when it exists has as much 
being as God; the stupid remark I here set down has as much factual 
existence as %inosa’s profundity; for factual existence is subject 
to the dialectic of Hamlet ; to be or not to be* Factual existence
50#
is wholly indifferent té my and all variations in eeeenee, and 
everything that exists partioip&tee without petty jealousy in being, 
and participates in the erne degree. Ideally to be sure, the ease 
is quite different# But the moment I eseak of being in the ideal 
éeneè I no logger e^ eak of being, but of eeaenoe» Highest ideality 
has this neoesslty and therefore it Is. But this its being is 
identioal, with its essenoe; such being does not Involve it 
dialeotioally in the deteminations of factual existenoe, since it is; 
nor can it be said to have more or less of being in relation to 
other things. • Of this footnote, which he quotes at even greater
length than we have done here, Wysohogrod says that ’at this point
Kierkegaard has identified himself with the school of thought that 
sees a sharp distinction between the essence and existence of a thing 
and has thereby posited the familiar disjunction between the same 
esseno© existing or not existing. * But in what sense is this ‘
to be understood? This could mean that we can discuss what is
essential to a concept without discussing whether there is any 
existent corresponding to the concept. Thus we may say that it is 
essential to the concept •unicorn* that unicorns have a single horn, 
but this tells us nothing about whether there are in fact any uniooraSi 
This is surely a logical point, however, md need not have ontological 
or metaphysical implications. The distinction between essence and
# fragments* P.32*
## Wyschogrod. op* cit. P.26.
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existence may be made as m  ontological distinotion, if it is 
presented as an element of estrangement within reality itself, so 
that existence is understood as a kind of pale imitation or a 
distorted image of the psre essehee# this is.the kind of ontology 
we find in the thought of Flato, ■ hut I see no warrant for 
understanding Kierkegaard in this way# It is not as if Kierkegaard 
allows m  independent reality to the realm of essenoe* To move 
in the realm of essence is, for Kierkegaard, to move in the realm 
of abstraot thought, hut this ahstraot thought must sustain a 
relation to that from which it ahstraot# i namely existenoe. If 
this relation Is not sustained then we find ourselves indulging in 
•pure thought* and ’pure thou#^ t is a phantom’#
Bven if Wysohogrod is not justified in suggesting that 
Kierkegaard has actually entered the metaphysical debate at this 
point, he may nevertheless insist that metaphysioal pre-suppositions 
do underlie Kierkegaard’s thought# le may not have suooeeded in 
showing that Kierkegaard covertly (or not so a.overtly) argued for 
a specifio ontological position Wt he om still hold that since 
’it is not possible to formulate an existential .situation suoh as 
the moment without m  ontological structure at its basis’ g 
Kierkegaard must have pre-mpposed such a structure# And having 
said this Wysche^od certainly admits that this structure is not
# see our earlier discussion above F# 16-17, 
w* Wyschogrod# B#l|§
developed by metaphysioal apeoulation but la rather ’ generated from
the pathetic thW%lng of the suhjeotlvo thlMcer# ’ ^ Ho maintains
nevertheless that the fact that ontoXogioal catégorie# do appear
ahowe that we ##- mo longer moving in the rehlm of the existential*
At this point* of course'he is claiming more than that ’the
formulation of m  existential situation’ impies ’an ontologloal
etruotmre at its haeio#* He is saying that the ontologloal
©ategorles of this implied basis do in fact appear in Kierkegaard’s
thought. He that ’it is true that pure Being never appears in
Kierkegaard as such hut only in terms of the subject* s relationship
to it* Which i# a constant becoming and never a being it. Even
with this qualifioation* however* the fact remains that pure Being
or eternity* a non^ existential category in m  operative feature in
the ontology of Kierkegaard.’ And he adds that It is ’a feature
##which cannot he arrived at hy means of existential thinking.’
But when he npnàXm here of ’the ontolo^ of Kierkegaard’ 
it is not quite clear what he means. If he means the ontology 
which Kierkegaard actually formulates, he ic surely begging the 
question; for it still is in question whether Kierkegaard ever 
formulated an ontolc^# If he means the ontology implicit in 
Kierkegaard’s thought then it may still be that Kierkegaard himself 
never entered the ontological debate* but rather rejected all
# Wysohogrod# F#13# 
m  Ibid.
oîiiîoiogioal’ mpomlhtion# Probably what ?/y#cho^ od means here is 
that ’ pur©'Being* -or * eternity* pi'aye an operative pari" in the 
theu^hŸ of Hlerkegaard, ond'Sinoo they ore mom^exletemti;al categories* 
at least to thi'O. extent it mu# he non-exiotentiol thought# But ■ 
this- only raie.ee the question omo again t muet these oatogoriea*
80 used by Kierkegaard* he"understood m  mom*^ xiate%%iial aategoriee?
In the note we have already quoted from the Fra^qnt^ Kierkegaard 
Gontraete the notion of faotual being with that of ideal being#
But this ideal being ho eaye ia not really being at all; it is only 
oeoeneo. It h w  the momo statue a#-the logical definition of the 
unicorn and leave# the question of being* of reality* out of aooount 
altogether. Now Wysohogrod seomo to suggest that he unm the word 
’being* in onotkor way to refer neither to existential no# oaeential 
being but to ’otemity*'# And at this point at least we seem to be 
confronted with an ontologloal category#
1fot Wyoohogrod Is still prepared to admit that Kierkegaard* & 
ontologloal picture is not arrived at on the basis of an ontologloal 
argument* but that hie storting point in to be found in *&n
existential imvolvemont#., suoh the necessity for winning %y 
eternal-happiness of the Poqteoript.* ■ But might m  not contend 
that this starting point is also the whole point? Might it not be 
that the oonoept of eternity really does have an existential 
signifioaaoe for Kierkegaard rather than an ontologloal slgnifioanoe?
 ^ %sohogred. F#130
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For surely Kierkegaard only uses this ooneept in relation to the 
existential need to find a basis for ’my eternal happiness* and 
never as an element within an ontological picture or system#
Let us now review what has really emerged in relation to
Kierkegaard* s thought out of this whole disoussion# It seems to
be true that Kierkegaard was fascinated by the contrast between the
neoessity of the abstract truths of reason and the oontingenoy of
the factuality of existenoe and this seems like that very oontrast
between essence and existence whioh been a central idea of much
traditional ontology# But the thing that pussled Kierkegaard was
the fact that he oould give no reality to this realm of essenoe
except as a geometry for desoribing the patterns (i.e. the *possibilities
#of factual existence.
It is also true that Kierkegaard saw the paradox of belief
in God as arising from a disparity between the infinity of God and
the finiteness of existence; the ’necessity* of God and the 
* contingency’ of existence; perhaps we may even say in a certain 
sense the * essential’ nature of God’s being and the ’ accidental’ 
nature of factual existence. And this certainly makes the conception 
of paradox look like an ontological formulation# Yet surely the
This is pointed out by James Collins i ’Kierkegaard admits that 
the greater part of our thinking is carried on in terms of 
objective, abstract reasoning. The natural, mathematical and 
social sciences deal with objects through their essential natures, 
abstract relations and inductively necessary natural laws.
Such sciences give genuine knowledge within these methodic 
limits, but they are not competent beyond the sphere of essence 
and possibility. (Gollins# The Mind o:f Kierkegaard* P.122)
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whole point of Kierkegaard’ a formulation of the problem ie aimed 
at showing that the paradox whioh eonfronte nm in an authoritative 
faith demanding a oonorete finite décision, is something quite 
different from the abstract universal oonoepts of the ontologist* 
Indeed, to present ’ being’ as an abstract universal oonoept has 
always been an attempt to resolve the paradox and henoe it leads 
to fantasy# Thus while it is true that Kierkegaard confronts ue 
with the need for an ’Archimedean point’ and while it is true that 
he suggests that this point must have an infinite eternal signifieanoe, 
which transcends the accidentai eontingenoiee and relativities of 
factual existence, he nevertheless denies that such a point oan be 
discovered by, or even grasped within* an ontological system of 
conceptual thinking# This being so surely Kierkegaard ia rejeoting 
metaphysical speculative ontology#
A slightly different approach to this question is found 
in James Oollins* discussion of Kierkegaard’s thought. Gollins 
admits that Kierkegaard does in f^ t^ reject metaphysical speculation, 
but he argues that this is really because the only form of 
metaphysic he knew at all well was the idealist metaphysio of Hegel# 
Thus Gollins believes that one might still postulate a quite 
different kind of metaphysical system which Kierkegaard would have 
been much more prepared to embrace* There is, #ollins suggests, 
always the possibility of a realistic philesopby and a nonidealistic 
metaphysics, which Kierkegaard never seriously considers#
•Kierkegaard’s tragedy was that there was no philosophioaX movement 
on the horiaon whioh oould find a place for hie deliverenoee.
After a shrewd appraisal of contemporary tendenoiee, he oonoluded 
that, at its worst, philosophy degenerates into Hegelian "pure 
thought" and, at its beet romaine an analyeio of essential forme# •
Tot Gollins insists that there w s^, a philosophical movement whioh 
oould find a place for Kierkegaard* e deliverenoes, and this was the 
Thomist movement# Ibrthermore he suggests that Kierkegaard* s own 
thought already shows a certain preparedness to entertain the 
possibility of a new kind of speoulative theory# * Kierkegaard*, 
he says, ’does not leave entirely unexplored the alternative routes 
to philosophioaX wisdom* and as evidenoe of this he cites a 
footnote in the philoBophioal Fragments in which Kierkegaard reproaches 
Hegel for leading the readers of his Philosophy pf History straight 
to the consideration of concrete events, as if to establish the 
validity of his method by this demonstration of hie extraordinary 
learning# Kierkegaard complains that the display of learning may 
so distract the reader that he will in the end forget to ask whether 
it ever became clear that Hegel* a method was valid# And so he asks 
why Hegel started with concrete events# *Why at once begin to 
experiment in concreto? Was it not possible to answer this question 
in the dispassionate brevity of the language of abstraction, which
# James Gollins# The Mind of Kierkegaard# P# 
Ibid#
57.
has no means of distraction or onohantment, this question of what 
it means that the Idea heoomes oonorete, what is the nature of 
becoming; what is one’s relationship to that whioh has oome into being 
and so forth?’ ^
Save for the name, Gollins maintains ’this is asking why 
Hegel does not examine more exactly the metaphysical problems underlying 
philosophy of history.’ And most of these questions are ’treated in 
a quite formal and technical way by Kierkegaard himself.’ In view 
of this Gollins thinks we are entitled to interrogate Kierkegaard 
•as to whether his own stand on the modes of being has only an 
abstract essentialiat signifioanoe#’ But there seems to me to b© a 
gap in Gollins argument at this point, as he does not go on so to 
interrogate Kierkegaard# He goes on to say that ’an admission 
that his position does oonvey some knowledge about the universe in its 
existential character paves the way for a philosophical theory of 
being as existent# ’ But ho enters into no discussion here as
to whether Kierkegaard ever makes suoh an admission nor does he 
discuss what is meant by a philosophical theory of being as existent#
He does go on to claim, however, that the Thomlst philosophy 
addresses itself to the problem of existence rather than restricting
* Philosophical Fragments# P.64 note 
ibid. Pp.253-254*
ttseXf to ’ & phemwemoXcgiomX desarlptioa of essential structures’ »
$t* Thomas a#v that ’ the heingm of our own ea^ arienoe are constituted 
mot only hy a determinate mature, hut also by am ultimate act 
whereby this oomorete mhjeot is enabled to be in the existential 
order*’ And this applies mot only to human agents but to all finite 
things and thus a toad is opened for a realistic speoulative 
knowledge of all existing things# ’ Since a thing is not a being 
in the full sense until It exercises this existential act a philosophy 
of being must have special regard for the existential order#’
With this no doubt Kierhegaerd would have agreed# Indeed he would 
perhaps have put the point even more strongly and said that a 
thing is not a being in .,any_, sense until it is realised in existenoe* 
For ’ in the face of factual existence it is meaningless to speak of 
more or less being’ whereas ’ ideal being’ should mot be spoken 
of as being at all but as essenoe# Yet what Kierkegaard called in 
question was whether it was possible for philosophy to have regard 
for the existential order# ’Bxiateaoe’, he say#, ’like mcvememt 
is a difficult category to deal with; for if I think it I 
abrogate it md.. them I do mot think it#’ And for all Gollins*
# the whole argument is on Fp#252«-2§4 of Gollins’ book.
In a note on this seotion Gollins insists that ’the 
rehabilitation #f a realistio spéculative philosophy depends 
on the reoogmitiom that even the mon^ humam things in the 
sensible world exercise the act of existing# Hints of suoh 
a broadening of the meaning and seep# of existemoe are mot 
entirely lacking in Kierkegaard# ’
#* Post script F #
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Insistence that Thomietio philosophy has a due regard for the 
exercise of the existential act, I do not thinlc he succeeds in 
showing that St# Thomas has met this difficulty in any way that 
would he acceptable to Kierkegaard.
It is beyond our scope at this point to investigate
exhaustively the existential ontological system of Thomism#
Collins argues that the Thomist system, although it i^ a system
does not close itself to the concrete demands of existence, and the
subjective demands of personal existence* Furthermore he insists
that St. Thomas realises that ’in the speculative order we cannot
legislate about the human condition but must accept it as we find it.
The human mind, ’ he goes on, •is not divine and its concepts not
creative. %  means of our concepts and empirical investigation
We can attain to some understanding of the structure of being
through its experienced traits. But we are not equipped to gain
an exhaustive insight into essences such that they might be
*
completely assimilated to a system.* So far then St* Thomas* 
system is able to meet the Kierkegaardian criticism, but what I 
think Collins fails to show is how such an exlstentially rooted 
system oan really go beyond giving a phenomenological description 
of essential structures* Surely it is just inasmuch as a system 
of thought attempts to go beyond such a description that it becomes 
subject to Kierkegaard*s strictures : it has lost touch with reality 
and has become fantastic.
* Mind of Kierkegaard* P. 257
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In the end of the analysis it certainly does seem to mo 
that Kierkegaard* s rejection of metapliysioal speculation is decisive, 
Indeed, I believe we might see in this rejection a certain affinity 
to some of the twentieth century philosophers whoso work is devoted 
to linguistic or conceptual analysis. We have already quoted 
Gollins* remark that for Kierkegaard philosophy *at its best 
remains an analysis of essential forms.* From this it does not 
seem a very big step to suggesting that perhaps the natural and 
social sciences can take over the job of formal structural 
analysis, leaving philosophy the job of conceptual analysis t an 
analysis directed towards clarifying the proper understanding of 
the concepts we do in fact use to talk about the world. Of course 
Kierkegaard did not himself develop suoh a view of the philosopher* s 
task# Nor did he subject metaphysics to the kind of rigorous 
linguistic or logical analysis to which it hue been subjected by 
contemporary analytical philosophers. Yet he did discover at least 
some of the conceptual confusions which beset the Hegelian 
speculations, and he went a long way toward showing that there was 
something peculiar about the questions the metaphysicians wore 
asking, and at the very least something inappropriate about their 
way of dealing with these questions. In fact he went a long way 
towards showing, on logical grounds, that there is an element of 
fantasy in all metaphysical speculation. This is not to suggest 
that the twentieth century development of logical analysis owes
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anything directly to Kierkegaard, of oouree. But it does suggest 
that he saw it as part of the philosopher* s task to engage in a 
kind of logical analysis of language* And we may even say that 
pursuing this task led him at least to suspeot that many of the 
problems of metaphysics are pseudo-problems.
Yet perhaps it would be wrong to end on a note whioh 
suggests that Kierkegaard simply dissolved speoulative philosophy 
in suoh a w#y that the philosopher is left to abandon metaphysios 
and turn to oonoeptual analysis* Kierkegaard was not concerned 
merely to out the philosophers down to sise, as it were, by 
de-bunking their metaphysioal pretensions# A philosopher who 
aspired to nothing more than oonoeptual analysis might esoaps 
Kierkegaard’s strictures, but suoh a one would be leaving out 
Kierkegaard* s problem of exietenoe (On what am I to base ts^ 
eternal happiness?) altogether. And of course Kierkegaard* a 
most vital oonoern was that we should understand this existential 
problem as clearly as possible.
Having acknowledged his negative attitude to the 
signifioanoe of metapWrsioal spéculation, therefore, we must go on 
to aoknowledgo his positive attitude to the sign%f|,oanoe of 
existential analysis# Ho was not primarily concerned with defining 
the task of the philosopher and whether this kind of analysis of 
exist ©no© was the business of the philosopher or of the
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psychologist, m  even of the novelist, playwright or poet, did not 
worajy him oopeoiolly» But whoever the tàCk belonged to, he olearly 
thought it was important that we should have a deeper understanding 
of #%%» own oxistenoe in order that we should better underetmd our 
own needs and our own task, and that we might live our lives with 
a new integrity.
To this the metaphysician might very well reply that 
while self-understanding is important, we cannot really hope to 
understand our own task in the world unless we have some vision of 
reality as a whole* Gan existential analysis in itself really 
challenge us to a new integrity in our living? I think Kierkegaard 
probably thought it could, but certainly he thought that in the 
end something more was needed* We need an Archimedean point, an 
eternal truth, on which to base our lives, if we are really to 
move beyond the grasp of despair* this truth is not to be
discovered by the methods of metapbysical speculation* When it 
comes to recognising this truth upon which we might base our 
eternal happiness then we must look for the authority of a divine 
revelation.
In order that we might better understand Kierkegaard* n 
thought in this connection we should now turn to his attitude to 
revelation and to the Christian gospel*
63*
m m M ïï Mé KxnmmAim m a  ghristiait oospel*
The .ar^ ment a© far has led to the ©onelueion that 
Kierkegaard’s philesephieal and peyehologieal analysis is not on 
the whole dimeted towards finding the ahstraot structures and 
possibilities of existence, though he does not deny that philosophical 
reason may achieve this purpose, but rather towards the need for 
finding some basis for life, some truth upon which the thinker can 
base his eternal happiness. But his analysis, as we have examined 
it so far, has not gone on to discover this basis itself. How 
is it possible that a mm can in fact find such a basis at all?
It was abundantly clear that the citizens of Kierkegaard’s Denmark 
did claim that they had such a basis in Ohristianity, but how was 
this possible? It was this whioh set the central problem of 
Kierkegaard’s work i the problem of becoming a Ohristian*
We have already .seen that he was not prepared to accept 
the path of metaphysical sp.eoulation as the path by which man oan 
reach this truth# He did indeed admit that the metaphysician 
might reach, by means of his analysis, a limiting conception of 
the H:#nown but then this limit necessarily remains unknown. One 
might go on to ©all it ’God’, but it remains unknown and nothing 
can really be said about it. And of course the .recognition of
*
this limit is no help in answering the question of God’s existence*
# this is discussed in the Philosophical Fra#enta*
:♦ (p
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But perhaps If our philosophical analysis directed Itself 
towards the eoneret© historical ■ reality of the Chriatiari gospel, 
rather than towards the abstract question of God It might have 
greater suocess# This kind of philosophical analysis might perhaps 
discover the eternal truth precisely through establishing the 
truth of the gospel. This possibility is discussed in the opening 
section of the Postscript# whioh deals with the objective problem, 
which ’consists of m  enquiry into the truth of Ohristianity.*
The truth of Christianity in this objective sense, he 
says, may mean the historical truth or it may moan the philosophical 
truth* In the first case it may be determined by a critical 
examination of the sources and so forth? in the second case it is a 
matter of establishing the relationship of this historical truth 
to the eternal truth#
Turning to the question of the historical truth of the 
gospel, Kierkegaard first makes the general point that historical 
knowledge can never be more than approximation knowledge, and 
this seems ’ incommensurable with an infinite interest in an eternal 
happiness*’ The historical enquiry may lead to a very high degree 
of probability being attached to our beliefs about the past, but 
it can hardly be that our infinite interest in existence oan wax 
and wane with the Increasing or decreasing degree of probability 
uncovered by our historical research.
for example, we turn om attention toward the 
Scriptures. #atever our historical research may establish about 
the origin and intention of these books, we will certainly not 
arrive at the conclusion'that they are Inspired simply as a result 
of- the research we do* And Kierkegaard maintains that this is 
precisely beoause the question of inspiration Is of quite a different 
order* ’Anyone who posits inspiration, am a believer does, must 
consistently oonsider every oritioal deliberation, whether for 
or against, as a misdirection, a temptation for the spirit.• *
point here is not just that because historical research 
can only lead to approximation knowledge its oonoluaions are not 
certain enough to foma the basis we need, but rather that the whole 
proeess of weighing evidenoe and testing oonolusions is useless to 
us when we me enquiring about our own need for eternal truth» 
Suppose the orltios did simoeed in proving about the Bible anything 
that any learned theologian in his happiest moment has wished, 
what follows? Does this bring us any nearer faith? Kierkegaard 
oOBOludes that it does not* Indeed' if it reduces our relation 
to the object of faith to one of easy objective oertainty, then it 
tends to weaken, our faith, he oontends » for in this ease the 
inward passion of faith will tend to be dissipated# '’In this 
voluminous knowledge, this oertainty that lurks, at the door of 
faith and threatens to devour it, he is in sa dangerotis a
# Postscript f#2?
Isituation that W  will need to put forth much effort in.,great fear
and trembling, lest he fall a vlotim to the temptation to eonfuee
knowledge with faith»’ ^ •
On the other hand suppose the opponents of Christianity 
’ have auooeeded in proving what they desire about the scriptures, 
with a certainty transcending the most ardent wish of the most 
passionate hostility ^  what then?’ %ain Kierkegaard denies that
this has any hearing on the issue of faith# Although it ma^  he
proved that ’ these hooks are not written hy these authors, are not 
authentic, are not in m  integral condition,, are not inspired 
(though this cannot he disproved since it is an ohjoct of faith) 
it does not fellow that thee# authors have not existed; and above
m i
1 it -does not follow that Christ has not existed#
In all this Kierkegaard is not denying the historical 
content of what the Christian believes# He does not say, for 
mmplOf that it is a matter of indifference to the Christian 
whether Christ existed at all# He simply argues that no matter 
what the historian may prove about the biblical documents, he 
cannot prove that Christ did not exist#
But Kierkegaard’s views regarding the uncertainty 
surrounding the historical content of faith not our chief
* PoBtBOJfipt» ?»30
** IWd. P.31,
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concern here* We are rather concerned with how he thinks the 
object of faith la to be recognised# In hie argument about the 
signifioanoe of the historian’s dieooverias for faith there seem 
to be two atrandSÿ one of whioh draws attention to the 
inoonolusivanesa of the historian* s work, the other drawing attention 
to the faot that no matter how well established the oonolusion may 
be, it only establishes what happened, but cannot establish the 
eternal signifioanoe of what happened*
Aooording to Hegel’s view of history as the self-unfolding 
of the eternal thought or idea, one might indeed argue that there 
was some kind of eternal signifioanoe, observable to the speculative 
reason, in the pattern of historical events, Thus it might be 
claimed that eternal truth oan be derived from the historical 
pattern* But such a view is open to all Kierkegaard’s criticism 
of the metaphysical method.# In the end any pattern whioh you claim 
to perceive will be either m  abstraction, not unlike the principles 
and hypotheses of the natural sciences, or a fantastic product of 
Speculation* In either case such a pattern seems to be more like 
a speculative hypothesis than like an eternal truth.
If wo wore concerned with establishing an hypothesis, then 
we oould indeed use arguments from history ft the argument from the 
eighteen hundred years for example. But while suoh an argument
* i.e. The argument that Ohristianity is proved t:mie by the faot 
that it has maintained its significance for eighteen 
hundred years.
68.
might lead ono to aooopt an hypothesis, it will not ostahlish in 
the individual # relation to that truth upon which he oan base his 
eternal happiness* ’An hypothesis may hooomo more probable by 
maintaining itself against objections for three thousand years, 
but it does not on that aooount become an eternal truth adequately 
decisive for one’s eternal happiness’? Furthermore Christianity 
’desires to deal with the individual and with the individual alone; 
and so with every other individual,* mid So to point the 
individual sinner to the millions of other believers may only 
distract his attention from the real question, naraoly the question 
of his own relation to the gospel#
On© can See behind all this discussion Kierkegaard’s basic 
conviction that this ultimate question of truth does not arise at 
the level of objective reason at all, but only at the point of the 
personal need to find a basis for living# Hence when he turns 
from the historical to the philosophical question of the truth of 
Christianity^  he argues that inasmuch as the speculative point of 
view ia objective it is incommensurable with Christian belief# 
’Ohristianity does not lend itself to objective observation 
precisely because it proposes to intensify subjectivity to the 
utmost? and When the subject has thus put himself in the right
« Postsojflptf* P«45 
** IMd. P.4Î
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attitude, he cannot attach his eternal happiness to epooulatlve
philosophy *
Thus, as we should have expected from our earlier analyaie 
of Kierkegaard’s attitude to metaphyaios, he does not think the 
speculative philosopher is in any better position than the historian 
to establish the truth of faith# If the philosopher is a believer 
’he must long ago have perceived that phiXoaophy oan never acquire 
the same significance for him as faith* It is precisely so a 
believer that he is infinitely interested in his eternal happiness, 
and it is in faith that he is assured of it# (It should be noted 
that this assurance is the sort of assurance that can be had in 
faith i*e# not m  assurance once for all, but a daily acquisition 
of the sure spirit of faith through the infinite personal passionate 
interest*) Md ho does not base his otaanial happiness upon hie
philosophical speculations
All this is, of course, no more them an application of the 
principle that ’truth is subjectivity* to the particular case of 
Ghristian truth# We have thus done little more than repeat the 
arguments relating to the limitation of the speculative method 
whioh were presented in some detail at the beginning of this study. 
The objective method whioh he has presented as ’enquiring into’ 
the truth of Ohristianity, has not achieved its aim# And this
» ?ostsosipii f*55
#* 2%&a. *>#53
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faillir©'is to b# ©xpeotod of a method arising in th© objootiv© 
realm of postulating hypotheses and investigutlug and testing 
theories* Btit this ©till leaves us with the queetion m  to whether 
Kierkegaard propose© any alternative method for estahllehlng this 
Ghristian truth* Should we say that he gives ue etioh a method 
in hie ©xiatontial au^yei# Gan we hop© that hy analysing 
human ©xleteno© w© shall not only die©over the problem© whioh 
underlie suoh ©xietenoo, hut eîiall also domonotrat© that only the 
Ghrietian gospel oan meet these problem© adequately?
%©n we consider the form and appa3?ent apologetic intention 
of much of Kierkegaard'’s writing wo might conclude that this is 
hie hope# If w© consider again The Slcknece unto Death» for 
example, we find him analysing human existence in eitch a way s|a to 
discover a basic despair whioh he goes on to identify with the 
theological concept of ©in# And he compare© this Ghristian 
theological understanding of the situation with the understanding 
of Socrates, in auch # way m  to ©uggeet that the Sooratio (p&gsm) 
understanding is Inadequate* This may certainly be interpreted 
as , an argument designed to demonstrate the truth of the gospel or 
if not the truth, then at least the adequacy of the goapol to 
meet man’s need* ^
ikiIIB 'mwliM W * i** # #  I n i iiiiiiiiii iiiiii<iii*#ii»i»n i»> ... .
# It may of course be argued that even if it were shown that 
only belief in the gospel will save man from despair, this 
doe® not in itself prove that the goépol i® true* This only 
proves that the gospel is peculiarly fitted for dealing with 
the vicissitudes of life*
n#
In the end I do not think it is quite clear whether 
Kierkegaard really means to suggest that his existential analysis shown 
the inadequacy of non-ohristian understandings of existence or not.
He certainly seems to argue that the Sooratio definition of sin is 
not adequate to explain the reality of human existence, and perhaps 
there is an assumption that all non-ohristian accounts must he 
similarly inadequate# At the same time he also insists that 
•there has to he a revelation from God to enlighten man as to what 
sin is and how deep it lies#* But if the inadequacy of Socrates* 
account of man’s ethical life can he discovered hy a psychological 
or existential analysis, then it would seem that this very analysis 
has discovered the need for something like the Ghristian dootrine 
of sin. Tot in this case there seems to ho no reason why someone 
should not have developed such a doctrine without appeal to 
revelation# It is hard to see how Kierkegaard oould maintain 
that the need for suoh a doctrine oan he demonstrated hy an 
analysis of existence, and yet deny the possibility of developing 
such a doctrine as a consequence of discovering this need.
Perhaps Kierkegaard would object that we are here treating 
hie ’psyohologioal analysis* as if it wore based upon objective 
observations of the way in whioh people live and feel, while in 
faot it is an expression of a subjective awareness of existence#
And he might say that it is in the light of this new and subjective
# sickness tJnto Death# P#155,
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aw«ar©n©0s that wo oome to ooo other klndo of awarenoao as 
lîiia^ e(iuat0. ^hlo would mean that ho is not juet showing us the 
faots and then arguing that only the dootrine of sin will aooount 
for these faots# Instead he is saying that as a man who stands 
in the presenoe of God and his revelation^  he has a deeper awareness 
of the tragedy of the human state than the pagem*
If this Is how the €u?gument is to he understood, however, 
how should we understand the analysis of the despair of the human 
state? Here too we must hold that his argument prooeeds from his 
own experionoe of exlstenoe rather than from empirical poychologioal 
investigations^  Although he may generalise ahout the human state 
to the point of insisting that all men are suhjeot to despair, 
this is clearly not a generalisation based on 'soientifio* 
observation, as If he had examined the experience of a carefully 
chosen sample of men and women# Indeed when he admits that there 
are in fact people who are not conscious of being in despair at 
all, but of whom he nevertheless says that despair really underlies 
their existence, his generalisation about despair begins to look 
like an a priori judgment of some kind, rather than m  a posteriori 
empirioal generalisation#
In fact I think we oould say that underlying Kierkegaard’ e 
argument about the universality of despair is an assumption that 
to bo unconscious of despair is to be unconscious of the demands
of existence, the demands for eelf-development and moral 
aohlevement. In other words wo find at the heart of this argument 
a auhjeotive judgment that his own awareness of existence is 
deeper and more true to the lUlnesa of personal existence than is 
the case for the man who is not conscious of despair#
If this is the proper understanding of his existential 
analysis, then we cannot say that he is proposing a new line of 
argument which will succeed in establishing the truth of 
Christianity where traditional metaphysics has failed* 1‘hat he 
proposes a new direction for philosophical thinking is ac»nething 
that we have already suggested, hut all that this thinking will 
lead to, it seems, is a fuller understanding, a fuller awareness, 
of our own existence, and of the issues that face ue as persons# 
Inasmuch as our experience of exietenoe is common, we may discuss 
the adequacy of our analysis and we may even cme to the point of 
recognising a need for m  ’eternal truth’ * fhis muoh, certainly, 
Kierkegaard does seem to expect from existential analysis * that 
it will enable him to bring people to recognise a need for some 
point of ultimate significance or eternal truth* But when it 
cornea to establishing that truth, something more than philosophy - 
more even than existential philosophy *• is needed# It is here 
, that we come up again# the need for a revelation, and a revelation 
oannot be proved, or even supported, by any kind of philosophical 
or psychological analysis* %Vhen it comes to the truth of
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eevalatlon âlvlw awthoeltr la the aategoaw»> *
'OWatlml# oame into the world by the use of 
authority..»«.It must not be merely the objeot of «>eoulatioi».
®atee a quite simule illustration. A polioemaa la a riot. He 
s^e "be so good" - no arguing. Ho arguing - wlgr? Because he 
uses authority. Is there nothing objective in Ohriotlanity or 
oannot Ohrlstianity be a topio of objective enquiry? lea, wlqr not? 
Oîhe objective is what he says - he with authority» But - no 
arguing} least of all arguing which would steal behind the back Of 
the person with authority and at last speculate him away too 
mil to
Of omm 0 cmecme might complala that thla hm not solved 
the p3?ohlem of belief at all* It simply gives the question a new 
iom^ It is no longe# a matter of asking **How do I know that this 
is tme?" hut #athe# «How do I know that this is authoritative?" 
tet this change is olea^ly m  important move towards Kierkegaard** 
oonoeption of mhjeotlvlty* ihe subjective question is not to he 
decided by judicious testing such as would establish objective 
txuth# %he ovucial issue is whethe# this gospel will in fact 
gvasp and enlighten and twansfom my life* #d this is quite a 
different question fmm the * objective* questions about histonioal
liiiihiififiiiii Y It,,I,II.I,.,|. .y I'l "'-"1 'rim.V..*lrTi-.f"i- r i'lti I'.p'iifi.r
^ On Authority and ievelation* f*.23
a# Papive# 1| Ilf quoted by Owoxall in Kievkega&ed 
0ommenta#y#
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f a c t  02? f y o m  s p e c u l a t i v e  q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  m e t a p h y s i c a l  t m t h *
*0m may m  Apostlè, 0m  may ask u ah#i$tlm%, what tmth is, 
and then th# Apostle ca? the ahrietlm will, point at Ohrimt and say 
’^Behold Him, of Him, H© was the tmth% fhat ie to say, the
' tmth, in the #en#e in which Ohviet'Wae the tmth, is not a mm 
of mnteneee not a definition of eonoepte, ©#*, but a life# 
fxiith in its ve#y being 1# not the duplication of being in tome 
of thought t # # Ho, t#uth in.. its va#y being ia the #e#plloatlon 
in me, in tWe, in him, so that my, that #gr,, that hie life, 
appvoxlmately# in the etaplvlng to attain it mpweeaee the tamth 
and in the v##y Wing of tm%th** #ue wlthW me *tmth la, if it is 
at all., a being, a .life and in p3?lmltlve OWIetianity all expxeeelona 
we#© ©onetmoted with a view to txuth m  a t n m  of’being#* ^
fhuo Ki##egaa#d in not interested in question© about the 
ebjeotlv# truth of the gospel# He is Interested in the question 
as to how the truth which is a being 0# a life is to be created 
within him.* therefore his question beoomes 1 how am I to be 
related to the .gospel? low m  % to appropriate it? How is it 
to become effective in «y life?
laving thus fa# disoussed Kierkegaard* s attitude to 
philosophioal analysis and revelation what ©an w© now say of his 
relation to the systematic theologian in his fimotion as a framer
# See draining in Christianity* Pp# 0^0-203*
and oorrootc# of dogmail# formulae? this %m m  issue wMoh I 
think he never really faced* Having demanded m  acceptance of 
the Christian faith either on authority, or not at all, he seems 
to 00 on from that point to adopt an attitude of almost naive 
piety, albeit a piety which depends upon ’the daily acquisition of 
the mire spirit of faith through the infinite personal passionate 
interest,* 5?hus he can contrast his own position with that of the 
biblical schol#' who approaches the Bible armed with ten 
dictionaries mà twenty commentaries and who remains undecided as 
to the correct reading of the passage whereas he, Kierkegaard, is 
compelled simply to act immediately in accordance with the text or 
else make a humiliating confession* ^ As to the question of 
right doctrine, in one of his very few references to anything of 
the kind we find him saying that ’Doctrine usually expounded 
is on the whole correct* I m  not disputing about that# #  
whole concern ia how far it can be effective* ’
In the end, then, une seems to be loft with m  assertion 
that Ohrist is the truth, md if one appropriates this with 
passionate inwardness then one can simply go on to follow the 
direct word of the Bible# Ihe question of right doctrine can be 
largely ignored#' And this Is hardly surprising for he insists 
that ’Christianity is not a doctrine #*# Christianity is a
# see For Self Examination P,5^“57*
P#irer % | quoted by Diem, Dogmatics B«ao 
(English translation),
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mo33000 about oxiutouoo# fhat is why every generation mist start 
on it anowÿ the aoommlatod erudition of praooding generations 
is eosentlally edperfluoue yet not to ha soorned if it understands 
itself and its limits hut extremely dangerous if it does not#* ^
^ Papirer IK A #07 Included in eeleotione .from the Journals 
published à© 9)he Diary of Soren Kierkegaard translated by 
Gerda H* Anderson#
PART II. TILLICH'S METHOD OP OOHEELATIOH
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It Is clear that whatever Kierkegaard may have thought 
about the problem of method in theology, he seems to leave little 
room for the kind of rational apologetlo that might be proposed by 
a ^ hristian idealist philosophy. Such a philosophy might claim to 
provide a systematic understanding of reality which would assign a 
place to Christian belief within the system, so that belief itself 
would seem to be inevitable. Bit this is just the kind of thought 
project which Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel seems to discount.
Bearing in mind his rejection of the Hegelian concept of 
•pure thought*, however, we might question whether Kierkegaard would 
consider that philosophy had any apologetic function to perform in 
relation to faith. In view of some of the more forcible attacks 
upon philosophy and the philosophers in his writings, we might well 
conclude that he wished to reject the whole philosophical enterprise 
out of hand* And yet we have alrea^ seen that this rejection 
arises out of a polemic which is specifically directed against the 
idealist philosophers of his own day. Hence we must ask whether it 
is philosophy as a whole he rejects, or only the idealist philosophy 
of his contemporaries* Is his aim merely to * counteract the 
abominable falsity which is the mark of modern philosophy’?
# Johannes Ollmacus or Be Dubltandum est p. 102#
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It does certainly seem true that when Kierkegaard disousses 
ancient philosophy, and in pewtioular Socrates, his attitude is more 
positive than we might have expected from such a severe critic of 
philosophy in his own day* In this regard we may say that he 
contrasts the idealist attempt to construct a system based on 
’ objective reason’ on the one hand, with the attempt of Socrates to 
awaken the individual to a new awareness of existence on the other.
And in view of this we may well feel that he sees the really 
significant task of the philosopher as being located in this matter 
of existential awakening*
If we are justified in concluding that this is Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of philosophy, however, we are left with a further 
problem# what part, if any, can this existential awakening play 
in relation to the task of the apologetic theologian? Does it 
mean that the philosopher is, in his ~own right, directing us towards 
the subjectivity or inward passion of faith? When we read 
Kierkegaard’s desoription, in the opening pages of the Philosophical 
Fragments, of Socrates attempt to awaken people to the truth, is 
this to be understood as something parallel to the preacher* s attempt 
to awaken people to the reality of faith? Such a parallel certainly 
seems to be suggested in the Fragments themselves, and yet Kierkegaard 
does make it quite clear that something more than the most excellent 
Sooratic teacher is needed before a man can be awakened to the 
possibility of faith, Socrates certainly understood the nature
8 0,
of truth as something to which the individual must he awakened, 
rather than as a system to he developed and taught# fhus Soorates 
is concerned with bringing his pupils to what we might call a point 
of •existential awakening*, in which each one mi^t become aware of 
the truth that is in him# But a free decision made in the light of 
this awakening, is not necessarily the decision of faith# We stand 
in need of something more# We stand in need of a revelation in 
which the truth is brought to us*
If this is the correct ww to understand Kierkegaard, as 
presenting a possibility which goes beyond the existential self­
awakening of Hocratic philosophy, it suggests that philoeophy, even 
In this Socratic sense, must now give way to evangelical preaching*
But in saying this we should remember that while Kierkegaard certainly 
considered that men needed to be confronted with the message of 
revelation, he also considered that the men of his own ago needed 
to be brought to understand the issue of faith before they could 
rightly understand or receive the preaching of the evangel* The 
whole plan of his writings makes this clear#
This may suggest that the strategy of evangelism will 
demand that a man should in the first place be brought to an awareness 
of the structure of his own existence, so that the issue of faith, 
or the possibility of faith, may b© opened to his view# Thus the 
preaching activity would be correlated with some kind of analysis
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of personal existonce* The nature and poeeihility of faith would
he displayed by the ’existential analysis’, while the speeifio ohjeot 
of faith would he deolared in preaching#
This kind of plan is very like that proposed hy Paul Tillioh 
as the method for his own apologetlo theology* In order to push 
this investigation further# therefore, we shall turn to Tillioh* s 
method of corrélation to see whether it supplies a satisfactory 
method for an apologetic theology which takes into account the 
Kierkegaardim critique of systematic speculative philosophy*
This method which Tillioh proposes for theology proceeds 
first of all hy analysing man’s existence, in order to find, hy this 
analysis, the questions implied in existence. These existential 
•questions’ are then correlated with •answers* supplied hy the message 
of revelation* This may suggest that the authenticity, or authority, 
of the message is to he tested hy its adequacy to meet the demands 
of the existential questions discovered* Before reaching such a 
conclusion, however, we shall certainly have to examine Tillich’s 
thought muoh more closely* At least we may say at once that 
Tillich does want to maintain a certain independence for these two 
correlates» the existential question and the message of revelation*
He insists that the answers oannot he derived from the questions any 
more than the questions are to he derived from the revelation which 
provides the «mswers# The two are certainly not dependent in this 
derivative way, yet he also insists that there is a certain inter-
âependenae between them# lenoe he speaks of the Unter-dependenae 
of two independent factors# ’ * the fact of this inter-dependenoe 1» 
of vital importance for the theologian, Tillioh helievee, ainoe the 
word of revelation will not oome to man as a significant word at all 
unless it comes to him as the answer to some question*
This oould he illustrated hy considering the language in 
which the message of revelation is in fact expressed* Even such a 
haeio utterance as M  am the herd thy God* pre s^uppose# that the word 
*0od* already has #me currency) and again when Kierkegaard puts 
forward the claim that * Ohristianity is the absolute’ he assumes a 
whole background of meaning for the term ’the absolute* * Thus 
Tillioh would say that if these utterances arc to have any significance 
for the hearer# the .question of God# or the ouqstion of the absolute# 
must in some sense have arisen#
Just how we should understand Tillich’s claim that we are 
here confronted with two inter-Mlependent factors which are nevertheless 
independent of each other is something we shall have to examine further 
when we have explored his thought in some detail# In particular we 
shall have to t#* md assess what he means by the #o sides of his 
correlation# inly then# when we h|ve examined what he means by 
•existential analysis* on the one hand and by *the message of 
revelation* on the other# shall we be in a position to assess whether 
Tillich* s method really leads to an apologetic theology which is
  .. ....  W W Il l'll#
*  m  Ut p.14
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pot vulnerable in the face of Kierkegaard* e critique of systematic 
•pure thought’*
At this stag© we need only observe that there is an obvious 
prima facie resemblano© between this method of correlation of Tillioh 
and the two distinctive kinds of writing which make up Kierkegaard* e 
work* It oould well be argued that Kierkegaard* s work falls 
naturally into works of ’existential analysis* (the pseudonymous 
works) and works presenting'the message of revelation (the opeoifioally 
Christian disc ourses)* Kierkegaard himself said that *a more
profound self-knowledge tsaches one precisely that one needs God* 
and this might well bo taken to suggest that before declaring the 
Word of God one must first bring the hearer to that ’more profound 
self-lmowledgo’# (Although it jnight be better to say that qt. the 
same time as we preach the Word of God we should also concern 
ourselves with bringing men to a more profound self-lmowledge* )
Tet even in this grima facie examination it may be suggested 
that a clear difference is already apparent between Kierkegaard and 
Tillich* Kierkegaard may indeed want to bring us to *a more 
profound self-knowledge which teaches one precisely that one needs 
God* # but is this the same as confronting us with a questions 
the question to which God is the answer? Tillioh suggests that 
unless the message of revelation comes as an answer to some question
# Edifying Discourses - a selection transiated by Swenson, for
Pliés*
@4.
whlob man alsieaây an a neal n^éatlon^  than it will not
#be heatd by mén at all# " Ii©rl«a-gasrd may be taken as suggesting 
that unleee a man ham that kind of aelf-knowledge which leads him 
to reoogniae his need of God, he will not understand the issue of 
faith at all. But these two assertions do not neoessarily mean the 
same thing. To sey that a man must reoogniae the question to which 
the revelation of God is the answer may well point us to some kind 
of metaphysical or ontological question, which confronts us when 
we ask ultimate questions about the nature of being# But understood 
in this way, this recognition of the question would be something 
very different from the existential awareness about which Kierkegaard 
is■ concerned. Of course one might well retort that if the kind of 
question Tillich has in- mind wore of this ontological nature he would 
hardly speW: of the questions being discovered by ’ existential 
analysis* * After #1 Tillich "docs insist that ’the material of the
#e
existential question is the very expression of the human predicament* 
and this does not #ound like the material with which the ontologist 
works.
Tet ontological considerations seem so prominent in Tillich* s 
theolo^, that we must look at his dlaoussicn of ontolo^ and try 
to see what part it does pl^ within - his method, bofffa we turn to 
his explicit discussion of existential analysis^
# m  II# P.15
#* m  IÏ, p.i?
OEAFTm II - Timim* a
Thrcjugh all Tillich’s writings there mmn a eentinual 
ooneerii to pose md to investigate the ontological question# He
aooepts what he desorihes as ’the oldest definition given to 
philosophy', namely that ’philosophy is that oognitive endeavour in 
which the question of being is asked#' ^ This question of being, 
he says, is not a question of this or that particular being# but it 
is a question which enstelnes the mystery of what it means to sigy 
that there is miything at all. Every philosophy# he insists# move# 
around this mystery of being# and has a partial answer to it*
In this desoription of philosophy Tillioh seems to be 
desoribing something quite different from existential analysis* 
Indeed he seems now to be desaribing something muoh more like that 
kind of all-embmoing speoulatlve system-building against which 
Kierkegaard directed his attaak* Md fillioh would not object to 
his ontolo^ being described as 'speculative’ as long m  we remember 
that the word comes to us from the latin m.eoul#'^ . morning to 
’ look at' * We should not# therefore# think of speoulation as
i f  it were a fantastio speculative game in which m  create imaginary 
worlds* We should realise that speculation has its origin in
# m  & m  p .5
## ibid p#i 
### ibid p#T
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looking at the real world. He would, therefore, reject the 
mggeetlom that his pMlosephioal work is a product of a '^ pure 
thought* which has lost touch with reality* (indeed he suggest a 
that to understand metaphysical speculation in this way is to do 
less than justice to the whole classical trewlition from Anaximander 
to Whitehead)*
Hence Tillich insists that his ontology is not to he 
characterised as a more thought experiment which proceeds hy the 
power of pure thought to construct a synthetic View of the whole of 
reality# In fact he does not claim for his ontology that it is 
synthetic at all# hut deliberately refers to it as ontologioal 
analysis* On© must look at things as they are if one wishes to 
understand the principles, or the structure, of their being* This 
would suggest that in Kierkegaard’s sense his ontology remains in 
the realm of • abstract thought*, which retains its relation to that 
reality from which it abstracts, rather than being * pure thought* 
which loses sight of this relationship*
If this is the case, does it moan that Tillich’s ontologioal 
analysis must, after all, be a kind of phoncmenological analysis?
That is to say, i# it an analysis of the basic structure of 
phenomena?  ^ If this is so then when he is asMng the question of
# %  use of the word ’phenomenology* here does not take into
account the rather technical sense given to the word in the 
philosophy of Edmund Husserl and his successors# I use the 
word to refer to any study of the patterns, or the ’logic’, 
discoverable in phenomena. (And I Inolude here social, historical, 
cultural and psychological phenomena as well as physioal phenomena* 
Thus physics is just as much a phenomenological study as geometry, )
87,
being# which he telle us is the ontologioal question# he would 
presumably be asking some question about the struoture of phenomena 
or of phenomenal reality# But is this really how we should understand 
the question of being? In dealing with empirioist philosophy 
Tillioh telle us that 'here the ontologioal question is not denied# 
but is interpreted as the question about the most general struotures 
and relations of reality and the methods of their analysis#*
But this is not an Interpretation he is prepared to aooept# For 
such an empirioist ’■'oonoepts like being - itself or the power of 
being seem to be idealistio or mystical —  in any ease# beyond 
empirical confirmation*’ Thus for Tillioh the question of being 
is not to be identified with the question of ’the most general 
structures and relations of reality* # since if there were m  
identity here ho would not call in question, as h# certainly seems 
to do# the adequacy of this empiricist Interpretation of the 
ontological question* let he does use the phrase ’structure of 
being* in relation to ontology#. Indeed in his discussion of 
empiricism he ' goes on to say that even, empirlclm assumes a 
nominalist ’vision of reality* end thus assumes a structure of being* 
Here à distinction seems to be drawn between ’the most general 
structure a and relations of reality* which are the explicit concern 
of the empiricist, and the ’structure of being*, an understanding 
of which is only implicit in empiricist thought# being related to 
an implicit ’vision of reality’# ,411 this may surely justify our
BE & ÜE p»l?
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concluding that the question of being Is something more than a 
question about the struoture of phenomena.
In view of his reference to a ’vision of reality’# perhaps 
we should understand Tillich as insisting here that everyone, from 
the most thorough-going empiricist to the most abstract idealist 
assumes some working understanding of reality as a whole# and it is 
this which forms the subject of the ontological analysis. And it 
is in this sense perhaps that Tillioh insists that there is an 
ontology implicit in everybody* s thinking* To refer again to his 
disousslon of empiricism# he tells us that the empiricist sees 
reality as composed of individual things standing alongside each 
other and looking at each other and at the whole of reality.
Whether the empiricist v/ould In fact admit to such a vision need not 
concern us. The point is that Tillioh insists that he must implicitly 
assume some kind of vision#' Perhaps he may imagine reality as a 
closed system of enor^# reacting in completely determinate patterns# 
but inasmuoh as this is a vision of the infinite wholeness of reality# 
it too is an imaginative vision. In Tillich* s terminology perhaps 
we could ssy it is a vision of the ’ structure of being’ rather than 
being merely a desoription of * the most general structures and 
relations of reality*'#
Yet we mey hesitate to identify Tillich’s ontological quest 
as an attempt to discover such imaginative visions of the universe
III #1 A 'lkiiw » ! i ,,»»w # # »i*w il. i.M ».i| iji iiitiiriii«|ii»w if
# For the whole discussion of empiricism see IR è TO p.l?
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as a whole# for he does not himself speak of imaginative ore at ions 
in this oonneotion# Instead he speaks of an ontologioal question, 
which seems to suggest some kind of rational investigation which 
will give us the right answer# When Tillioh disousses the kind of 
’questioning* he has in mind, however, he seems to he thinking of 
something rather different from either simple questions about matters 
of fact, or the rather more sophisticated phencmienologioal structural 
questions# He says that the question of being arises beoause we 
both have and have not the being about which we ask# If we 
possessed being in all fulness we should not need to ask about it, 
we should just know it, whereas if we did not possess being at all, 
we would not oven be able to realise that there was any question of 
being# 80 he tells us that to ask the question means that we both 
have and have not that whioh we ask about# This is the nature of the 
questioning situation#
Gould this be a desoription of the man who aWks about 
structural patterns in the world, as he knows it in the phenomena 
whioh he experieaoes? It is oertainly true that if we had no 
experienoe of phenomena, or if we had no Imowledge of structural 
forms, then we oould not formulate any questions about phenomenologioal 
struoture8, Or again if we had already grasped the structure of 
phenomena in its entirety, we should not need to ask any further 
questions about the matter# But Tillich’s talk about possessing 
being and yet being separated from being suggests something much
# BR ds TO p.II
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more than just an Intellectual state of partial understanding# ^
It Is not just that we know partially, and yet want to know more
fully* It is rather that we exist, and yet are threatened with
non-existenoe* It seems to he in view of this struoture of our 
existenoe, and not the state of our knowledge, that Tillich says we
both have and have not the being we ask about# The things which
constitute the world exist, but as time goes on they may cease to 
exist* In the same way we know of ourselves that we exist and yet 
we are threatened with death# Thus it is a simple observation of 
the facts whioh leads us to see that, like all the things in the 
world, wo have come into existence and will pass out of existence#
We both exist and are threatened with non-existence*
How then does this consciousness of our finitudo effect our 
possibilities for asking questions? Tillich's suggestion appears 
to be that if we were not finite in the sense I have described, but 
if we knew our existence to have begun with the beginning of all things, 
and if we knew that our existence was to continue to the end, then 
the fact that we knew this would give us a conception of 'beginning* 
and ’end* such that we would know the answer to the question of being.
If we knew our existence to be from infinity and to infinity, if 
such a thing is conceivable, then we should not need to ask the 
question of being in the form in which we now ask it*
# of# BR & TO p. 12# ’Man can and must ask; he cannot avoid
asking because he belongs to the power of being from which 
he is separated and he knows both that he belongs to it 
and that he is separated from it.’
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A» finite beings, however, we have not these limitless 
viewpoints, and indeed, since our awareness is finite, we oannot 
really have any clear idea of what auoh a limitless viewpoint would 
be like* Yet if this is so does it not mean that we oertainly 
oannot ever answer the question of being, and perhaps we oannot even 
formulate or oonoeive what question we are asking?
To this Tillioh says that the possibility of asking the 
question arises inasmuch as we realise that we are finite. But how 
does this realiaation affeot the situation? Presumably our 
realisation of finitude is itself a kind of imaginative transoendenoe 
of finitude. In this sense at least we can traneoend our own 
existenoe to the extent of contemplating our existenoe in the world, 
rather than just reacting to the demands of the present here and now. 
Thus we oan ask questions about the limits of existenOe; questions 
whioh would penetrate beyond the horioon of immediate present 
awareness, and in the end questions whioh would pass beyond every 
oonoeivable horieon.
If this is the way in whioh we are to understand his aooount 
of the ontologioal question then we may indeed suggest that what he 
is oonoerned to discover i& something very like an imaginative vision, 
even if he does apeak of hie quest as an analysis aimed at answering 
a question. His aim then would seem to be something more than the 
deriving of a oonstruotion of oategories from the analysis of 
phenomena, or the developing of a system of mathematical logic whioh
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cm be applied to the phenomena* S«oh aategorioal or matbematioal 
©onstruotlona might give ue a far more oomprehenalve understanding 
of the phenomena whioh confront us and might lead to our diseeming 
patterns in this or that aspoot of reality as it presents itself 
in existenoe, but this in itself oould not give us purely logical 
grounds for working out a vision of being as a whole*
Thus at this point one might suggest that Tillioh* s ontology 
is really oonoerned with discovering what are the imaginative 
understandings, or the unifying visions, whioh are implicit in this 
or that person’s thought* In this case he would be proposing for 
the ontologist a task very much akin to the task proposed by 
Gollingwood for the metaphysician; that is to discover the absolute 
pre-suppositions of this or that thinker, I do not Intend to 
explore this comparison at all# but will only say that the implicit 
ontologies of which Tillich speaks seem very different from absolute 
presuppositions in Oollingwood* s sense* Furthermore, when he speaks 
of the ontologist being- * driven from one level to another to a point 
where he cannot spe# of level any mere* in his search for the really 
real, he does not mom to be speaking of a eyetematic uncovering 
of deeper and deeper level© of pre-supposition in the examining of 
the thought of this or that thinker* He seems to be speaking of 
a direct investigation of reality itself* Thus he claims that the
# See Oollingwoodt ]^sssy, on Metaphysics* On p#41 he writes *I am 
assuming that metaphysics is the science of absolute pre­
suppositions** The whole essay is really an exposition of this 
position,
a# BR ^  TO p *13
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philosopher transoenis the most all-pervading prinoiples or categories 
he can discover in existenoe and tries to reach being itself# Hot 
that he oan hope to define being itself, bat that ho might point to 
that whioh is always present yet always escaping# *
Here Tillioh seems to be suggesting something almost like a 
mystical sense of reality# He tells us that ’this word "is" 
hides the riddle of all riddles, the mystery that there is anything 
at all’, and I am immediately reminded of the description of the 
ïiyetical given by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus hogloo-philosophiousi 
’Hot how the world is is the nyatieal, but that it is’# But
having acknowledged so much should we not now say that the ’question’ 
of being la not in fact a question but a R^ steiy? Will we not 
have to agree with Wittgenstein that we. have now-reached the limits 
of oxpreasibilityt Wittgenstein says that ’ there is indeed the 
inexpressible This shows itself; it is the ^ stical’, but 
can that whioh'is inexpressible be the object of the philosopher’s 
quest? At one point Tillich ssys that ’ philcsop*^  i.s alweys in 
what the Greeks c.all agorja (without a way)* ‘ and this might 
suggest that he would agree that the philosopher’s task is not to 
solve problems but to b$lng us face to face with a mystery. Yet 
00 much of our previous discussion of ontology seems to be suggesting
* m à m  p.19
ibid p#6 
#** op# cit. proposition 6*44 
#*#* ibid. proposition 6#^ 22 
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a quit© different understanding*
I think we might now suggest that we have distinguished 
three different levels in Tillich's description of ontology* First 
there is the problem of discovering ’the principles, the struoture 
and nature of being’ and this is done by looking at things as they 
are given* This, we have suggested might well be interpreted as 
a demand for a phenomenological structural analysis# Secondly there 
is the question of establishing, or elucidating and explicitly 
accepting, some total vision of reality. Thirdly there is something 
rather like the contemplation of a mystery.
How then are these levels to be related to each other? 
Tillich’ 0 writings at least seem to suggest that there is «orne 
relationship. When he seys that we must start our ontological 
analysis by looking at reality, for example, he certainly seems to 
think that there is some kind of move to be made from describing 
the structure of the phenomena which confront us, to discovering the 
structure of being as a whole and this seems to provide some ground 
for a movement from the first level we have distinguished to the 
second* But in fact one may ask whether he is really doihg any more 
than proposing a fuller and more embracing analysis of the phenomenal 
structures themselves# It has been suggested by Ehadakrishnan 
that philosophy is an attempt to explain the world to which we belong, 
and we might expect Tillioh to agree with this judgment* But how 
is such an attempt to be carried through? If it is to proceed by 
’ looking at things as they are given’ does it then start with an
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analysis of the phenomena whioh we experienoe? If this is so then 
perhaps we should start with the whole realm of ezperienoe, in the 
widest sense# • Experience*, it has been said, ’relates to the 
world of objects, of things, of nature studied by the natural soionoes) 
the world of individual subjects, their thoughts and feelings, their 
desires and decisions, studied by the social sciences, like psychology 
and history; the world of values studied by literature philosophy 
and religion#* Ac philosophers, therefore, ’wo must weave into a 
consistent pattern the different sides of our experience# #.# #We must 
endeavour to frame a coherent system of general ideas in terms of 
which the different types of experience may be interpreted# ’
The reason for quoting those words is not that we wish to 
bring their author into our disoussion, but because they do aeem to 
express clearly one possible way of interpreting Tillioh* a 
understanding of the ontological task. Tillich certainly does seem 
to hold that all the possible kinds of analyses open to man will in 
some way contribute to his understanding of the world as a whole#
Yet perhaps he would be somewhat hesitant in saying that his total 
understanding is reached by a synthesis of all these analyses - a 
synthesis whioh would weave them into a ’consistent pattern’.
Oertainly Tillioh does not think that it is only those who have 
carried through such a conscious act of synthesising who have any 
understanding of being to build on. On the contrary he holds that 
such an understanding is assumed by every thinker, even by those
# This is quoted from The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan 
edited by Paul Arthur 'Sohilpp, pp2o-27# ''.
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wào wm%à mjeot the poseiMlitjr of any suoh
eynithetio activity# fhue fillloh would p3?ohahly eay that the 
opening propoeition of Wittgenstein* e fyaotatus# *(Phe world is 
everything that is the oase* is already expressing a vision of 
reality inasmuah as it speaks of *the world’ in a universal sense# 
But Wittgenstein oould hardly have heen said to have arrived at this 
view hy a process of weaving together into a coherent whole all the 
aspects of hi# experience# filliah may nevertheless want to say 
that although the implicit world-view of this or that thinker may 
not he derived frm the phenomenological structures he disc over s^  it 
must nevertheless arise in some sense out of his experience, and it 
may have to he modified in the light of future experience, or in 
the light of hi# phenomenological analysis#
In any case we may ssy at least that the ontological 
significance which f Jllioh discovers in a man* s view of reality is 
of a different order from Wowledge of the structural patterns of 
phenomena. h^at le to say there is some kind of leap required to 
pass from, an analysis of the facts to a vision of the whole, even 
though the direction of this leap may he affected hy our knowledge 
of physical and sociological or psychological facts# Perhaps we 
could desorihe this situation hy suggesting that the ontologist is 
concerned with the choice of an appropriate y^mhol, which will serve 
him as pointing to the world as a whole# Some symbols will seem 
more appropriate than others, and this will depend upon what he 
know# about the world* fhus for the man in the nineteenth century 
it might have been the image of a machine working in determinate
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patterns, rather like à watch, while in view of recent developments 
in physical theory# some people may suggest that this image would 
now need to he replaced* But to choose such symbols at all is to 
do something more than to work out the implications of physical 
theory# It is to envisage the universe as a whole, which is surely 
something beyond the scope of physical theory* Yet inasmuch as it 
is beyond the scope of physical theory is not this ontological 
enterprise open to Kierkegaard*s attack upon the 'pure thought* of 
Hegel? How is this developing of unifying visions to be related 
to the world? èxià is there any sense in which we can claim that 
our vision is the * right * one?
Sometimes it would seem that Tillich would admit that no 
vision can finally claim to be the * right * one, since every philosophy 
moves around the mystery of being and only has a partial answer#
But at this point we seem to have moved to the third level which we 
identified earlier# It seams as if he is ultimately trying to 
become more fully aware of the mystery of being* But the attempt 
to become aware of a mystery Is something different from the attempt 
to develop an image in which the universe as a whole is envisaged# 
Certainly one may feel the need to see reality as a whole# A man 
may find 'that individual existence impresses him as a sort Of prison 
and he wants to experience the universe as a significant whole#'
And indeed one may certainly seek to fulfil this desire by developing
# The phrase is Albert Mnstein's# (See Einstein* 'Ideas 
and Opinions' p#,
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imaginative visions of some kind# Yet this creative prooess of the 
imagination is not the same thing as the experience of unity and 
the product of suoh a creative process is not the same as this 
experience#
Even though we can distinguish between the attempt to create 
a suitable imaginative picture and the desire to experience the unity 
of reality in some kind of direct apprehension, we may nevertheless 
feel there is a close link between the two# Yet perhaps we may 
think that this link is to be found not in ontological analysis, but 
in the arts* If we really hope either to find a world vision of 
significance, or to awaken in people an experience of reality as a 
whole, is it not m% artistic creation which is oalled for?  ^ Again 
we might imagine a kind of reflection upon our own situation in the 
world which would load to an awakening apprehension of imlty, and 
which might also lead to the developing of an imago of the world as 
a whole, but such reflection might be very different from the 
ontologist* 0 analysis# The • mystical* may * show itself* to such 
reflection, but the reflective process may be markedly different 
froiB rational omceptual analysis# Indeed to speak of the mystical 
m  that which * shows itself* is to borrow a phrase from Wittgenstein* s 
Traotatus and we might add that in the Traotatus Wittgenstein
# It is interesting to note that Einstein suggests that *lt Is the 
most important function of art and science to awaken this sense 
of unity W  keep it #lAve.' (Kaeee p.38)
m  wittgeneteia* S!yact6ttaa..ljQgio,0rPkiloaephiom pÿopoeltion 6»$22
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argues that that which shows itself in this Way Is the inexpressible# 
Whether an ontologist aould admit as much is doubtful, I think.
This brings us to a question which is closely akin to some of the 
questions put by Kierkegaard in his critique of the Hegelian 
system. Gan the obieotiviaing categories of conceptual thinking 
really succeed in comprehending the universe as a whole? If not 
is not the ontologist attempting the impossible, for does he not 
proceed on the assumption that a properly elaborated ontological 
system, or a properly developed ontological analysis, will enable 
us to grasp and understand the vary nature of being itself?
It is this claim of the ontologist which Supplies the 
main ground of Willem guurdeeg*s criticism of Tillich's ontology*  ^
#en Zuurdeeg says that 'there is no guarantee that any knowledge 
or "understanding** of transempirioal realities is possible*, 
he is suggesting that since knowledge and understanding are of 
necessity limited to the realm of the empirical (which we may say 
is roughly equivalent to what we have called the phenomenal), 
Whatever our ontological analysis discovers it will not be 
knowledge or understanding* In fact Zuurdeeg claims that 
Tillich's whole ontology is an expression of what he calls a 
'conviction*, which is something that cannot be established by
# See Willem SSuurdeeg* An Analytical Philosophy of Religion
pp.156, ff.
ibid* p#lë2
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objective reason# Z^ urdeeg does not deny that TiXlioh bases 
bis ontology on exporienoe, indeed he insists that it is so, but 
•experienoe* here does not mean objective empirical experiences 
it means personal experienoe, which is conditioned by personal 
convict ions and do does not offer us the kind of objective knowledge 
which would enable us to 'understand* the universe#
Before m  accept this oritioism of 2Suurdeeg*s, however, 
wo should need to oxemino more closely whether Tillich really 
intends us to take his ontology as being based on objective reason, 
rather than on convictional beliefs# ^d this leads us straight 
back into the question we have alrea^ been struggling with, namely, 
how are we to understand Tillich's ontological quest? In 
discussing oxlstentlalist and existential thinking he tells us that 
* generally speaking one can describe essential structures in terms 
of detaChraont, and existential predicament in temis of involvement* 
But this statement needs drastic qualifications# There is an 
element of involvement in the construction of geometrical figures; 
and there is an element of detachment in the observation of one's 
own anxiety and estrangement#' Assuming that ontology is
# Oompare this with Kierkegaard* • Actually, qonviction is what 
.supports the reasons, not the other way round#' And again 'All 
that went before was merely preparatory study, something 
preliminary, something that will disappear as soon as qonviotion 
makes Its appearance.##Otherwise there would not be any repose 
in conviction either; for then having a conviction would moan 
constantly repeating the reasons to prove it#' (Papirer K,1 A 
461* Translated by Gorda M. Anderson for Tbe Biary of Kierkegaard 
published by Peter Owen# The whole entry is relevant, 
see The Diary p.163 )
guurdeeg op cit pp. 156*^ 158
ST II p*m
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conoomed with essential structures, this passage would seem to 
support the oontention that ontology is based on objective reason.
Yet his hesitation in aoaeptlng a sharp distinction between objective 
and subjective thinking cannot be ignored. He concludes that 
♦involvement and detachment are poles, not oonflioting alternatives',* 
which might suggest that in the end he rejects Kierkegaard's sharp 
dichotomy between the subjective and the objective (or between 
'reasons' and 'convictions') altogether*
Nevertheless one can find support for guurdeeg's objection 
even in this polar understanding, for Tillioh certainly places the 
analysis of essential structures (and, I think we may assume, his 
ontological analysis) far over towards the pole of detachment,
While Suurdeeg insists it is firmly embedded in a conviction, which 
can properly be understood only in terms of involvement# We may 
tales it that Tillich has the ontologist in mind (as the reference to 
'the structure of being* clearly shows) when he says that the 
philosopher 'tries to exclude the personal social and historical 
conditions which might distort an objective vision of reality*.**#
The material for his critical analysis is largely supplied by 
empirical research Of course the philosopher, as a philosopher,
neither criticises nor augments the knowledge provided by the 
sciences. This knowledge forms the basis of his description of 
the categories, structurel laws and concepts which constitute the 
structure of being* • In this he makes a claim for the
* ibid p.29
** 8T I p.25-26
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objective validity of the philosopher* s work and this claim would 
seem to be applicable to the work of ontological analysis* But 
it Is this olaim which Siuurdeeg suggests ho has no right to make#
In terms of our own disoussion we might say that he could 
only make good this claim to objective validity if he confined his 
ontolo^ to the analysis of phenoraenologioal structural patterns*
Yet even in the passage just quoted it is not clear whether he 
intends that it should be so oonflned. What does he mean when he 
speaks of the * structure of being*? This is very difficult to 
discover, especially who# we find Tillich himself suggesting that 
the question cannot be answered*
Having observed the difficulty involved in penetrating 
Tillich* s account of the nature of the ontological quest, we might 
yet hope to form a clearer understanding of the real signifioanoe 
of his ontology, by looking at the actual procedure he proposes for 
the ontologist* How does one in fact approach the analysis of the 
structure of being? Indeed is not the structure of being so general 
that it is beyond every structure and therefore itself has no 
structure?
In answer to this latter qtwstlon Tillich claims that 
* ontolo#" io possible because there mo concepts which ore less
* See the Reply $e his Galtlee, In ghe__^ %e^ plQ@r ,of Raul. 3^11#
edited by Kogley and Bretall p*33v, who# he w!#tes 'Miss Btamst, 
for instance, questions me about the definition of the term 
"structure"* I don't believe that this question can be 
answered#*
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universal than but more univaraal than w  ontic concept,
that is, more uhlwrssl than any ooneept cLesignating a realm of
beings* 8ueh oonoepte have-been called "prineiplee" or "categories"
a
or "ultimate motions"* # Thus when it cornea to the question of 
how ontology is to proceed he certainly does seem to come down 
om the aide of n<mo kind #f etmctural anmlyeiag. which may perhaps 
he compared with the structural malyeia of physical reality 
undertaken hy the phyaici## Yet Tillich looke for an anslyeia 
which will reveal etmcturaa which are more general than the 
limited patterns derived from the inveetigatioma of any particular 
branch of natural ealemcei for these latter patterns will apply 
only to that area of reality which forms the subject of the ecienca 
in question; or perhaps we might better cay will only apply to 
reality imaemch as/it is viewed in the aspect of the science in 
question, The general concepts of Tillioh*e pmcpooed ontology 
would be of little use to any of the exact eoicncoc since they would 
be toO' general, to form the basis of any predictive knowledge about 
the actual facte of the world*
Such ontological concepts arise at four levels, Tillich
euggeete
(1) The basic ontological etmcture which is the implicit 
condition of the ontblogioal question#
(g) The element a which constitute the ontological structure*
(3) The characterietic# of being which are the conditions
of emieten#*
* ss Î 9.182
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(4) The oategories of-being and knowing#- ^
At the first level he suggests we are fooed with an asking 
auhjeot and an ohjeot about which the question is asked. The 
subject/object structure is thus the implicit condition of the 
ontological question.
At the Second level he tells us that distinctive elements 
cm only be’.dlstitiguishocl at all by contrast with their absence, or 
their opposite (c#g# one cannot think of individuality without its 
opposite universality) and one therefore discovers the polar nature 
of the element a which oonatituto the ontological atruoture.
At the third level he discovers that finitude and freedom 
are the conditions under which the transcendent possibilities of 
essences arc realised in existence*-
At the fourth level he mentions time, space, causality and 
substance as the four main categories which must be analysed from 
the theological point of view#*
Much more would need to be said if we w-mted to give
anything like a complete account of all the points in the very rich
and wide-ranging thought in which Tillich claims ontological 
signifiaanoe for what he Is saying# However this extract from the 
0ystepatip Theolomr at least gives an indication as to how the 
ontological quest is actually to be pursued* At%d at this point -
# For this whole discussion see ST Z pp.l82*#164#
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I find that the aotual procedure reminds me very much of the 
oritical philosophy of Kant# In faot his questions of structure 
seem very similar In oharaater to the question underlying The 
Orit%que of Pure Reason# what are the conditions under which 
experience is possible?
Hence we might say, for example, that the subjeot/objeot 
structure is a presupposition of the possibility of experience, or 
perhaps of knowledge* But in what sense can we claim that this 
really leads us to an ultimate •principle* or •category* of being? 
Again we may feel that to distinguish general characteristics in 
existence we must in some sense recognise polar opposites. But 
while this may be a valid opistemologloal principle, can we really 
apply it as a principle of polar structure in reality itself?
At the third level of ontological concepts we may certainly agree 
that our knowledge of reality can only proceed in terms of stable 
general ooncepta (abstract ideas or changeless •essences*) which 
are then applied to the contingent exigencies of existence. But 
this again seems more like an epistemologloal truth than a statement 
about being.
We cannot enter here into a full discussion of the relation 
of the epistemologloal and ontological significance of the kind of 
critical analysis we are discussing. It may be held that for Kant 
epistemologioal and ontological questions are the same. Sinoe 
being can only be known under the conditions of experience, to 
speak as if ontological questions must concern the thing in itself
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rather than the structure of the known thing, would he, for Kant, 
to banish ontology to the realms of the unknowable.
In any oase one may soy that to discover the oonditlone 
which make experience or knowledge possible Implies that reality is 
such that it oan be experienced or known in just this way. And 
perhaps this is the point of Tillich's analysis; perhaps this is 
the ontological signifie mice of what he is saying* Thus it could 
be maintained that if the subject/object structure, or the 
possibility of distinguishing polar opposites, or the possibility 
of forming stable general concepts are the conditions of knowing 
reality, then the reality which is known must be such as to 
demonstrate the subject/object structure and such as oan be 
comprehended in terms of polar opposites and stable general concepts,
In spite of this difficulty of distinguishing between the 
epistemologioal and the ontological, however, the analogy between 
Kant's critique and Tillich's ontological analysis as he actually 
embarks upon it here, seems significant. At this point he does 
j- seem to be discovering the limiting structure which makes knowledge 
possible. But what of the more detailed developments of his 
ontology? Without pretending to examine this in all its detail,
I think we might make the suggestion that most of the more detailed 
discussions which Tillich sees as having ontological significance 
are discussions of the actual nature of man's personal existence, 
this analysis being conformed to (and Zuurdeeg would argue
m .
confined within and hampered by) an application of those oategories 
already dieoovered*
Thus when we actually examine the outlines of Tillioh* a 
ontology it appears as if it is indeed an objective analysis rather 
than a subjective expression of inwardness* Hot that he denies 
iSuurdeeg'e contention that experience is rooted in, and informed by, 
the subject's conviction* Tillich himself may be making a similar 
point when he says that *the philosopher is a human being and in 
every philosophical school human interests and passions are a 
driving force*' Yet having said this he goes on to say 'the 
effect of this existential element on metaphysics has not the 
character of interference* The experiential basis and the logical 
Structure of a metaphysics are not affected' # In other words
he insists here that metaphysics, which is very closely related to 
Ontology, can claim objective validity* And we have suggested 
that ho would make good this claim for ontological analysis by 
embarking on a logical analysis of the conditions which make 
knowledge possible*
Whether or not we accept the results of Tillich's analysis
* Here I have in Wind not only the discussions of Individualisation 
and Participation, Freedom and Destiny and the rest, in the 
Systematic Theology, but also the discussions of Courage and 
Anxiety in The Gourde to Be# and of hove Power and Justice 
in the booït 'cf ''%at' ' #
See an article on The relation of Metaphysics and Theology, 
in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol X, Ho* 1* (September 195o)
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is not of omolal importance to us at present# The point we want 
to make clear is that such an analysis would, by virtue of its 
very objectivity, be rejected by Kierkegaard if it should be claimed 
that it will point us towards the truth on which we may base our 
eternal happiness*
Let us now return to the consideration of Tillich's method 
of correlation and let us ask how his ontology fits into this method.
In discussing this method Tillich tells us that 'the analysis of 
the human situation is done in terms which today are called 
existential' and this would seem to make it clear that he is not 
speaking here of an ontological analysis# We have already seen 
that he accepts that ' generally speaking one can describe essentiail 
structures in teims of detachment and existential predicament in 
terms of involvement', ^ but if this is so, how then are the two 
related to each other? The proposed method of correlation certainly 
finds a place for existential analysis in theological work, but can 
it find a place for ontological analysis?
It might Seem that our whole discussion can be simplified 
at this point by the suggestion that the method of correlation 
provides no place for ontology in theological method at all, and 
so our whole discussion of ontology has been a digression# But 
this would mean ignoring Tillich's own discussions of the relationship 
of theology to philosophy# In the article on Theology and Metaphysics
* ibid.
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already quoted* for example, Tillioh argues that inaemuoh a$ 
theology Is an ordered 'logos-dotermlned' aooount of faith ('of 
the symbols of ultimate oonoern*) it must use metaphysioal oonoepts 
whioh betray assumptions about the structure of being# In this 
article we may feel that he is suggesting that ©very theologian
betrays a particular Vision of being as a whole#
This would lead us back once more into our discussion of 
what Tillich means by ontology, perhaps now with the additional 
question as to whether this is the Sam© as what he means by 
'metaphysics"# We do not want to take this question up again, 
however# W© shall simply point back to the result of our previous 
investigation and suggest that in his actual ontological analysis 
Tillich seems in the end to be seeking for that structure which
makes knowledge possible# At the same time we must give due
attention to the fact that Tillich seems to hold that this structure, 
which we might describe as the structure of consciousness, gives 
swe access to 'being itself In the different senses he gives to 
that phrase# It is this which enables Tillich to make the 
questionable assumption that having established a kind of axiomatic 
inevitability of the category of 'polarity', he may then proceed 
to reduce any situation to a 'polar' structure in which only two 
factors are involved#
If this kind of development from the structure of 
consciousness to the structure of being were indeed possible, then
* ibid,
m  Hot© u^ttrdeeg’s criticism# op# cit* p.
110#
it would bo easier to see the relationship between ontologioal and 
exletential analyeia# In euoh a ease ontological categories would 
at least provide a etruotural pattern whloh could be applied to 
the understanding of personal exietenoe, just as they oould be 
applied to any other realm of exiatenoe* Thus to quote the example 
already auggeated, having eatabliahed that all knowledge pre-auppoeea 
the distinction between opposite», and having exalted this to the 
status of a structural principle of being itself, we would then be 
justified in tryihg to reduce the pattern of existence to simple 
and discrete polarities, and this principle oould be applied to 
elucidate personal existence just as readily as it oould be applied 
elsewhere.
But surely we cannot assume this kind of continuity. It 
was suggested earlier that the general concepts of Tillich's proposed 
ontology would be of little use to the exact sciences, sinoe they 
would be too general to form the basis of any predictive knowledge 
of the actual facts of the world. We would now add that they are 
too general to be of much use to us in any detailed analysis of the 
structure of existence whatever. We cannot therefore assume that 
our knowledge of such structural categories as render knowledge 
possible will automatically supply a structure for our knowledge 
of any particular realm of existence. And In particular we cannot 
assume that Tillich's ontological analysis will give us a framework 
for our understanding of personal existence. Yet sometimes his 
discussion seems to suggest that it will do so. The structure of
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his theologioal system, for example, seems to assume a close link 
between the existential analysis of which he speaks and the ontological 
analysis on which he embarks. In fact we may sometimes feel that 
we find in his system not a correlation of existential questions 
(expressible in terms of involvement) and theological answers, but 
rather a correlation of ontological (essential) questions (expressible 
in terms of detachment) and theological answers.
Nevertheless our discussion so far seems to justify the 
conclusion that whatever may be the place of ontology in Tillich's 
theological method it cannot be absorbed into the existential 
analysis which is one of the correlates of his method. Whether some 
kind of ontology may yet find a place within a theology committed 
to the method of correlation is something we shall have to take up 
again when we have examined the method itself more closely.
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ÛEànm III m TILLIOH' U MISTWIAL MAÎ.TSIS
*Ia using the method of oorrelation', Tillich tells us,
' systematic theology proceeds in the following way* it makes an 
analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions 
arise and it demonstrates that the symbola used in the Christian 
message are the answers to these questions*. Let us ask ourselves, 
then, what is involved in making this analysis of the human situation, 
which he says 'is done in terms which today are called "existential"*.
Tillich himself says that 'Today whoever uses terms like 
"existence", "existential" or "existentialism" is obliged to show the 
way in which he uses them and the reasons why. He must be aWare of 
the many ambiguities with which these words are burdened, In part 
avoidable, in part unavoidable'* We must therefore start by 
taking note of what Tillich tells us about the way he uses these terms, 
so that we might better understand what kind of analysis of the human 
situation might in his sense be called 'existential'. We find this 
whole issue discussed at the beginning of Part III of his Systematic 
Theolojjff'. Th# discussion is very compressed, occupying no more
than twelve pages of the book but it nevertheless attempts to explore 
the ground quite fhlXy# Thus he starts with an examination of the 
etymology of the word 'existence*, before moving on to the rise of 
the existentialist problem, existentialism and eeeentialism,
* ST I p.70
m  m  II, p.21 
*## m  II, p.21 ff#
iiy*
existential and existentialist thinking and finally existentialism 
and Christian theology# In order that we might understand Tillich's 
attitude fully we shall follow through this discussion in some 
detail.
He justifies beginning with an etymological enquiry on the 
grounds that 'one of the important tasks of theology is to regain 
the genuine power of classical terms by looking #t the original 
encounter of mind and reality which created them' $ In the 
present case we are faced with words which are burdened with 
ambiguities but which originally sprang from the root verb to exist* 
It may therefore help us to understand the present meanings, and to 
wiravol the ambiguity if we look at the origins of this word itself. 
Thus we may start by aeûcing why the word 'exist* ( latin exist ere), 
the root meaning of which is 'to stand out*, came to have its present 
reference to the existence of things in the world*
Tillich suggests that this is because existence is to be 
understood as standing out of non-being. To exist is to stand out 
of nothingness and this means to stand out of nothingness in the 
sense of absolute non-being (Greek ot)K ) und also nothingness 
in the sense of relative non-being (Greek )• The
absolute non-being of which he speaks is the straight out nothingness 
of non-existence, while relative non-being refers to potential being.
* ST II p.22
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Thus Tillich suggests as a background to our understanding of 
existenoe that it means standing out from nothingness, and standing 
out from the merely potential or possible modes of being. He also 
suggests here that the faot that the word existence basic ally means 
•standing out* points to a view of existence as being in some sens© 
grounded in that from which it stands out; that is non-being. This
I
does not mean, however, that there is no real contrast between 
existence and non-being* Existence does stand cut in a very real 
sense.
If I understand Tillich rightly at this point, he is 
suggesting that the classical tradition which forged this concept of 
existence saw existing reality as arising out of non-being, so that 
existence stands over against non-being, and yet has its standing 
against the background of non-being out of which it has arisen.
In this sense we may say that existence stands over against the 
emptiness of absolute non-being and the potentialities and possibilities 
which are relative non-being.
These considerations lead on to the rise of the existentialist 
problem. It is the recognition of the contrast between relative 
non-being and existence, Which points to the whole development of 
thought about the split between potentiality and actuality and thus 
forms the background of this problem. 'Within the whole realm of 
being as it is encountered there are structures which have no 
existence and things whloh have exlstenoe on the basis of stnuotures.'
» ST II, P.23
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Thus m  om distinguish tm level# of reality which we aall the 
essential and the existential# . Tillich hold# that this was 
reoognised long before Plato and he suggest# that ' the Orphies, the 
Pythagoreans, Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides were driven 
to their philosophy by the awareness that the world they ©noountered 
lacked ultimate reality* # In Plato, however, the contrast between 
existential and essential heoomes an ontological and an ethical 
problem, since for him existenoe is seen as the realm of mere 
opinion error and evil, while true being is essential being to be 
encountered in the realm of essences, eternal ideas or forms*
Hence inasmuch a# man in his existence * stands out* of potentiality 
he has fallen from what he essentially is, mà is therefore faced 
with the task of rising above existence to the realm of eternal 
essences.
Tillich claim# that this attitude which he ascribes to Plato 
dominated the later ancient world, despite Aristotle* # doctrine of 
the dynamic inter-dependence of form and matter in everything. 
Aristotle failed to close the gap between essence and existence, 
he believes, * partly because of the sociological conditions of later 
antiquity and partly because Aristotle himself in his Metaphysics 
contrasts the whole of reality with the eternal life of God, i.e.
III!
his self-intuition#* This last point means that participation 
in the life of God remains as a goal which requires that the mind
* m  Uf p.84
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should rise above all that ia mixed with non-being into the pur© 
aotmality of divine being#
The scholaetio philosophera too aooepted this contrast 
between essence and existence as far as the world was concerned, 
while denying its applicability to God# God* they insisted, is 
eternally what he is, and so they took up Aristotle* s formulation 
that he is pure act (or pure actuality) without potentiality. But 
this formulation would appear to deny the possibility of there being 
mqy divine will, since will implies potentiality# The scholastic 
philosophers did not want to deny the divine will, however. Hence 
filliah believes we would best understand their position in saying 
that for them essence and existence must be applied symbolically to 
God, God is not subjected to the conflict between essence and 
existence# But this, is not because he is wholly existent, since 
every existent, to be an existent, must be transcended by its own 
essential nature, not is it because he is the universal essence, for 
this would deprive him of mw self-realisation# Thus fillich 
concludes that the scholastics rightly saw God as the one in whm 
all potentiality was fully actualised# This means that in God the 
actuality is a perfect actualizing of the essence, so that the gap 
between essential and existential being is overcwe#
This applies only to the reality of God, however, while 
the universe is still subject to this split# So the soholastios 
maintained, as Plato had done before them, that in the universe as
we Iwow it existence Is not a perfect actualization of eseenoe but 
represent# a fall away from the ideal world of essences#
In the new awakening of the renaissano© and the enlightenment
Tillich believes that this attitude changed* At this point men
began to see existing things m  the material in which essential
possibilities were to bo actualized* 'To stand out of one’s
essential being was not a fall but the way to the actualization and
*
fulfilment of one’s potentialities*' Thus in a sense what had 
boon affirmed by the scholastics about God is now affirmed about man, 
namely that his existence is an actualization of his potentiality 
in the fullest and most complete sense, ^
Tillich thinks this view of the matter was not fully 
elaborated until the rise of the •distinctly anti-enlightened'
German classical philosophy, however, and in particular until Hegel 
elaborated his system. It is in this system that wo have the 
eoholastiO doctrine that God is beyond essence and existence applied 
to the universe* In this system, Tillioh tells us, the world is 
seen as the process of divine self-realisation# ’Existence is the 
expression of essence and not the fall away from it,' And he 
insists that it is against this development that the existentialist 
protest is directed# For existence as understood by existentialism 
is not this kind of realization of the ideal# The estrangement of
I#"*! rt ii'*ni'4*'iii»fRU wiji,»ii If# nn n n w m iwiw**»*
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existence from th# ideal world of eeaenoe (which estrangement Hegel 
does not deny) is not overoome in the movement of historical 
exlstenoe, or the eelf*#realization of personal and social life.
In this exposition of the haokground of existentialiem 
Tillioh seems in the end to suggest that there are two possible 
ways of understanding reality - an easentialist way and an 
existentialist way# This is not just to say that in the one ease 
thought is directed toward essonoes and in the other towards 
existence# Her is It the sum© as the traditional epistemologioal 
distinotion between realism and idealism. We should be nearer the 
truth if we said that the distinotion is an ontologioal rather than 
an epistemologioal one# It is m question of two different ways of 
understanding being* the essentialist way sees existence as a 
movement in which essential (ideal) reality is continually being 
realised. Thus it is with Hegel, who sees the realm of exlstenoe 
as a process in which the imperfeot nature of the real is ooastaatly 
being overeom© through a dialeotioal movement in which the ideal is 
always realising itself * The existentialist on the other hand sees 
the essential as an ideal pattern of reality which is never truly 
realised in the realm of finite ©xistenaa* so that existence always 
falls short of esasnoe, or the actual always falls short of the 
possibilities of the potential#
On the basis of this distinotion we may that the 
philosophy of Plato, as tillioh presents it, is above all
U9.
existentialist, inasmuch as It sees the world of contingent 
existence, th© world of appoaranoec, as a fallen world separated 
from the ideal world and failing to realise the ideal potentiality 
of essential reality* Similarly we may assume, according to Tillioh, 
that the soholastio philosophers are on the side of the existentialists 
rather than the essenti&liste*
If this he a right understanding of existentlaliefia, how does 
it stand in relation to Christian theology? Tillich points out 
that Ohristlaaity assorts that Jesus is the Christ, and this 
assertion means that he is the hrlnger of the new age, the universal 
regeneration, the new reality. But this implies an old age in need 
of renewal# The message of the coming of the Saviour pro-supposes 
a need of salvation# So Ohristianity starts out from thinking in 
terms of a world which needs to he saved and, according to the 
prophetic and apocalyptic descriptions, this is hooause it Is a 
world which is in a state of estrangement from God# It is this 
estranged state of existence which is represented in the biblical 
ih of the fall*
But the existentialist also sees existence in terms of
estrangement, and indeed in terms of fallenness, and therefore Tillich
#concludes that ’existentialism is a natural ally of Christianity*•
H© then goes on to develop this idea of an alliance by suggesting 
that existentialists, depth psychologists md artists have supplied 
the theologian with an immense amount of material which he con use
* ST II p.30
mà organ!so in tte attempt to present Ohrist m  tho answer to the 
questions implied in existence# Those sources of material have a 
spooial importance since the traditional sources of such material 
(the monastic theologians) have largely dried up under the impact 
of theologies of pure consciousness •represented, above all, by
Garteslanism and Oalvinism#
Having followed Tillioh's di sou scion of existentialism this 
for, let us now return to the question of what he means when he 
spealcs of existential analysis as one correlate of the theologian's 
work# The main lino of the argument seems to lead towards the 
conclusion that existential analysis will he a kind of analysis 
which will present existence as separated from essence; which will 
see a gap hotwoen the potential and the actual# Existentialism 
in this sense seems to turn out in the end to he a particular view 
of the worlds what w# have elsewhere called on imaginative vision 
of the world as a whole# We have already argued that the
development of such a vision is at least one way of understanding 
what Tillioh means hy ontology# We might now suggest, therefore, 
that existentialism represents one ontological vision, while 
essentialism represents another.
This kind of ontological vlev; certainly Seems to he open to 
l^ uurdoeg's criticism that it is in faot expressing something like a 
personal conviction about reality, rather than an objectively
# m  It p # 3 0
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r^potheaàa kind# Bat having said this one ml^t
add that existentialism is at miy mte a oonvistion whioh aan he
madily correlated with Ohrietlan eonvietione (i#e# hihlioal 
oonvlotions)| while the esaentialist oonvictien cannot# #his 
understanding of existentialism is hardly enough to supply us with 
m  understanding of fillioh’ a method of eorrelation, however. He 
is surely not suggesting that we should oorrelate m  existentialist 
oonviotion about reality with a hihlioal oonviotion about reality, 
as if it were easier to arouse the first oonviotion, and this might
then serve as a Mnd of ground for arouoing the moond* If this
were what fillioh m#m%t he would hardly talk of m  existential 
ai^ aljei.si it would seem more appropriate to ape-hh of an 
existentialist message, as being in some sense parallel to the 
hihlioal message*
Yet fillioh himself would no douht deny that the existentialist 
view of reality is in this sense a oonviotion or a faith. He would 
prohahly insist that it Is arrived at hy that method of speoulation, 
of * looking at% of ontological analsrsis. of which he speaks in 
other plaoes# We have already disoussad some af the difficulties 
entailed in this oonoeptiom of ontologioal analyeia, and we shall 
not discuss it further hero# Our present mmwn  Is with his 
presentation of the existentialist position, end he does seem to 
present it m  a metaphysical position related to the understanding 
of reality#
* u^urdeeg loo* #it*
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In this whol# discussion of *Bxistonoo md felatentlalism* 
whioh we have been oonoidarlng here, there i$ one important section 
which .we have left out of considérât ion, however# fhie io\|i ■ 
eeotion on Ixletential. .md .Iklatont^ eli.et 'Whlnking* ' It le in this 
seotion th# hor, eeme to give ue grounde for our. earlier assertion 
that he would in fact make, a dietlnotion between ontologioal and 
exlmtentlal analyme* It le in this section that we find the 
assertion which we quoted earlier that * generally speaking one oan 
deeoribe essential etmoturee in terme of detachment, and 
existential prediement In terme of involvement,# ' Md it ie in thi# 
section that he introduoeo an important dietimotien between the term» 
'existential* and * exiatentialiet* « *fhe former^ , he say a, * ref era 
to a human .attitude, the latter to a philoeopMoal wheel# ÎPhe 
opposite of oxiatmtial ia detaohed; the opposite of exlatentialist 
is eeaentialiet**
If we take this diatinotion eeriouelj then we may euggest 
that when fillioh epeoke of '''existential analyeio*' and of diaoovering 
'existential #e#ione', m  he does in dioouoeing the method of 
aorrelation, he doe# not mean the same thing #a if he were to apeak 
of ^ istentialliat analyelo*- And again when he apeak» of the 
eontraot between deaoribing eaaential atmoturea (in terms of 
detaotoent) and existential prodioment (in term» of involvement) 
he is not talking about the contrast between an essential let
« a  ÏÏ, 9.29 
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metaphysio and an existentialist metaphysio*
Indeed it would he hard to maintain that this latter 
contrast between two metaphysioal beliefs oould be a contrast between 
detachment and involvement# for surely an essential1st metaphysio 
might be held with just as high a degree of passion and with just 
as intense a sense of involvement as an existentialist metaphyaio#
And if the terms most appropriate for presenting an essentiallot 
metaphyaio are those of detachment# then should we not say that 
they will also be the moot appropriate terms for presenting an 
exi stentiali st motaphyslot
It might still be said that the existentialist is especially 
concerned with the human predicament# to an extent that the 
assentialist is not# since it is central to existentialism that it 
sees the existent facing a predicament# namely that he has fallen 
away from the ideal possibility of his essential nature. Tot the 
oBsentialist might well say that he too is concerned with 
understanding existence. Perhaps he does not see it as a predicament# 
but rather as a realm in which the potential is continually 
actualized# the essential realised. fhus if the existentialist 
needs to draw on the terms of involvement# then so does the 
©Qseatialist. If on the other hand it is claimed that the 
essentialist is presenting a view discovered by some process of 
(rational) ontological analysis# and he must therefore be prepared 
to present it in the detached terms of discursive reason# then we 
may say that the same demand may be made of the existentialist,
124#
if he Is really attempting to present a rival view# 5?here seems 
to be no reason to suppose that the existentialist analysis will be 
any more 'existential* than the essentialist analysis#
*l?his oomparison of existentialism and essentiallsm Is not 
worked out in any detail by ^ illioh# although he does seem to think 
that existential aonOern dominates existentialist analysis# in a way 
in whioh it does not dominate the analysis of essential struotures. 
Generally speaking one oan desoribe the latter in terms of 
detachment# whereas in the fortner 'since the element of involvement 
is so dominant the most striking existentialist analyses have been 
made by novelists# poets and painters* # *
At this point one wonders whether fillloh* s distinctions 
are sharp enough to avoid confusion# Does he really make it 
possible to distinguish between existential# existentialist and 
essential analyses? let us try to sum up his own exposition as we 
have followed it# According to the definitions he gives us# the 
word 'existential' refers to a human attitude* the attitude of 
involvement# (Therefore may analysis of m%r kind In which the 
subject is involved might presumably be described as existential no 
matter what is the object of analysis# 5?he word 'existentialist* 
refers to a philosophical school, which believes that there is a 
gap between essence and existence# therefore any analysis which 
forms part of the presentation of this philosophical view might
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presumably be called existentialist. Unfortunately# the word 
'essential* is not defined in this disousslon* It might in the end 
have made the position much clearer if îillioh had made a distinction 
between 'essential* mà 'essentialist' parallel to his distinction 
between existential and existentialist# In fact his discussion as 
a whole seems to assume such a distinction# for while the 
existentialist necessarily repudiates the essentialist view of 
reality, he does not therefore reject the reality of essential 
structures# On the contrary he seems to be committed to considering 
essential structures in their.relation to existence just as much 
as the essentialist is# We may conclude therefore that an analysis 
of essential struoturcc need not proceed on the basis of an essentialist 
philosophyt and equally m% existential analysis need not proceed on 
the basis of an existentialist philosophy#
Yet not only does flllioh fail to introduce any distinction 
between essential and essentialist into this disousslon, but at 
times it seems as if he does not accept the implications of his 
distinction between existential and existentialist# When he 
brackets together the existentialist philosopher^  the psyoho-analyst, 
the writer# the poet and the artist# for example, how should we 
understand this grouping? When he speaks of the insights into 
human nature which existentialism (including depth psychology) have 
given us, how should we understand this? On what grounds could 
he include depth psychologists among the existentialists? Such an 
inclusion appears to suggest that depth psychologists accept the
I2$é
existentialist ontology* that there is a split between the 
actuality of existence and essential potentialities# so that exiatenoe 
must he Understood as falling aw^ from essential possibilities or 
struotures. But can we assume that depth psyohologists will aooept 
this? It seems very unlikely that Freud would have aooepted any 
suoh metaphysioal formulation* Of course Tillich may suggest that 
inasmuch as a depth psyoholOgist reoognises the importance of 
feelings of guilt, for example, as basic to human personality he is 
implying that there is a split between aspiration and achievement, 
between the ideal and the real* (Thus ho might argue that even if 
the depth psychologist' denies that he understands the world in this 
way, this understanding is nevertheless implied in his psychological 
findings.' •
fhis raises once again the #estion raised by 25uurde©g in 
his criticism of ontology. Qm the facts of existence really 
provide a compelling objective ground for adopting a certain 
conviction about the world as a whole? In relation to our present 
example, surely the depth psychologist may hold that the unrealised 
ideals of humanity are no more than fantasies with no real 
significance. In this case the split between the real and the ideal 
is not a split within reality, since the ideal has no reality*
Existing reality on this view is the only reality we can sensibly 
talk about* #he tension which causes human neuroses may be real 
enough, but this is only because it ie a tension generated within
# see above p.99 f.
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exist enee# beaauae an existing •organism, man, ■entertains ideal a#
0# again the depth psyehologiet may be a thorough-going Eegelim 
esaoiitiaXist, who understands the phmomemom of guilt as a slgnifioaht 
stage in the self-^ realisatioii^  of ■ the ideal*
fhe point whioh I wish to make here is that a phenomenological
analysis of personal existenoe is working at a different level frm
\ ' ' ■ , ' . ■ ■ ■
i developing a oonviotion about reality as a whole, (Thus when 
Tillioh points to the relationship between the existentialist 
philosopher and the theologian, and then to the relationship between 
the depth psyohologist and the theologian, he is surely indioating 
two %uite distinct relationships* We have already seen that he 
suggests that there may be an alliance between the existentialist 
and the theologian, because both believe in the importance of 
estrangement as constitutive of reality* How we oome to consider 
his assertion that the systematic theologian 'needs the support 
of the pr&otioal explorers of man's predicament#' ' 'fhis 
''practical exploration* may well be what is mem# by existential 
analysis, but it does not seem to be the specific concern of the 
existentialist.
If we really accept fillich’s distinction between the terms 
'existential* and ♦existentialist*, then, how are we to understand 
the existential analysis which Tillich sees as one part of the 
theologian* s task? (Tillich* s analysis of existentialism suggested
* Sf II, p*31
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that w© might find curaeives once more involved in «■#! the 
diffioulties of ontologioai femulations# ' But now the separate
dieauseion of the word 'existential*, with 'involvement* as its 
definitive oharaoter, coupled with the ooneideration of the praotioal 
exploration of man* 0 prediommnt, suggests a way of understanding 
existential analysis whioh Is distinct from all ontological analysis*
At this point I thihk the possibility of a reel comparison 
with the thought of Kierkegaard begins to emerge^  From (Tillich's 
actual definition of the word 'existential* it is clear that 
existential analysis must be an analysis in which the subject is 
personally involved; and his discussion of 'Existentialism and 
Ohristtan theology' gives us grounds for ooncluding that existential 
analysis means any practical exploration of human existence* At 
both these points the parallel with Kierkegaard is obvious* Ee too 
insisted that the subjoct must be involved in his thinking, if he 
wore to approach the realm of existence, and he too turned to a kind 
of thinking which might well be called the practical exploration of 
man's existence*
Tillich himself mentions Kierkegaard as one of those 
nineteenth century existentialists who attacked iogel and he tells 
us that 'the common point in all existentialist attacks is that man's 
existential situation is a state of estrangement from his essential 
nature' ^ and so he presents existentialism as a philosophy which
# m  II, p.27
129*
reùogn&aes this estrangement as fundamental# It is this which led 
us to the conclusion that existentialism comes to look like an 
ontological theory. But X question whether this formulation 
represents the nature of Kierkegaard* s attack upon Hegel at all 
adequately. (Tillloh seems to assume that Kierkegaard, among other 
nineteenth century existentialists he mentions, accepted the 
classical distinction between essence and existence, but rejected the 
Hegelian view whioh sees existence as the Self ♦«realisation of essence, 
and instead suggested that existence is estranged from essence.
fo what extent does cur own analysis of Kierkegaard confirm 
this View? We have already seen that Kierkegaard does in fact 
make use of these concepts of essence and existence in his discussions, 
but We also had occasion to question whether he uses them in the 
same sense as the classical ontologlsts. Kierkegaard warns us that 
in formulating the answer to the question 'what is meant by being*?
It is important *to take heed lest the knowing spirit be tricked 
into losing itself in the indeterminate, so that it fantastically 
becomes a something that no existing human beihg ever Was or can be, 
a sort of phantom with which the individual occupies himself upon 
occasion but without making it clear to himself in terms of dialectical 
intermediaries how he happens to gat into this fantastic realm, 
what significance being there has for him and whether the entire 
activity that goes on out there does not resolve itself into a 
tautology within a recklessly fantastic venture of thought.
w Postscript, p.169
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fhis Xmg mé sentence seems to be warning ue against the
danger of answering the question of what la me mit by being in ter#a 
of pure thought. Pure thought Kierkegaard telle me 'explains 
everything in euoh fashion that m  dhoieive explanation of the 
eeaential question beeomee possible# '
In view of this argument# surely we must oonolude# as we 
have argued earlier# that any discussion of the essential# as 
distinct from the existential# must either acknowledge that it is 
an abstraction from existence to which existence it yet remains 
related# or else it must become a • recklessly fantastic venture of 
thought*. (Thus we may say that Kierkegaard certainly acknowledged 
the essential and the existential realms in the sense that he 
acknowledged the distinction between abstract universale and concrete 
existing particulars# but ha would surely reject the Flatonio 
suggestion that in the essential realm of universale we know the true 
ideal reality. For us the universale are no wore than abstractions, 
enabling us to thW% about the reality we do know, namely, the 
reality of existence#. We cannot Imow reality by grasping it in an 
essential system#' Hot that Kierkegaard denies that such a system 
is possible. He saya that it is possible for him who is ' outside
existence yet in existence, who is in his eternity forever complote 
mid yet includes all existence within himself.* ' But for 
Kierkegaard this is not a description of man* s state, but of Qod* s.
* Post0ort9t, p«8?8 
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'Reality itself is a system for Oo&',* (Thus if we oan equate this 
eystematlo knowledge with ' essential * knowledge, and I think there 
is a parallel between the two, then this kind of 'essential* knowledge 
is not within the grasp of man. Man must always relate his 
understanding of reality to that oontaot he has with reality in 
existence#
W© might certainly say of Kierkegaard* s argument here, that 
it is opposing Hegel on the ground that in his qyetem-^ buildlng he 
is failing to admit the contrast between man's finite limitation and 
Ood's infinity. Kierkegaard objects that Hegel claims to have 
tranaoended existence in his thought in a way that is really quit© 
impossible. But is this what (Tillich means when he says that the 
cmmon point of the existentialist attacks upon Hegel is that man's 
existential state is a state of estrangement frcm his essential 
nature? Surely Kierkegaard* s insistence on the contrast between 
man's finite limitation and God's infinity is not indicating man's 
state of estrangement from his essential nature* (This would only 
be true if we could say that it was of man* a essential nature to be 
like Godl Yet perhaps our disagreement with (Tillich at this point 
is not quite so sharp as it might appear. Kierkegaard certainly 
does see a tension in man' s situation, Inasmuch as man is an existent 
thinker# fhie necessarily involves a tension, since if he beoomee 
a pure thinker he loses touch with his existenoe and becomes 
fantastic I while to think at all is neoessarily to stand outside the
* Postscript, p#
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exlateaoa, slitoa 'a l l  logioal thinklirîg^êiiiploya the language
of abstraction* , and this means that the thinker becomes as one 
who would see reality sub speoie aeterni# (Thus there is a difficulty 
whioh 'lies in bringing this definite something and the ideality of 
thought together, by penetrating the oonorete particularity with 
thought* Abstract thought cannot even take oognizanoe of this 
contradiction since the very process of abstraction prevents the 
contradiction from arising*' Here Kierkegaard seems to be 
describing a basic tension facing mm, which may be compared to that 
which (Tillich has described in his assertion that man is a finite 
being who may yet transcend his finitude. Yet having said this we 
may still hold, surely, that this is not the same as affirming an 
existentialist ontology suoh as we have been discussing in relation 
to rillioh.
Ferhaps the most important thing that emerges from this 
investigation of Kierkegaard* s understanding of existence Is that 
his protest against idealism is not in the name of a straight-forward 
realist metaphysic# (The realist objects to the idealist way of 
understanding reality and presents an alternative way# In the 
realm of epistemolo#^  the argument goes on as to the relationship 
between reason and experience, and perhaps maong the ontologlsts we 
may have related discussions between essentialists and existentialists 
But Kierkegaard is not satisfied to tell the Hegelian that knowledge
« Posteoslpt, 9.273
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must begin with experienoe, or with empirioal existmoe# He goes 
further and suggests that our direct oontaot with reality is not to 
he found in our knowledge at all, hut in our existenee. It is not
our thinking and speaking ae euoh whioh oonetitute our oontaot with 
reality, it ie something more fundamental than all speaking, namely, 
our exletence. fhla may seem to he neither more nor lose than a 
new statement of the empirioist position# Yet I do not think it 
would he a correct understanding of Kierkegaard to say that he is 
just telling us that our understanding of reality must start from 
oxperienae# He rather seems to suggest that we have a diroot 
oontaot with reality in our heing as existing individuals, and this 
is a starting point which is more fundamental than any actual content 
of experience whioh we might have#
h^e immediate difficulty which Kierkegaard must face, however, 
is the difficulty of finding any way of stating suoh a position, for 
it Seems as if his protest would he directed against any cognitive 
grasp of reality whatsoever# He was not unaware of this difficulty 
as is clear when he writes that ' existence like movement la a 
difficult category to deal with; for if I think it I abrogate it 
and then I do not think it# It might therefore seem to be the 
proper thing to say that there is something which cannot he thought, 
namely, existence# But the difficulty persists in that existence
itself combines thinking with existing insofar as the thinker exists#•
w Post script, p. tî4
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(This might well suggest that Kierkegaard's 'existentialim' 
leaves no room for philosophic refleotion about reality at all* It 
seems to follow that if we want to have any real understanding of 
reality w© should leave the philosopher* s study and go out and 
exist* rather than talking about existence* Or if we do prefer 
to stay in the study then our direct contact with reality is still 
to be found in our own existence, and it Is this that matters, rather 
than any systematic understanding of reality our rational thought 
may produce*
How then is any developing understanding of reality possible 
for Kierkegaard? It is possible through an existential pathos 
which 'dedicates itself more and more profoundly to the task of 
existing and with the consciousness of what existence is, penetrates 
all illusions, becoming more and more concrete through reconstructing 
existence in action#*
(This examination of Kierkegaard* s thought certainly helps 
us to see why the word ' existential* suggeats something whioh is the 
very antithesis of detachment, for 'existential pathos is action.'
But just because he holds this so strongly Kierkegaard seems to deny 
the possibility of there being any existentialism (An existential
"W#
system is impossible it cannot be formulated.) fhus on the 
basis of Kierkegaard*e thought we might accept (Tillich's distinction 
between the terms 'existential* and 'existentialist*, only to deny
# Postscript, p. 
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the possibility of m  escietentialist philosophy, if this should 
mem m  exiateatial system# (The only existential philosophy possible 
would be a philosophy whioh mad© no attempt to exp^ imd reality 
systematioally, but Which merely pointed man towards his own 
existence#
(This would certainly seem to aooord well with Billioh* a 
aooount of the word * existential* as referring to a human attitude; 
an attitude which is the opposite of detaohment# But we are left 
with the further question as to what kind of existential analysis 
oould be carried out on the basis of this understanding# If an 
existential philosophy is intended to point a man towards his own 
existence, oan suoh a philosophy proceed by means of any kind of 
analysis? Analysis suggests a procédure whioh approaohes the objsot 
to be analysed and examines it# And this suggest# that analysis 
might enable us gy^ stematio-,ally to understand the reality of 
empirioal existenoe, but if we interpret Kierkegaard rightly this 
would not bo, in hi# term#, to disoovor the reality of our- own 
oxlatenoe whioh we fimow* in oxieting# fet-when we turn to 
Kierkegaard* # own writings we do find what must surely be regarded as 
extensive malyees of himan existenoe, in suoh works m  Fear and 
(Trembling# fhe gonoeut. of Bread or fhe Gioknes# unto Jeath# How 
then should we und##$tmd these works? Should w# perhaps regard 
them as studies in the phenomenon of personal life, or of oonseiousness, 
and as being without truly existential signifioanee? Or is it 
possible that even in these analytical studies the aim is to point
mem toward# a mew awaremem# of their own ©xlstemoe? mat is the 
rolatiomohip betweem twstigatimg the phamomemom of oomsoioumess 
and iXlumimatimg mam* # own oxistemoe?
fher© is am imterestimg disousslon of this issue, or of a 
closely analogous issue, in the volume on the philosophy of Karl 
Jaspers, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp* This discussion is not 
directly related to Kierkegaard* a writings but arises out of a 
consideration of the relationship between the phenomenology of 
consciousness and the * illumination of Bcistem* in the philosophy 
of Jaspers* It is so closely related to our present concern, 
however, that it seem# worth«#hile looking at it* Jaspers claims 
that there exists a radical difference between the phemememology of 
oonsoiomsness and the illumination of-Existent-# But this poses 
the question as to Whether phenomenological description oan 
contribute anything at all to existential illumimmtion# William 
Earle, in a criticism-of Jaspers position^  ;(a criticism whioh mi^t 
easily be re-«fram#d as #.criticism.of Kierkegae##). says that no on# 
can read Jaspers® chaptars on Ijxlstenz without extending his insight 
intO' the human situation*. 'But', he goes on, ’how dismaying then 
to discover that it all ia not to be interpreted as objective 
knowledge, but as appeals to the reader to become himself & *
Having recognised it as basic to Jaspers* position that •illumination 
of Existent as thought can not complete Itself but must finally
# fhe Fhilybophy. ,qf J^ arl ^ sspo.^ s edited by Paul Arthur 
'Hchllpp'
m  Ibid, p.-:
hiipp* p*o&9#.
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trànsoond thought mà pam 'into act* ,* goes on to argue that
this in the end leads us to the conclusion that Jaspers* existential 
assertions are really pseudo^ assertions; they turn out in the end 
to ho hortatory in funotion, rather than assertive#. Yet Earle 
thinlcB that even as exhortations they fail unless they are at least 
telling us what we are to he or what we are to do# Heno© they must 
he asserting something# In the end Earle reaches the oonolusion 
that * a sound phenmenolo^ of the total struoture of the inner life, 
and the self oould ahsorh all that is valuable in the illumination 
of #Kistenz without heooming involved in paradoxes and appeals* •
In other words the positive value of the Illumination of Existent 
does not lie in directing people to that fundamental oontaot they 
have with reality to their own existence at all* And if one did 
want so to direct people to existenoe, Earl# might suggest, it would 
not help to give a phenomenology of the total struotute of the inner 
life* fhis would he to develop a rational objective oonstruotion 
whioh would give factual information, rather than illuminating 
people's lives with a new awareness of existenoe*
In the face of thin oritiolsm Jaspera oonttouea to insist 
that there ia a radical àiftBmnm between the pheufmenolegy of 
oonsoioueness and the illumination of Exist on#* *%is différence', 
he eeys, 'would be badly designated if one. were to call it a return 
from oonsoiousness to what lies before ©onsaiouaneas and supports it;
*  IM d , 9,534 
w« i'bldÿ 9»!
138.
it i# descrlbad more qorreetly ms the lomp from obeorvimg to
philosophizing, that 4# from knowing-something.to inner motion
through thinking#' #n the other hand he admits that ’in the
illumination of .Mistenz 1 am oonmtantly making use of oonoeptual
#
schemes, which as suoh make assertions about structures*, and in 
this w© may suggest that he leaves open the possibility that the 
insights of a phenome#lêglèal - analysis may be taken up as 
existentially illuminating*
In all this I think we oould well that Jaspers is 
working out a position very oloaoly akin- to that of Kierkegaard, 
fhua while Kierkegaard denies the possibility of an -^ 4^ stent ialist 
philosophy in a systemati#. mnm ('theretoan. be no existential 
system* ) he would nevertheless have aooepted philosophising which 
was desoribable in a* phrase m  Mnner action through thinking*
It seems clear that Kierkegaard recognized the need for suoh 
philosophising#' Although it might seem the proper thing to say
that there is something whioh cannot be thought, namely existence, 
nevertheless the difficulty persists in that existence itself 
combines thinking with existence insofar, me the thinker exists. 
Hence he puts- it to us that it is man* e task to identify himself 
with the content of M s  thought in order to exist in it/* (This 
certainly seams to suggest that the content of our thought can in 
gome sense contribute to our awareness of existence and this not
# fhe Philosophy of Earl Jaspers, p*Sl9
#* Bee Postscript p. 302
139,
just because it rspresemts a stock of information about the world, 
m  about human, life even, but because it can in some way issue in 
am inner aotion, based upon a-vivid inner mwareuess,
fhis ms^ surely justify us in claiming that for Kierkegaard 
m  existential anMysis is possible, inasmuch as oertain analyses of 
human existence may help to open to us In a new way the basis of 
our own existence* Perhaps this analysis itself could be quite 
oorreotly described, as a phenomenology of the total structure of 
the inner life (the phrase whioh William Earle uses) yet Kierkegaard 
would still have had an intention beyond the development of a more 
extensive objective knowledge* Indeed his intention might well be 
described as * hortatory' by Earle, although his aim is surely not 
to exhort people to do or to be anything, but rather to open them 
to m fuller kind of awareness of- - one oould almost may a new degree- 
of sensitivity to the basis realities of their own existence.*
from this diaoussion it seems that we may certainly conclude 
that (Tillich's stress on the importance of existential analysis 
has m parallel in the thought of Kierkegaard inasmuch as Tillich 
sees the task of existential analysis as relating to the practical 
exploration of man’ s predicament* At the same time this does not 
mean that Kierkegaard would have accepted the importance, or indeed 
even the possibility, of developing an ’existentialist’ philosophy* 
Since Tillich himself speaks of ’ existential’ rather than 
• existentialist* analysis in regard to his method of correlation,
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however, we may proceed on the assumption that it ia this ’praotioal 
exploration’ that he is referring to* The question as to whether 
an e^ iatentialist philosophy oan have any place in theology must 
wait until we are ooneidering the method of correlation in relation 
to ontology*
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mànm iv lu TimoH* s methob*
Of th© two oloments of Tillioh' s oorrolatlon w© hav© ao 
far diaouaaod %n ©orne détail the existential queetiona. We muât 
now turn to the other element, that of theological anawera, or a@ 
he also calls them revelatory answers*
These answers, Tillich tells us, * are contained in the
#revelatory events on which Christianity is based*, and we may say 
that it is only insofar as the events are received as revelatory 
that they can supply a correlative answer to the existential 
questions# But what does Tillich mean by calling the Christian 
message, or the events referred to in the message revelatory?
To answer this question we should first look at what he says about 
the Meaning of Revelation and the Reality of Revelation in his 
Systemat io Theology*
In discussing the meaning of revelation Tillich begins with 
some methodological remarks* First of all he says that theology 
must apply the phenomenological approach to all its concepts and 
in particular, therefore, to the concept of revelation*
For Tillich this means that we must describe the meaning of all our 
determining ideas and give a picture which is convincing to anyone 
who looks in the right direction* * Phenomenclo^ is a way of
* ST X, p*72
e* ibid; Ohaps* V and 71*
*** It is clear that Tillich’s use of the word •phenomenological*
is rather more ’technical* than my own* I shall therefore
distinguish Tillich’s use by underlining*
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pointing to phenomena as they "give themselves" without the
Intertereno© of negative or positive prejudice# and explanations*.
This phenomenolofgioal method would have us investigate the oonôept of 
revelation by taking a typical revelatory event and looking into it, 
in order that we might see, by a *phenomenologioal intuition* the 
universal meaning of revelation in and through this example#
When we are confronted with different or perhaps oontradiotory 
examples, however, this method gives us no criterion upon which to 
hase our choice of a typical example# What we really need here is an 
example whioh has actually been received as a revelation, and which 
furthermore is considered final in the sense that it is critical in 
respect to other revelations, so that all revelations might be judged 
in the light of this critical example. It is not a typical example 
but rather a critical example which we need here# an example which 
has been grasped ’ exlstentially* by the subject and which is, 
therefore, of critical significance for him* This does not mean 
that the Intuitive-niescriptive method of phenomenology is to be 
abandoned, but it is rather to be united with, or is to proceed on 
the basis of, this existential-critical element. It is this whioh 
provides the basic of our investigation, and if we abandon this 
basis we should be reduced to abstracting a concept of revelation 
from different examples, and this would deprive the examples of their 
concrete significance and reduce their meaning to empty generality#
But having accepted such a basis we may derive an idea of revelation
* SŒ Î, p.118.
from the classical example and aooept this idea as valid for every 
revelation#
Having eo developed the principles of his methodology we 
may expect Tillioh to turn now to the exposition of that revelation 
whioh he aooepts as being the critical example* In fact he goes 
on to make further general remarks* His discussion of methodology 
forms only the first part of a discussion of the marks of revelation, 
and he now goes on to discuss three marks which h# regards as 
essential to any revelation whatsoever* that it should reveal that 
which is essentially and neoessarily mysterious; that it should be 
received in eoetasy and that it should be given in a miracle or 
sign-event#
This immediately raises a problem as to whether his previous 
insistence that our discussion must proceed on the existential- 
critical basis of a concrete revelation leaves any room for suoh 
generalised discussion of the marks of revelation* How does he, 
in fact; distinguish these marks? He starts his discussion of 
mystery by considering the origin of the word ’revelation*, as 
referring to the manifestation of that whioh is hidden, and this 
leads to a consideration of the essentially mysterious nature of this 
hiddennees whioh is uncovered* This seems to suggest that he 
derives this first mark of revelation not from any oonorete 
existential critical case but from a conceptual or linguistic analysis, 
Similarly, the other two marks - the ecstasy of the reception and 
the miraculous nature of the event - seem to be derived from the
subjôôt-objaot stmctur© of reality in which revelation ooours*
Thus thee© marks do not seem to he derived from Tilliah’e own 
participation in a concrete revelation which he believes to he 
critical*
We must return to thfs question later, when we attempt to 
assess Tillich’s understanding of revelation* In the meantime, we 
shall continue to follow his discussion, passing from the marks of 
revelation to the media through which it is received#
First we must look again at his discussion of the three 
marks of revelation* Of the mystery which is reveMfd he tolls us 
that it has a negative side and a positive side* The negative aide 
appears ’when reason is driven beyond itself to its "ground and 
abyss**, to that which "precedes** reason .**#** to the original fact 
(Ur-Tatsacbe) that there is something and not nothiKig’ and ’the 
"sti#Aa** of finitude which appears in all things and in the whole 
of reality and the "shock" which grasps the mind when it encounters 
the threat of non«#being reveal the negative side of the mystery*’
But this ’ revealing' of the negative side of the mystery is to be 
distinguished from ’actmai revelation’, for he goes on to say that 
’the positive aide of the story whioh includes the negative side - 
becomes manifest in actual revelation’ and this positive side 
appears as the power of being conquering non«‘being| it appears as 
our ultimate concern and it expresses itself in symbols and myths 
which point to the depth of reason and its mysteay*
* ST I, p.122
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Of the ecstasy whioh' Is the next ■mark of revelation he soya
it is a "standing out aide oneself" which 'points to a state of mind
whioh ia extraordinary in the sense that the mind transoends its
ordinary situation# %stacy Xu not a negation of reason, it is the
state of mind in which reason is beyond itself# that is beyond its
#subjeet-objeot stmetwe# ' This appear® to be m  attempt to
do scribe the experience in whioh revelation is actually received,
It inoludes the "ontologioal shook" already referred to in relation 
to the negative side of the mystery, but it alee includes the 
elevating power of the divine presonoe which overeomes this ’shook’* 
le then says there is a eo^itive side to this eostasy, whioh is 
often called inspiration* But - we must not make the mistake of 
thi-id^ ing that this refers either to some non-rofleotive act of 
cognition (as -’I had an inspiration’ for example) or to a strange 
though authoritative bo# of knowledge (as some understand biblioal 
inspiration)* lightly understood, fillioh believes, inspiration
opens a new dimension of teowledge - the dimension of understanding 
in relation to our ultimate oonoem, and to the mystery of being*
Of miraole, whioh is the third mark of revelation, he says 
that It is ’ astonishing, unusual § shaking without sont radio ting the 
rational struoture of reality’ * In short a miracle is an event 
whioh has the power of evoking eostasy in the sense of that word 
already deseribed* ’The sigm-events in whioh the mystei:y of being
* S3 I, p.124
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giirea itself ooaslst in speoial ooastellatlons of elorasata of reality
in qoerelatlQn with «paoiaX oonstellatiorio ùf elements of the mind**
Moving on to the mediums of révélation^  fillioh dlsousses 
first nature, then hlstor^ ÿ groups and individuals, and finally the 
word as mediums of revelation* He suggests that any natural event 
may enter a constellation of revelatory oharaeter, hut this does not 
mean that natural knowledge itself can reveal the divine mystery* 
natural knowledge can lead to the question of the ground of heing, 
hut it oannot answer this question* 'It is the question of reason 
ahout its own ground and ahyss. It is asked hy reason but reason 
cannot answer it* Revelation can answer it*'
(Phe position is veïcy much the same in regard to history ^ 
groups and individuals* 'Eistorioal eventgroups or individuals 
as miùhÿ are not mediums of rovelatiom.' It is the revelatory 
constellation into which they enter under special conditions that 
mWce them revelatory, not their historical significance or their 
social or personal g r e a t n e s s * O f  course, the situation hero 
is not exactly the same as with natural knowledge for there is the 
new possibility that a group which actually has the so static 
experience in relation to its history may become a medium of 
revelation for other groups* Usually these revelations through 
historical groups or individuals are accompanied or supported by 
revelation through nature, which might be expected since nature is
# m  X, p*: 
m  ibid, p.133 
*** ibid, p*133
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the basis on which history moves.
93o oonsider the word as a medium of revelation is a bit more 
complex, for it demands that we should in the first place discover 
what we mean by 'word' when we speak of '#he Word of 0od'. So 
important does Tillich consider the symbols 'Word of God* and 'Logos' 
that he readily understands why attempts have been made to reduce the 
whole of theology to an enlarged doctrine of the 'Word of God*.
But he objects to this nevertheless, because in order to comprehend 
theology in this way one must either use the phrase 'Word of God* 
in such a broad sense that it will embrace every divine self- 
manifestation or else restrict revelation to actual spoken words*
But the first of these alternatives would deprive the phrase of any 
specific meaning while the second (which would take the phrase 
literally instead of symbolically) would preserve the specific 
meaning in such a Way as to limit God to vocal self-Hsaanlfestation. 
Having thus rejected the attempt to make the phrase 'Word of God* 
embrace every divine self-manifestation Tillich nevertheless does 
insist that 'the word* is not to be understood as one medium of 
revelation among others. It is a necessary element in all forms 
of revelation* At this point Tlllioh seems to be speaking quite 
literally of words - of human language, but not language seen as a 
means of conveying information.^  ^'The "Word of God" is not a word 
of information about otherwise hidden truth* he writes* The 
prophets and apostles bear witness to revelatory events and
* ST I, p.138
But %hi8 whole discussion should he compared vjith the discussion 
below, p*1^8 ff.
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experiences but they are not just informing us that these events 
happened or that this eostatic experiaaoe was received* lore than 
this, their witness itself bears with it revelatory power so that 
it may be received in ©ostasy. Thus the words of the witness are 
not to be identified with the Word of God, but inasmuoh as they 
have revelatory power, they are 'transparent* to the Word of God 
or the Word of God 'sounds through them'. It is in this sense that 
the phrase 'Word of God' is aymbolio. There is no collection of 
actual words which can claim authority as having been spoken by God. 
There is no body of divine information which tells us facts of which 
we should otherwise remain ignorant. But there are words - ordinary 
human words - which in the concrete historical setting in which 
they are spoken have the ' sound' and 'voice' of the divine mystery.
From here Tillich passes on to the dynamics of revelation,
which he describes in terms of original and dependent revelation.
'An original revelation^  he says 'is a revelation which occurs in
a constellation which did not exist before. This miracle and this
ecstasy are joined for the first time', while 'in a dependent
revelation the miracle and its original reception together form the
giving side while the receiving side changes as new individuals
#and groups enter the same correlation of revelation. ' Thus Peter 
was part of an original correlation and it is this original 
correlation which is the permanent point of reference which forms 
the objective miracle which is received in the ecstatic participation
# ST I, p.140
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in the dependent revelations* But the report of the original 
revelatory event and its reception only heoomee the occasion of a 
dependent revelation when it is so received. The report in itself 
is no more than the communication of a piece of historical 
information*
This last point is developed hy Tillich in his succeeding 
section on the knowledge of revelation. Knowledge of revelation 
Cannot he introduced into ordinary knowledge as if it provided 
special information not otherwise available. The îmowledge of 
facts .and structurée in the world as studied by various kinds of 
natural scientists, historians or sociologists cannot be challenged 
on the authority of revelation* There is no revealed information 
about such matters# Gnly where matters of mm* s ultimate concern 
are discussed is it appropriate to speak in the name of revelation 
and such matters are not the concern of the psychologist or of the 
social scientist# Of oource, if matters of ultimate concern are 
discussed under cover of ordinary knowledge, then Tillich says 
theology must protect the truth of revelation against attacks from 
distorted revelations, whether they appear as genuine religions or 
as metaphysically transformed ideas* This, however, is a religious 
struggle in the dimension of revelatory knowledge and not a conflict 
between knowledge of revelation and ordinary knowledge* We can 
evaluate the claims of knowledge of revelation# but only by judging 
it according to its own implicit criteria* 'It is the task of
igo,
the âcGtrlme of the final revelation to m'ake these criteria 
explicit,'*
If knowledge of revelation la not adding to our information 
we might ask why we Call it knowledge at all. #at is it knowledge 
off Tlllioh seems to answer that it is in the end knowledge of 
God# hut it is just for that reason symbolic or analogical (as is 
all knowledge of God)#
All our exposition so far has been of Tillich's diaoussion 
of the Meaning of .Revelation# We mu-st now follow- him into his 
discussion of Actual Révélation and Reality# He begins this new 
chapter of his system with the statement that 'we have described 
the meaning of revelation in the light of the criteria of what 
Ghristianity eon aiders to be revelation. The description of the 
meaning of revelation was supposed to oover all possible and actual 
revelations, but the criterion of revelation has not yet been 
developed,' This immediately raises again the question we asked 
in relation to his methodological remarks. (bice again we are 
reminded that discussion of revelation must begin with the actual 
revelation which we accept, and now Tillich suggests that his own 
discussion so far must be understood as proceeding in this way*
But is the description of the meaning of revelation really developed 
'in the light of the criteria of what Ohristianity considers to be 
revelation?' If it is so, would it not have made the issue clearer
# m  I, p*i45
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if the account of aotual revelation had preooded the aooount of 
its meaning? As it etanda Tillich appears to he saying that hi# 
exposition of the meaning of revelation has been developed in the 
light of criteria which he has not yet expounded* This may be no 
more than a formal objection to the effect that Tlllioh's form
belles his true intention* Yet such a confusion of form can
Certainly lead to a misunderstanding of the whole exposition, as 
can be seen in a parallel confusion which arose in relation to the
'dogmatics' of Karl Barth. In the first draft of his ' dogmatics'
Barth tolls us he 'aimed to advance from the subjective possibility 
of revelation to the description and valuation of its reality or 
as it were from the problems raised by this concept to their 
solution' * The structure of his work at this point led to 
' a parlous obscuration, at least in form', Barth tells us* May it 
not be that Tillich has become involved in a similar obsouration?
This question will have to be considered in our assessment 
of Tillich's whole position# He suggests himself that his 
reference to the Ohrlstian affirmation has m  far boon indirect, 
but now ho says wa must turn to it directly mid dogmatically*
From the point of view of the  ^theological circle', he reminds us, 
actual revelation is final revelation# And the whole of theology 
must work within this circle* But if mo is open to other 
independent revelations, them one has already left the circle for
# Barths Ohurch ..Bomatic^  Î, 2, 99*205-206*
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me i$ surveying the possibility of revelation from an attitude of 
ietaoteent. Of oouroe a man may stand within waother circle of 
commitment altogether, fillloh aoknowlodges# He may believe that 
no concrete revelation has finality, but that the ultimate is beyond 
all concreteness so that all oonorete revelations are relative 
(as in Hinduism) # Or he may deny that there is either actual or 
final revelation, affimdng only moral autonomy which may be. 
•supported by the impression of the Gynoptie Jesus' (as in humanism)# 
But such oommitments are outside the oirole of Ohrietian theology, 
for Christianity claims to be based on Jesus as the Christ as the 
final revelation# On this olaim the Ohuroh is established and 
this revelation is 'final' not just in the nmm of being the last 
one, but rather as the point of reference-of every revelation.
•It means the deoisive fulfilling unsurpassable revelation# that 
which is the criterion of all the others'
Umi*n$ thus recognised the ' finality' of the revelation in 
Jesus as the Christ,#. Tillich n^ w raises the question as to whether 
there are any oharaoto.tistios of this revelation which may be taken 
as-oriteria of its finality-# , Me insists that wo omnot apply 
criteria derived from outside the revelatory situa$.ion but ho does 
think we #an find them within that situation itself# In fact it 
might be better to say that he believes that criterion can be 
found# for although he presents us with a oriterlon whioh he says
* #  I# 9*148
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is the 'firet - and bmeie to the question of the finality
of Jasus'aa the Ohriat# this first answer seems to be the only 
orlterion which he- gives uo* *A revelation i® final*# he oayo,
* i f  i t  has thO'power of negating- i t s e lf  without losing its e lf# * *
We mo this oriterion manifested in Jesue-who reaists the demonic 
temptation to 'claim ultimacy for his own finltude and finally 
sacrifices himself upon the oross*
As has already been said, this oriterion is itself derived 
from, the final revelation# the appemranoe of Jesus as the Christ. 
This demonstrates the oiroular character of %stomatic Theology, 
Tillich points out, Inasmuch as the criterion of final revelation 
is derived from final revelation# md this oiraul^ity is an 
expression of the existential character of theology# thus 
Systematic Theology in its -own peculiar circular -way provides a 
description of final revelation in two way si first- in terms of an 
abstract principle and second in terns of a concrete picture# It 
Is this concrete picture, the %)icture of -Jesus m  the Christ, which 
Tillich now goes oh.te e%cmiw# outstanding impr,ess.lona emerge
from the How Testament presentation of Jesus m  the Christ# his 
m-aintonanoo- of unity with God and his sacrifice of everything he 
might have gained for himself out of that unity# The Hew Teatment 
witnesses to these two #%%a#acteristies and in so doing witnesses to 
the miracle of the Christ* the Hew testament also witnesses - to 
hie reception as the Christ and in so- doing witnesses to the ecstasy
* S® I» p,l#
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in which this mimcle was received#
But this event is not an isolated event. It pre-suppoaed 
a revelatory hiete% which was a preparation for it md in which 
it was received* This revelatory history can be called history of 
revelation* This is not to be thought of m  being the same thing 
as history of religion, however# not even the history of Jewish 
and Ghrletlan religion. For revelation judges, .religion* ' Her is 
it the sera© thing as the history -of -all revelations, for one can 
only talk of revelation on the basis of an 'existential relation to 
it. A histoiy- which claimed to emhraae both revelations to which 
the writer had a relationship of personal commitment and those to 
which he had m  such relationship ' w$dild in the end he merely & 
collection of -reports aJhout, revelations rather than-being a witness 
to thmn But the reception of the final revelation carries with it 
a reception of-the revelatory significance of those things which 
prepared the way for, or pointed towm^ ds, the final revelation*
Hot that they are received m  independent revelations but they are 
received as a preparation for- the revelation# ■ Just as subsequent 
witness to the one- final revelation springs cut of a new reception 
of this same revelation and la, therefore, itself part, of the same 
revelatory c onsteIlati0.n*
0f revelation occurring .In the period of preparation 
tlllioh mays that it is universal, this universality of which h# 
speaks is not a general oharacteristio or law ab.s$mot0d from every
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revelatory experlenoe# nor is it a 'natural revelation* which forme 
m  it were a natural oharaoterietlo of the human situation, nor 1#
It a revelation always ooourring everywhere# It ia rather the 
unlveraal poaalhility of revelation» the universal preparedneaa 
of man to receive that revelation which ia for all*
■ In hiatory the preparation ia carried through hy 
conaervation, hy criticiam and hy anticipation# The oonaervation 
referred to ia the conservation of that which has already been 
received m  revelatory In a aacramentaX cult* This containa within 
it the danger of the eacrmental symbols becoming identified as the 
content of the revelation* It i# this danger of idolatry which 
call® forth the word of criticism, whether it be the critloiam of 
ï^ Btlce, of ratlenaliete or of prophet a *. Of these critloiame it 
is the prophetic word which im decisive, and it ia the Old Testament 
prophète who are bearer# of the direct concrete preparation for the 
final revelation. The ' anticipation* i# not separately diaouaeed 
by Tillich, but presumably we may aay that in their forward-looking 
aapect the word# of the prophet# paa# from oriticiem into anticipation*
. After thi# diaouision of revelation and hietory Tillich 
paese# m  to the question of revelation and oalvatlon* Be insist# 
that revelation and salvation, are not to be mparat#* If 
revelation were understood in m  intellectual, non-exi#tential sen##, 
them wo could consider revelation a# the passing on of a revelatory 
truth which i# Independent of the receiving side and can either be 
accepted or not m  the hearer judge# in hi# wisdm* But this is
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to deprive revelation of it# shaking transforming power* Heither 
eoetaey nor miracle belong to such an aaoount* But for Mosee and 
Isaiah, for Peter and Paul, it was not like that. They were shaken 
and transformed*
Again, if salvation is understood as an ultimate fulfilment 
I beyond time and history, it is clearly not to be identified with 
revelation* But salvation means making men whole, or healthy, and 
this is something which takes place within time and history»
There are five more seotions in Tillich's chapter on 
Actual Revelation and Reality* The first three of these deal with 
the way in which final revelation overoomes oonfliots of reason in 
existenoe. First he dlsousses the way in which the final revelation 
ovsroomes the conflict between autonomy and heteronomy* This is 
the oonfliot between the relativism of a groundless autonomy which 
would m m  to leave us no ground for choice or decision and so 
would undermine personal freedom and leave us only the possibility 
of blind response to the stimulus of the moment I or on the other 
hand acceptance of m  heteronomous principle or law which was 
imposed upon us from outside and so limited our possibility of free 
choice* To what extent this need be a real tension or conflict, or 
how far Tillich gees toward showing how it is overcome, we need not 
discuss here* Briefly, he says that since Christ is completely 
transparent to the Ground of being (i.e. he is at one with Cod) the 
revelation saves us from groundless autonomy, and since the Christ
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always points beyond himself ( 'He who believe# in me does not 
believe in the bearer of the revelation does not become an
heteronomouo authority# Secondly, he disouaeea the way in whioh 
final revelation overcome a the oonfliot between abeolutiem and 
relativiam* In the Hew Being manifest in Joeue m  the Christ, the 
oonorote partloularity of Je eue ie seen ae having unconditional 
univeraal validity, and through this paradox of a concrete particular 
with universal eignificance the conflict between relativism and 
abeolutiem is overcome for the believer, Thirdly, he discusses 
the way the final revelation overcomes the conflict between 
formalism and emotionalism, 'When the mystery of being appears in
a#a revelatory experience the whole of the person's life participates'# 
This means that fom and emotion are united. It is the claim of 
final revelation ' that that which can be grasped only with 
"infinite passion*' (Kierkegaard) is identical with that whioh 
appears as the criterion in every act of rational knowledge*' Thus 
a ' theonomous' reason emerges from the revelatory experience which 
is beyond the conflicts both of absolutism and relativim and of 
formalism and emotionalim%
In this summary of Tillich's dieoussion many critical 
questions remain unanswered and indeed unasked, but some of them 
may be raised in a consideration of his whole position. The 
remaining two sections of his discussion are devoted to the ground
# ST I, p.170
** ibid*
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of revelation (i.e. God and the mystery of revelation) and final 
revelation and the doctrine of 'the Word of God'* Ho eaya that 
having approached the oonoept of revelation from 'below' (i#e* frm 
the side of man in the situation of revelation) something must now 
he said about God who is the ground of revelation* le therefore 
gives a short summary of his understanding of the term ' ground' in 
the phrase 'ground of revelation', and sinoe this 'ground' is 
believed to be Ood who is the ground of being# our understanding 
of revelation pre-mpposes an understanding of Being and God* But 
this latter understanding is itself dependent upon the doctrine of 
revelation* This, he says, is one of the major diffioulties of 
j^ %*stematio Theology# all the parts are pre-supposed in each of the 
parts* In order to try and meet this difficulty, Tillich tries to 
fill out the description of revelation with a mmrn^ discussion 
about 'God' seen under the symbol of the divine life# The divine 
life is a dynamic unity of depth md form* The oharaoter of depth 
1 he aalls ' Abyss' and the oharaoter of form ' Logos' and the dynamic 
unity of the two he oalla 'Spirit'* The atyomal oharsoter makes 
revelation mysterious and the formal 'logos' oharaoter makes 
revelation of the B^stery possible and the spiritual oharaoter creates 
the correlation of mystery md eostasy, in whioh revelation om be 
received*
It is this logos element in the divine life or in the ground 
of being which supplies the key to a proper understanding of revelation 
as the Word of God* There are six different meanings to the term
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'ford of God' in this somse. First it is the principle or logos- 
oharaoter of the divine life# Second, the medium of creation,
Third, it is the manifestation of the divine life in the history of 
revelation and, fourth# in the final revelation. Fifth it refers 
to the documents of the final revelation (the Hew Testament 
documents) and sixth to the message of the Church proclaimed in her 
preaching*
All these mornings are gathered up under the concept ' Logos' 
and it is with this account of the meaning of 'the Word' that 
Tillich completes his dieoussion of Actual Revelation and Reality,
In view of this whole dieoussion, how should wo characterise 
Tillich's view of revelation? Perhaps the main difficulty we must 
face in attempting to answer this question is the difficulty which 
was raised from the very outset hy his methodological considerations. 
How are we to understand his critical-phentmenological method?
W© have already noticed signs of an inner conflict arising in this 
connection. The intuitive-descriptive method is not to he abandoned 
but is to bo united with the existential-critical element, we are 
told. But how is this possible? Does it mean that we start with 
the critical case of revelation which we have received 'existentially' 
and them apply ' intuitive descriptive method' to this phenomenon? 
Or does it on the other hand mean that we first carry out a 
phenomenological investigation whioh abstracts a universal idea of 
revelation from the actual examples, and then show how this universal 
concept is, in fact, realised in the revelation we believe in?
l6o.
If it mean® the latter, then a method of correlation 
would seem to he incorporated into the dleouseion of revelation 
itself. For on the one hand you have a oonaeption of the moaning 
of revelation, developed phenomenologioally ( in Tillioh* b soneo of 
the word) while on the other you have an actual revelation, the 
authority of whioh is displayed in the way in whioh it satisfies 
this concept.
The form of Tillich's discussion might well suggest that 
his procedure is of this kind, moving from the general concept of 
revelation as derived from investigating the various claims of 
different 'revealed* religions, or different 'revelatory constellations' 
to the particular claims of Jesus as the Christ, who, he believes, 
will satisfy the requirements of the concept* Thus when Tillich 
asserts that 'in the history of religion revelatory events always 
have been described as shaking, transforming, demmding, significant 
in an ultimate way' # he appears to be suggesting that this must be 
taken as a definitive characteristic of every reported example of 
revelation* And this generalisation appears in his discussion of 
the meaning of revelation, before he has turned to the actual 
revelation he believes in at all* Oertaialy he tells us ia the 
very next paragraph that there is no revelation 'in general'# but 
this again seems to be a generalisation based on observation of the 
facte; an observation which shows that revelation is invariably 
revelation for someone in a concrete situation#
# ST X, p.123
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This certainly suggests that there may be good ground® 
for believing that Tillich moves from a general aonoept of what 
revelation ia to the particular place where hie own existential 
relationship to revelation ham its roots#- in the event of Jesue 
as the Ohrist* Yet flllloh himself expressly denies that'his 
procedure is to be understood in this way* He insists that 
discussion of 'all possible and actual revelations' is carried on 
in the light of what Ohristisnity considers to be revelation# And 
we must remind ourselves again of his insistence that there earn be 
mo abstract discussion of revelation, based om an observation of 
all possible examples# rather thm on an exist entially received 
oritioal ease.
If we are to t#ie these affirmations seriously, then we 
must assume that Tillioh intends that his discussion of the 
meaning of revelation should be derived from the oritioal and final 
revelation. It may be objected her© that even in regard to this 
final revelation he seem# to demand an abstract criterion by whioh 
we may test whether it is final or not, but them we must remember 
that this criterion is itself derived from, the actual revelation 
which is received as final# The 'criterion' is not m  much a 
criterion as the characteristic in virtue of which this particular 
revelation claim# finality*
Yet Inasmuch as Tlllioh turns first to the marks of 
revelation, rather than to its actuality, we may well feel that in 
the event his procedure conceals rather than reveals hi# avowed
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intention. We must nevertheless take his avowal seriously.. Like 
the first draft of Barth's 'Dogmatic* his exposition seems to he 
involved in 'a parlous obsouration at least in f o r m ' W o  may feel 
Indeed that this confusion extends beyond the form to the matter 
Itself# May it not be that through his failure to start with an 
exposition of the actuality of the critical final revelation he has 
in fact developed a general theory of revelation in the abstract?
Yet this is something whioh according to his own account cannot 
legitimately be done#
If we are to understand this account of the meaning of 
revelation in the light of Tillioh's own principles, then, we should 
have to say that all his talk about the marks, the mediums and the 
dynamics of revelation are derived from no other place than from 
that particular revelation whioh he takes to be critical and final. 
Perhaps he would agree with Barth's assertion that 'when we put 
the question about a self-revealing God we could not raise it in a 
vacuum or in the light or revelation generally, but only in the 
light of the revelation attested in the Bible' . Yet Tillich 
would hardly express the point as Barth does, I think. He would 
surely agree that the reality of the self-revealing God cannot be 
discussed in the light of revelation generally, but whether there 
is a question of a self-revealing Ood whioh does arise for man 
outside the actual context of revelation is another matter. Tillich
* Church Dogmatics I, 2 p#205 
ibid, p.203
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clearly insist® ia aom© kind of question whioh arises outside
the context of revelatioa altogether, to whioh revelation supplies 
the anawer and only in revelation is the answer to be found 
Yet he does not call this 'the question about a self-revealing God’* 
Indeed# such a phrase would aoom to ontioipate the answer in the 
framing of the question. Without anticipating our further discussion 
Of the method of correlation, we may say that, as far as revelation 
is concerned, Tillich seems firmly committed to the view that our 
whole understemding must bo controlled by that final revelation 
which is the origin of all Christian thinking on this matter.
’Revelation has an unshakeable objective foundation’, he tells us,
’in the event of Jesus as the Christ and salvation is based on the 
same event’ »
Assuming that this is the true basis of Tillich* s position, 
despite the formal indications to the contrary, we may now ask how 
such a position can t#:c any cognisance of any revelation outside 
the context of this critical final constellation* For anybody 
who recognises the final revelation, all other revelatory experiences 
must be judged by this final critical case* But this being so, 
does it not mean that the final revelation is the only original 
revelation, all other revelations being dependent upon it? ’An 
original revelation’, fillioh tells us, ’is a revelation which 
occurs in a constellation that did not exist before’, while a
* cp St I, p*69 
m  i, p.162
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dependent. revelation 4® a revelation in whioh 'new individuals 
and groups enter the seme correlation of revelation'#^  But the 
oonetellatiou whioh the OhrlstAau reoogniaee ia the oommtellmtion 
originating in, Jesus seen aa the Ohri.at ami# therefore# all other 
Ghriatiau raveXatioue are dependent upon this final revelation# 
thus fillioh telle u# that 'the history of the Ghuroh ie not a Xooue 
of original revelatioma in addition to the &m on whioh it is based# 
Bather it is the looue of oontiuuoue dependent révélations whioh 
are one side of the work of the divine Spirit in the OtarohS.
If this is so# however, #m filXieh epe# of revelation in 
a way which would oover oatee outside the Ohrietlw faith? He telle 
us that 'the desoriptiom of the meaning of revelation was supposed 
to oover all poeeihl# and actual revelEtiouo' ' mê, this would 
seem to suggest that iu some aoueo .the deeoriptiou oevera oases 
beyond the Christian faith#- Yet if -he Is to take oaoes beyond the 
Ohrietian faith seriously# and yet maintain his commitment to final 
revelation# then he must s,ay that these #%tru^hristian oases are 
themselves dependent im their authority#-' or for their proper 
under standing, upon their being referred t-e the final revelation# 
fat they were not mo referred %  those who reeeived them in mt 
aotual eostatio e%erienoe#
the Case of revelation in hiatorlaaX preparation for the
* m  I, p,i4o 
** IMtl.
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final revelation revelation In the Old Tostamont) is oaoior
to mmm%^ for# einoo it could always be argued that the revelation 
in the Old Teat ament fao. alvwo referred forward by the## who 
received it: referred fomwd to the final .revelation for which 
they waited# It was recognised as dependent revelation: dependent 
on that whioh was yet. to come# (although thie last formulation would 
mggeet# in Tillich’e terme, that the Old Testament revelation is 
part of a revelatory oonstellation so new that it has not yet begunl)
Yet for Tillich perhaps the real solution to this problem 
is to acknowledge from the outset that the problem cannot properly 
be discussed* For he insists that our dlsousslon of revelation 
must be based, upon our participation in# or reoeption of, a 
partloiilar revelatory constellation# In this ease then, one oan 
say nothing of the pos-sibility or signifieame of mw revelatory 
reality unless-one has actually grasped it and baem grasped by it 
in the eastasy of revelatory experienoe# This raggest that 
nothing mn be said about .revelation at all ©xoept by way of 
reporting that which X have experienced - that which has grasped me 
in my existence* fo this Tillich might retort that these two 
phrases ’ that whioh I have ©si^ erienoed’ and ’ that which grasped me* 
do not refer to the same thing*. The first, refers to the subjective 
side (what he calls the ’ecstasy’) in which the revel.ation is 
reoeived, the other refers to the objective side (what he calls the 
’miracle’ or the ’sign-event*) which has the power to evoke this
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revelatory .oxperlenoe# talking about revelation we meed
not oonflne ourmel## to reporting on the oeetasy which forme the 
subjective side; we may aim point to the ■ objective olgn-event. 
Hevertheloeo to t#k w  a Ghriotlm about revelation 1® to talk on 
the baeie of -our ■ éoetatiO- reception of the 0hrlSt**event as normative* 
Other people may oertelhly talk from different standpoints-hut for 
me there ia no other foundation*
This all auggeate that in the end Tillich* a concept of 
original revelation seems to he oongment with hi® idea of final 
revelation# since it it hard to ■tee how the G h # # i m  theologian 
omld mncieretand m?y other revelation whatsoever at anything hut 
dependent* Perhaps it might - eeem mere omtioue to ##- the Ohrletion 
theologian could not rae,0.ive any other revelation me ■anything hut 
dependent* But if he could not receive it could he then understand 
itt Purely m y  ’understanding* he might have of moh extra- 
ehrietian revelations would not he a ’theological' understanding 
(with an existentlal*-otitloal haelm) hut merely an objective 
aoolologloal understanding*
For Tillich# then# we may ©ay that revelation originates 
In the final revelation* that Is# in the historioal event of Jesus* 
And yet it is not the objective desoription of the historloal event 
itself which provides a doeoriptlon of revelation* listorioal 
reeearoh can noither eotahlieh nor destroy the power of a revelatory 
constellation; it om only delineate with greater or less
probability- the - objective klstorioal f&ote which stand at the 
origin of that oonetellatlon# ■ fhu® Tillich seye that 'faith cw 
that the reality whioh is maùifeét im the H#w Teetment picture
of Jeamm m  the Gtolst has saving'power- for those who are grasped 
by it# BO matter how much or how little-cam be traced to the 
hietorloal figure who Is called -iomn of 'lasareth-r*^
Here Tillich’s position aeeme very close to that of 
Kierkegaard when he writes that ’ if -the contaaporary generation had 
left nothing behind, them hut these words "Wo have believed that in 
moh and ©moh a year Ood appeared among ue in the humble figure of 
a 00want that he lived and taught in our comrnmity, and finally 
died", it would he m o m  tlim enough’* - Porhipa Tlllioh remains i
somewhat vague m  to how the remits of historical reeearoh do fit , 
into the revelatory gonstollation* At least he appear-a to suggeot 
that being oonfromted with eome hlotorloal fact# or some alleged 
fact, may he the eooaeiom of the eheek, or the eçotasy# of the 
revelatory moment» Indeed %u regard to the final révélation, it 
-seem® that confrontatioB with the hlatorioal fact of Jem-# of 
Hasaroth, no matter how mi#h or how little we know about him, lo- 
neceseaty to the meaoiom# But may this not m e m  that mmo 
mbmeqment moment of historical dimove$y may be the occasion of a 
further shook in whioh our provioue belief la ahakem? I thlnis 
Tillich might a W t  such a pomlMllty and indeed ho might aay that
PhlloeopMoal, .%a^entm@ p.87
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Im moh m  event the eeoond ©oaaeion would itself represent something 
Very like a revelatory moment*
This seems to open us again to the poasihility of a new 
oonstellation of revelation, whioh is no longer dependent upon the 
definitive final revelation* The very fact that wo are-involved 
in a revelatory oonstellation seems to open us to the possibility 
of revelations other than the one we have reoeived* Perhaps the 
reason why we are turned 'haolc to this problem is heoause of the 
oonoopt of ' eorrelation' which lies behind the whole discussion*
For when Tillich apeal^ s of revelation coming m  an mmot to some 
•question’ which is inherent in the human situation, this at least 
seems to open the possibility of the ’ question’ being met in some 
other way* lot that a believer could conceive of any alternative 
to his belief# It would only be possible to conceive of other 
constellations which would meet this ultimate existential question,
If we started from a standpoint of detachmenti from outside the 
commitment to any one particular revelatory constellation* To 
stand in this position may be to pose the question of revelation, 
but an answer can only be found if one is grasped by a revelatory 
constellation and in this case one abandons the detached viewpoint*
la it really possible for Tillich to hold that the * question* 
of ravolation can arise for someone who has never been grasped by 
a revelatory constellation# however? To raise this question at all 
at this point may be to anticipate our further discussion of the
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method of oorrolation Itself, end yet some olarifioation seems to 
be neoessary to a full understanding of what he means hy revelation» 
He clearly holds that an outside speotator oould look at belief in 
revelation as a sooiologioal phenomenon to be studied, but oould 
suoh on investigator really be said to understand the question of 
revelation? We mi^t put this question even more sharply by asking 
whether Tlllioh oan have it both ways» Can he both maintain the 
neoessity of portioipating in a revelatory oonstellation before the 
oonoept of revelation can be dlsoussed, and at the sme time oluim 
that the question of revelation may arise independently of suoh 
participation?
Perhaps he would soy that this dilemma is on inevitable 
element of the questioning situation» We have already noted that 
he sees the questioner is one who both has and has not the thing 
he asks about. If he knew nothing of it he would not be able to 
pose the question; if he possessed it oompletely there would be 
no occasion for posing the question. Thus the man who has received 
no revelation may be in this paradoxical state of the questioner «• 
both possessing and not possessing what he asks about* This kind 
of position is well stated in two sentences of Rudolf Bultmonn 
♦Thus I know what revelation is without having found revelation - 
and yet I do not really know it. For the blind man also only 
really knows what light is when he sees, and the person who is 
friendless and unloved only really knows what friendship and love
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are when he finds a friend and is given love’#^  M% can we 
really say that Biltmann's 'blind man’ can ask the ’question* of 
light, if he has been born blind? Perhaps in a sense we can, 
inamuoh as he om ask the ’question’ of being able to move about 
freely from place to plaoSf knowing the geography of every room he 
enters without first of all walking around to explore it all# He
may also know that there are other people who have an answer to 
this question* Thus, although he may know nothing of what seeing 
is like, he may yet know the ’question’ to whioh seeing would be 
the answer* This analogy would suggest that the man who knows no 
revelation may know all too well the question to whioh revelation 
is the answer, yet he m #  Imm nothing of revelation itself* thus 
there seems to be a certain ambiguity in the phrase ’the question 
of revelation’ # It can either m m  the question as to how the 
oonoept of revelation is to be understood or the ’question’, in 
the sense of the praotioal predioameat, to whioh revelation oomes 
as an answer* Tlllioh does seem to suggest that inammoh as the 
oonoept is a thoologioal om$ the first question om% only be 
dlsoussed on the basis of participation in the revelatory 
constellation* This participation is, therefore# almost a 
sine qua mn for raising the question, of the meaning of the oonaept,
The of Revelation in the Hew Tes;tament* (A tranalation
of' Per Begri fiSen' TeAmemt Tubingen*
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The peeaihllity of ove% man 3?eoogniaing and aaking $ho aeoond 
{|;ao8tlon la, of oooayae, #o pwmppoaltloa of the method of 
oo^mlatlon#
One other important iasue face a m  at thia point# We 
turned to the problem of revelation in the firet plaee heoause 
Tillioh apeake of the ihrietian raeeaage as one of the oorrelatea of 
the theologian* a method and he also refers to this as the event of 
revelation# Thns we are referred to a message whioh relates to the 
event of revelation# How then are we to understand this message?
Is it to he understood as a report of the original revelation and 
its reoeptlon? We have already observed that for Tillich 
•revelation has an unshakeable foundation in the event of Jesus 
as the Christ* and so we maw expect that the message of revelation 
will be simply the reporting of this event» that is, it will be a 
straight-out historical report# It is true that, while revelation 
has its objeotive side in the * miracle* or * sign'**event*, however, 
Tillich would nevertheless deny that an objective historical 
description can really convey the message of revelation# Vet the 
fact remains that the message of revelation must be a message whioh 
points to the historical reality of its origin# It must point to 
the elgn-event itself, as well as describing this event in terms 
of its reception, (i#e# in terms whioh convey the revelatory 
significance which this event has had for those who have received 
it in faith*)
fhus the Christian message must always point hack to the 
final and original revelation, the believer may certainly want 
to bear witness to some subsequent moment of dependent revelation, 
but the Christian message as suoh must refer to that whole revelatoiy 
constellation whioh is Christianity, and so it begins with the 
•deoieive fulfilling unsurpassable revelation* in Jesus as the Christ. 
For this reason we must say that the message of revelation is 
neoess&rily the messago of the Bible, which claims to bear witness to 
this event. At the same time we may also say that It is the 
message of the whole correlation whioh was initiated by this original 
mir&ole and its reoeption by the apostles, Thus the whole history 
of the Church’ s response be part of the message although 
basio&lly it remains the message of the coming of Jesus as the 
Christ,
If this message is to be proclaimed in these terms, however, 
there still remains the question as to how it is to be heard. In 
Tillich* s terminology should we say that every new reception of the 
message of revelation is to be recognised as a moment of revelation 
in its own right? That is to say can the shaking miraculous 
character of the message become apparent, unless the hearer is 
himself grasped by the ecstasy which is the central character of 
the receiving aide of revelation? It would seem to accord well 
with Tillich* s conception of dependent revelation to insist that 
all moments in which the message is received mm in fact dependent 
revelaticns, yet this would seem to involve emptying the word
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•revelation’ of muoh of its power, toely we might feel that 
the term ’revelation*, even ♦ dependent revelation’, should be 
reserved for something more dramatio than anything that normally 
I happens when the h^ristian message is proclaimed and recognised 
as authoritative» Md surely the word ’eostasy’ is too strong a 
term to use for the relatively unmoved, perhaps even superficial, 
reactions the preacher gets even from quite ardent hearersi In 
fact the&e must he m  infinite gradation of responses to such 
proclamation, from complete indifferenoe to quite dramatic and 
catastrophic conversion, and it would indeed seem to he quite 
arbitrary to say that at a certain point in this gradation we 
should recognise the ecstasy of a genuine revelatory moment. Yet 
we may nevertheless say that this ecstatic quality may be present 
in greater or lesser degree, throughout this gradation, even as the 
revelatory significance of the message may be partially visible and 
partially hidden.
The same question may then be raised in relation to the 
objective side in the moment of preaching» that is to say the word 
that is actually spoken, fan we really ^say that this speech forms 
the objective side of a dependent revelation? 0# we really say 
that such a proclamation of the Christian message has that miraculous 
quality which Tillich ascribes to the objective side of every 
revelation? If not, can we really speak of this proclamation as 
revelatory at all?
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Perhaps the answer to this is that the mlraoulous quality 
is in fact looated in those original events to whioh the preacher 
points, and so the response of his hearers is to that same original 
revelation which is the origin of the Ohristian message. Thus it 
would he claimed that the original revelation is an ever-present 
power, which is still being received in ecstasy even as it was 
received in the day of its original happening# Yet this raises 
questions as to whether the preacher must he sure that his preaching 
is historically accurate, since it suggests that he is simply 
re-presenting the revelation as it happened. But is he really to 
he thought of as simply reporting events that happened years ago?
In fact his reporting will he far from simple, since it will he 
conditioned hy generations of response to these original events, 
and generations of historical distortion, misunderstanding and even 
myth-making. Hence, if Tillich believes that the original 
miraculous quality has been preserved in the witness at all, he 
seems to be faced with one of two alternatives» either he can say 
that this miraculous quality can still be seen through all the layers 
of accretion and historical distortion, or else he can say that 
within the life of the Church itself the miraculous quality has 
been preserved, so that in some sense the actual preaching of the 
word has a miraculous quality in its own right (or rather by right 
of its relation to the power of the Gospel, or of the Hew Being, or 
of the Spirit, within the Church.)
op. Kierkegaard ’This contemporaneousness is the condition 
of faith and more closely defined it is faith# * 
(graining in Ohr&st&anlty. t the ïnvooailoa, p.p.)
In the end fiXlieh might say that ^ there is .&. germ of tamth 
in both these altematlvee# Perhaps he would allow that however 
little we know about Jeeue of Hasareth, something of the miraOulouo 
quality of -hie life and death is preserved for us in the witness 
of those who responded to this revelation* this is not to say 
that we have an objeotivo aooount of his life, hut m  objective 
aoeount is not after all what we want* We w#»t m  aooount of the 
whole nesUS; of revelation as it was given and as it was reoeived; 
and a subjeotive aooount of this total situation is given to us in 
the Hew testament* #n the other hand tillloh m%0x% atill s»qr that 
the mitaouloua qualtty of these events would be lost if something 
of this quality were not to be discovered in the preaohing of the 
Ghutoh* That is to say It would not be enough for' the preaching 
to desorlbe the miracle, it must in m m  degree partioipate in the 
miracle, mà reproduce or ro*^ prasent it*
to say what would be f illioh’s finsp. answers to these 
questions is not easy, as he never speoifioally discusses this 
issue in his dissuasion of original and dependent revelations*
Part of our present diffioulty arises out of a lank of clear 
understanding of what he means by ’dependent revelation* * In my 
case whether the proclamation of the Ohristian message is regarded 
as revelatory" m  not, we may at least soy that in 'fillioh’s view 
the significance of the measago will only appear through its power 
to spools to men* s questions, and net simply through a fertuiteus
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miraculous quality of the events to whioh the preacher points#
It is as the message of the preacher * answers’ the ’ questions’ 
implied in the hearer’ s eacietenoe that it will he reoogniaed as a 
message, and presumably it is out of this récognition that a 
reoognition of Its miraoulous quality will arise#
At this point we might ask how this view of revelation 
compares with the view of Kierkegaard» In one way Kierkegaard’ 0 
understanding of revelation with its constant insisteno© that 
’authority is the category’ might seem much more uncompromising 
than Tillioh’s, Kierkegaard does not indulge in analysis of 
the marks or the dynamics of revelation# He does not distinguish 
between original and dependent revelations nor does he look for 
criteria by whioh revelation may be tested# ’Tlxf divine authority 
is t,he qualitatively deoisiv© factor’ * This is the only criterion 
whioh Kierkegaard seems to allow# ’It is not by appraising 
aesthetically or philosophically the doctrine that % must and oan 
reach the conclusion that he who has taught this doctrine is 
called by a revelation gggo he is an apostle* # And so Kierkegaard* s 
apostle says to the individual * Whether the simile is beautiful or 
not, whether it is tattered or threadbare that is of no account, 
thou Shalt reflect that what 1 say was entrusted to me by a 
revelation, so that it is God himself or our ho# Jems Ohrist who 
speaks and thou ©halt not engage presumptuously in criticising the 
form* I cannot, I dare not, compel thee to obey, but by thy 
conscientious relationship to Ood I make thee eternally responsible
to iod tm thy roXotionoMp to the doctrine tm-- the toot that I 
have, prool aimed It as mmmlmâ to mo by a rovelatloz»' and thoreforo 
proolaimod it with divine authority*^ *
This might mggeot that for Kierkegaard the apostle alone 
partioipatee in the reality of revelation and on the basis of hie 
partioipatien he proolalmo a doottine- whioh the hearer is to accept 
without miy participation of his own in the revelation which- is 
ploolaimad* We might say that in fillioh* s termimlo^, Kierkegaard 
believes in original revelation hut not in dependent revelation# 
tot Kierkegaard, is so mmmmmà about the necessity of the inward 
mhjeotive appropriation of the Ghrlstim massage th# he cannot 
m m  that the ’dootrino* of the apostle is to- he aooepted as so 
muoh Information#' Surely he must have thought that something 
decisive happened to the individual whan this apostolic message was 
preached# And. if this is so, we might surely say that he would 
have acknowledged mmething at least analogous to Tillich’s moment 
of dependent revelation, with its ’shook’ or ’eoatasy*# In my 
ease we may say that Kierkegaard wanted to bring his readers to a 
decisive moment in their relationship to the Christian gospel and 
it was to achieve this that he emb^ked upon his analysis of 
eacistenoe on the one hand and his edifying discourses on the other.
Perhaps in the end Kierkegaard understands revelation in 
what I might call a ’ starker* w?sy than Tillich does# That is to
# On Authority and Revelation# p.l07-10B,
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say he is 1mm prepared to diaomsa revelation as a social or 
psychological phenomenon in the affairs of mem# It is somothimg 
wholly other, whioh breaks into the affairs of mem and with 
authority# Whether this would have made Kierkegaard less ready 
to consider the method of oorrelatlom as appropriate to theology 
is something which we mmy consider after a fuller escamimatlom of 
that method* fe shall mow turn, therefore, from the consideration 
of the elements of Tillich's method to the method itself*
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aiAPfBH V - TOT MXOTOD OF OORBB&ATI0H
'Oorrelation*, Tillich telle us, 'is understood as 
’*imtor-dop©ndonoe of two independent factors"* But this 
immediately raises the question as to whether it is possible for 
two factors to he both inter-dependent and independent at the same 
time*
Tillich* s own explanation of this situation is that the 
independence of the two factors means that the answers cannot he 
derived from the questions, nor the questions from the answers while 
the iatcr-dependenoo arises out of the fact that for the theologian 
both question and answer are embraced hy the * theological circle* * 
*The existential question, namely, man himself in the conflicts of 
his existential situation is not the source of the revelatory 
answer formulated by theology* and *it is equally wrong to derive 
the question implied in human existence from the revelatory answer#*^  
This is the ground of the independenae of question and answer* The 
problem of inter^ependenoe oan be solved only within the 
’theological circle"# This circle con be understood as an ellipse 
having two central points, the existential question md the 
theological answer* *Both are within the sphere of religious 
commitment but they are not Identical * *
» m  II, p*14
** ibid, pp*14 and 15 
Ibid, p*Xd
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Does this ocoount really explain how the questions and 
miBwera oan be both inter-depondont and independent, however?
Xf we aooept the account of the moaning of inter-depondenoe, then, 
has not the independence been swallowed up or absorbed into the 
•theological circle*? The original formulation mmy have seemed 
vory x^ oradoxiloal, hut now has the paradox not been resolved hy 
aurrendering the claim of Independence? If this ia so, how are 
we to understmid the claim that one cannot derive the question 
implied in existence from the revelatory answer?
Borhaps the whole position could he understood more 
clearly In terms of a- p^ifti.al, Indepondenoo of the two factors* 
Perhaps they have a oortain degree of Independenoe, despite the 
fact that the correlates are hound together within the oommitment 
of the theological oirolo* This may seem to he a weakening of the 
paradoxe of Tlllioh’s original formulation, whioh seems to suggest 
that the factors were at onoe quite independent and yet In some way 
Interdependent * fat Tillich himself goes on to say that 
’ correlation means that while in some respects questions and
mmmm  are independent-, they are dependent in other respect a*
Having said this, however, in what respects are they 
dependent and in what respects independent? Perhaps Tillioh's 
oloareat answer to this question is in his assertion that *while the 
material of the existential question is the very os r^essiOE of the
* ST XI, p.X5
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livrnm predicament, ## form of the question ia determined by the 
total ay at am and by the anwera given to It#*^ le then goea on to 
say that 'the question implied in human finitude i@ directed 
towards the answer* the eternal* The question Implied in human 
estrangement is directed towards the answer» forgiveness* This 
direotedness of the question# does not take away their aerioueneas, 
but it gives them a form determined by the theological system as 
a whole* #
At this point the relationship between the two correlates 
of existential question and revelatoz^  answer seems to be far more 
complex than has been so far apparent and perhaps Tillich realises 
the difficulties confronting his method better than some of his 
critics have thought* There are those who would criticise the 
very notion of correlation in theology on the grounds that theology 
must start with revelation and It can admit no understanding of 
human nature apart from revelation* "the phenomenological method 
may do well In fields where there is little disagreement between 
believers and unbelievers but the understanding of human existence 
is not such a field", they will tell us* ' But perhaps Tillich 
would accept this, since he certainly admits that the way we 
formulate the questions implied in existence is shaped by the 
revelation which enlightens our lives* Yet at the same time he 
does seem to think that the material out of which these questions
* m  n ,  p.17
** Qp, B,S» Oairns who maJses this point in relation to theologione 
who think they oan aooept the phenomeaologloal findings 
©f Heidegger (see Oo@ q1 w.ltbont gyth. pp«#-44,)
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mm formulated is disoov©r©â %  m  ’oxiatentlal*' ^sâysie# Tàus 
fillioh might well argue that existential knowledge and faith 
knowledge (I.e. knowledge based on revelation) might be quite 
separate spheres of knowledge, were it met that the believer exista 
aa a mam, even m  the umheliever doea, and at the same time has this 
exlatemoe in faith# ' faith :W the atamdpoimt of the theologian 
who undertakes am amalyaia of exiateme, and faith is fundamental 
to the ©xiateno© he wishes to analyse| yet it vemaime ppmm 
exiatenoe, and all the material of phemomonologieal #udiee muet 
therefore he taken up and recognised#
This seem# to suggest that there Is m rather subtle 
dialeotie hetweem these two correlates and they are not just 
developed in complote independence and laid side %  aide# Tat there 
still seems to he room for am independent axietential analysis whioh 
will discover the material out of whioh the existential questions 
should be f ormulated# though the aotual fomulatiom is in some way 
determined hy the message of revelation*
In the light of this understanding we might now ask what 
kind of investigation will discover this material which is ’the 
very expression of the humm predlement#' Boss this call for an 
■existential analysis in the sense of a praotioal. ©imploration of 
man's predicament or doe# it call for something more - perhaps the 
development of an existentialist ontology? Perhaps \m may hope to
* É M
# Op. Kierkegaard’s suggestion that existence oeuM not he 
thought were it met that the thinker exi##*
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this question better if we Imagine how the .method 
might work in practice# One om imagine the theologian exploring 
the human pradioamont and, discovering the phenomenon of guilt, and 
then in the light of the hibliaal revelation formulating a question 
in terms of the doctrine of sin# low the existential question h&a 
been formulated in the light of the revelation, the formulation of 
the question, therefore, being 'determined 'by the mawere given 
to it’, the answer in this ease being the gospel of redemption*
It this stage it seems that Tillich la suggesting that 
the theologian must know m  much as poaelble about the empirieai 
reality of the world, or perhaps mere particularly of human 
payohology and aoolology, in order that he may elaborate hi© 
doctrine of m m  and the world in a living relationship to what he 
know# about man and the • world* This 1$ not heoauee the doctrine# 
are attempts to demoribe the foot a, or even in the sense of the 
empirloal sciences to ' explain’ the facta* lor 1# it. because 
doctrines are elaborated out of the facts* ft is rather hea&um 
doctrines must he related to facts in the way the 'believer looks 
at those facts* The doctrine of sin may he closely hound up with 
the way the believer locks at the phenomenon of guilt# though It i# 
not itself a description of that phenomenon* And it may be 
important to relate the doctrine to this particular phenomenon, if 
this phenomenon eeeme of basic importance in understanding the whole 
phenomenon of man*
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Yet we have mggasteâ earlier that f or a thinker like 
Kierkegaard exietentinl m#yeie may have a deeper eignifloanoe 
than merely to de#ri%# phenomena* In working this out we 
eaggeeted that Kierkegaard’ e underetmding was olomly akin to that 
of Karl Ja#era, v&o epeake of a leap from knowing something to 
inner action throu# thinking# If exietewtial malyei# mn really 
he understood in this w#, then we may expect it to play a more 
dynamic role in theological thinking than hm been m  far auggeeted# 
And this is aomethln# whioh Tillich himself would prohahly aooept# 
lo ham drawn our attention to the fact that in existential knowledge 
the subj eat is invelvedi in a way that makes It different from 
objective toowledgei and this means that it oan be distinguished 
from the objeotive Mowledg# of empirical p^ oliology just as much 
m  from anatomy or physiology# This at least moans that, while 
existential analysis may proceed la the guise of m  investigation 
of phenomena, the phenomena under investigation do not remain a 
matter of objective indifference# it not also suggest to us
that the investigator Is so involved in his subject matter that 
something happens to him (something which we may call a 'personal 
illumination' ) as a result of what he discovers?
If w# accept this# however, does it not mean that our 
existential analysis itself becomes a moment of revelation? I 
think Jaspers would say that It docs, hut then he would not accept 
the view of revelation put forward hy Tillich#. For Tillich the 
situation la perhaps more complex# lîvery moment of revelation is
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to he referred to the final revelation In e#er that it may he 
properly underetood* Hence that which happens to ue in the moment 
of existential illumination could only have ravelato^ t^  elgnlfioanoe 
in its relation to the revelation of Jeeue m  the Ohrist. Tet this 
is not to deny that it i# m moment of real elgnifiomoe within the 
dynemio of revelatiom, hut the nature of this etgnifloanoe remains 
t# he worked out#
Tillioh's understanding here would also seem to aooord 
well with Kierkegaard* a thinking# 'In îCiarkegaord* e thought there 
tm certainly a quest for a deeper understanding of existonoe hut 
this quest is always related to the central problem of the individual’ 
relationship to Christianity ^  the prohlOBi of heooming a Chrietiam# 
Time for both fillioh mà Kierkegaard the quest of ■existential 
illumination may worn to he a kind of preliminary to preaching the 
gospel#
At this point in our dleouseion we seem to he directed 
towards that unresolved problem of twentieth oentmy theolo^ - 
the problem of natural theology. Is it here ©uggemtod that this 
'existential illumination’ prepares the way for a man to roaeive 
the revelation of the gospel, so that it is part of the apologetio 
purpose of Tillich to open men to a fuller realisation of existence, 
in order that they might he prepmed to raoognise the gospel when 
it is preached? #me moh programme may seem to he suggested in 
hie use of the terns 'question* and ’ answer*, in proposing this
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method for theology, Bmt wo havo soon onozigh of tho complexity 
of his thought to hositato hoforo wo oharaotorim his method in 
this way* And what of Kierkegaard? Did ho writ© hi© works of 
• existential emalyais* in order that his reader© might he enabled 
to hoar the gospel? In a sense perhaps he did, Imt not In the 
sense that he would suddenly overooma the reel at ana© or the 
blindness of the unbeliever, hut rather In the sense that he would 
©nrioh and deepen the faith of the believer*
Perhaps the beat way of expressing this la to say that 
man’s awareness of existence is one of the fact ora that is at work 
in the inner dyaamia of his reoeptlon of the revelation of Jemia as 
the Christ* This la not to aay it is the factor, nor even 
necesaarlly that it la the moat Important factor; tot it la one of 
the factors juat as pliyaical or mental health may be two other 
faotora* This aolf-awarenoea la not iteolf faith, however, and it 
la at this point that both Kierkegaard and Tillich seem to he 
sharply divided from Jaspers* For Jaspers the •illumination of 
Bxistona' seems to represent something like a revelation in its own 
right, while for Tillich it gains significance In its relationship 
to the decisive renewal of listens which comes not through self- 
illumination, tot through the revelatory event of Jesus who is the 
Ohrist* And It is this final revelation which is critical for 
every revelation* For Jaspera the •illumination of Bxistena' 
leads to authentic essistence, while for Tillich existential 
analysis leads only to a question (albeit a question of * ultimate 
Qonmm*) and for Kierkegaard it leads to an awareness of despairji
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If we are right about the way in which Kicrtogaard and 
Tillich wo'uld interpret 'œlatantlal* tinder standing (what Jaopor© 
calls ’illumination of BxistonaO in its relationship to faith, 
then we might say that the signifioanca they see in self-understanding 
is oomparable to the signifieanoo seen by the peyoho-analyst#
For the psyoho-analyst self-understanding seoma to beaome, for some 
people at least* a criterion for full mental health* or perhaps 
better for full maturity of life# Sim3,larly* wo mey say that 
lierkogaard Is oonoernod to bring people to fntl maturity of faith 
and this entails not only teaching them better biblical theology 
but also inoreasing the awareness of existence in their own personal 
lives# lot that Kierkegaard would have said that biblical theology* 
properly understood* would have failed to increase man’s self- 
awareness* but it was not the only way of doing this; and indeed 
in situations where biblical theology is not properly understood 
he would probably have questioned whether it was even the best way#
Md this concern for a fuller self-awareness surely has a place 
in Tillich* s thinking too#
Of course^  this does not mean that Tillich would diacount 
the importance of our exploration of the human predicament being 
carried out with the greatest poasibl© objective integrity#
The most thorough-going grasp of the phenomena themselves is basic 
to our thinking* We cannot say that since our aim is to produce 
a higher degree of ael f-aw ar erne a a and since this is not the same 
as imparting or discovering more aoourate information* we need
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not bo apaoially o<wtitted to gathering information or observing 
phenomena, This would be to aamme that oelf-awareneso can be 
developed from any kind of decor lpt1 cm of personal phenomena, 
whereas Tillich and Kierkegaard (and Indeed Jaapera too) would agree 
that a right aelf-awarenoee dovelope from a right under at ending» 
from true knowledge; indeed from correct information,
Her should we mrnmm# that the understanding of man* a 
existence la pursued eolely to achieve a special kind of personal 
enlightenment, If this were what Tillich believed, then while 
this sal f-undor standing might play a part in the dynamic a of faith, 
it would have no ’logical* elgnificanoe within the■ dialectic of 
theological thinking# It might help a man to a more mature degree 
of faith hut it would play no part in the conceptual elaboration 
of a theology# It would merely aerve as a kind of preliminary 
thei^ ify which had to he carried out before theological thinking 
began. But Tillich certainly mggecte that the theologian* e 
doctrine# of man and of history and of creatlm met continually he 
related to him phenomemlo^cal knowledge of man and hi at cry and 
perhaps even of * creation* # Thus, to take the example we oonsiderad
earlier, it Is important that the doctrine of elm should he ralatod 
to the profoundeat poccihle understanding of guilt* since if our 
knowledge about guilt is superficial then our understanding of aim 
will mecesaarlly he impoverlshed.
In this sense then we can understand Tillich* a method of 
correlation m  a correlation between * ezietemtlal queetiona*
âieaovered by a practical exploration of man’s pmàiommnt mià 
mawere eiippliod by th# message of revelation# We have given mo 
aomeideratiom im this dioouoolom to a quoetlom whioh was merely 
memtiomed earlier* howovera doee Tillioh'e exiotmtlal amalyeio 
also ©all for the development of am exi# emtiali#  omtoio^? hot 
us mow oomaider this quomtioa im the light of our dieoueoiom of 
the theological dialeotia of Tillioh'e method ae wo have been 
oomeidorimg it 00 far#
W# mggeated that knowledge about the phemmemom of guilt 
might supply the material out of whioh the ’ question* of aim is 
formulated# May we mow aay that before this deetrimal ’queatiom* 
ie formulated Wé must firat of all organise the material 
eyatematioally md develop am omtolo©?’ - mm ontology of eétrangement 
for eacample? In terms of Tillich's method this might then he 
understood m  part of that dlwovery of the material out of which 
the existential question ie formulated; for it is only mmh 
diaoovery of material that earn really claim independence of the 
revelatory oonstellation* Yet presumably this ontological 
development could only claim to he part of our dim every of material 
if it were a dlmovary of the actual structure of the phenomena we 
are dealing with - that is if It were a kind of eoei^ logioal or 
peyohologioal generalisation# But it hm already been suggested 
that to make peyohologioal or eooiologioal genermllmtionm la not 
the same thing m  to declare one’s ontological oomviotloma* Wa
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have already argued, for example, that the disaovery of material 
mode avail able through depth psyoholo^ will not in itself lead, 
with rational neoeeeity, to oomd otione about reality ae a whole* 
We m e â  only re-iterate here that if * estrangement* is presented 
08 an • ontologioal* category whioh applies to the world bb a whole, 
then we have made a leap beyond the dieoovery of phenomena and 
phenomenal struoture, to something of quite a different kinds an 
ontologiaal intuition#
In this 0ESO, the omtologloal Intuition regarding 
estrangement seems to be an insight of the name order aa the 
epeoifioally theologioal doctrine of sin* It is a eonviotlon 
about being itself* .And this suggeate either that auoh a 
eonvlotion oan be reeeivad in some way entirely independent of any 
revelation, or else that the ontological insight i© itself 
formulated in reeponee to revelation* And in thia event one’s 
ontology does seem to tm open to 0%mrdeeg’ a oritloism that it is 
really a concealed theology*
If we try te inoorporate ontology into the dialsotia of 
Tillich* $ method in this way, therefore, it seems that in the end. 
our understanding of being will hsoome a way of answering man’ b 
questions; and this would certainly he unaaoeptable to Tillich#
If ontology leads us to $ unified vision of the universe, for 
example* should we not say that this vision # o u M  he correlated 
with man* s quest for unity? And might m  not say that this quest
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hm a central place in mm' # pvBêlommntf Indeed the queet for 
a mmlfled vision of the umlvera# may bo am oppression of man* a nood 
for finding meaning and aignifioanoe in oxiatenoe* This eeoma to 
eufgeat that we might correlate the queetione dlmmrered by an 
existential analysis with the answers supplied by ontologyi But 
this is not the method Tillich proposee; nor doe# it aoem oompatihle 
with hie belief in the oamcial aignifioanoo of the final revelation*
Perhaps we should remind ourselves again at this point 
that T illio h  himself does not speak of an e x is te n tia lis t ontolo^ 
having any place in M s  method of corrélation# He speaks alwe^ a of 
an ^ex is ten tia l’ rather than an 'e x is te n tia lis t' analysis# 
Purthemore, hie aoooumt of revelation would make .a correlation  
with mam* a ex is ten tia l prohlems more understandable than a 
eorrelatiom with Ms onteiogiqal. problems* Revelation is a shaking 
phenomenon whioh discovers a man' a ultimate oonoem, rather than 
being a rational answer to some metaphysical question* At the same 
time we must remember that In his disoussion of revelation he does 
say that '*%e genuine mystery appears when reason is driven beyond 
its e lf  to I ts  "ground and abyss" to that which "preoedes" reason 
to the fact that "being is and non-heing is not"'*^  This 
certainly seems to allow for a more positive relationship between 
revelation and ontology than we have so far allowed*, Here the 
’mysteryi*, which is m  essential mark of revela#o% seems to he 
quite clearly correlated with the ontological question# But having
* 8# I, 9*88
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said this m  mhouM notice how the oatoXoglaal question is ©onoeived 
at this point# Wa hare already aaon something of the difficulty 
mâ imdead the ambiguity of this concept of 'the ontologiaal 
question*, and ®o we should da our heat to dlotlnguioh how It ie to 
he understood in each separate context in which it appears# In 
the present context - the dimuealom of the marko of revelation - 
we are dealing with a my&tmxf which stands at the limits of the 
competence of human reaeon# Hence we may surely may that hero the 
question of being remains a question# There la no place here for 
the developing of a oonoeptual ay atom to answer the queetion.
Indeed the very reference t# the point at which reason driven 
beyond itself eeeme to mslm it clear that no ©onoeptual eyetom o.an. 
ha eonetruoted at this point#
Perhaps we should say, then* that if ontology ia oonoeived
in thia way perhaps it has b plooe in Tillich’s theologleaX method# 
But let u0 remember that oomeived In this way * ontology* la no 
longer oonoemed with developing metaphysical aystema# It is m  
longer oonoerned with the ©saentialist or axiatentlaliat visions 
of reality# It la only oonoerned to remind us of the faot that 
there ia a myetoxy at the limit of our knowledge of the universe#
And indeed we might well say that in this it is pointing u@ to one 
particular aepoot of the human predicament # Thus we may any that 
our analyals of man’s msietem# mat take into oooount the foot 
that he la a thinker who ia able to tranaoend the immediate 
impraaaioBB of the moment through hie thought* He oan for example
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contemplate what earn# before this preaent moment; mid what came 
before that; and what ome before that again. 80 he can push hack 
and hack until he aeeme to he oontamplating the possibility of an 
infinite regress# Yet this infinity of time ia something he 
cannot comprehend; tot nor oan he oomprehend any limit whioh oould 
be eailed a beginning#
This ia just one example of how am malyalm of man's
f
existence as thinker may five tie the material out of which the 
question of the ultimate myeteiy might he formulated# But oan we 
now say that the form of this question is determined hy the 
theological answers given to it? If so, mn we imagine how this 
material mpplied hy an analysis of man as thinker might he taken 
up in the theological eirole and formulated as # doctrinal question? 
Oan we set out the moments of such a dialectic as we did in the 
ease of guilt, sin and salvation? Perhaps we might' say that our 
examination of existence reveals the phenomenon of man pressing his 
questions to the limita of the universe m  we toow it and then 
seeking to look beyond the limits; and this phenomenon provides 
the material out of which the ’ question* of creation is formulftedi 
and this ’question* is answered by the * loges-signifioanoe* of Uhrist#
This formulation may immediately arouse the auspioion that 
we are forcing our theology into the ’question and answer* form in 
a most unjustifiable way, however# Is this not rather like Hegel 
forcing everything to conform to the pattern of his dialectic?
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Surely the doctrine of creation ia in m  aena# m question# It ia 
much mere like an mmm^* It is a peaitive aaaertien, not a 
doctrine g whioh pointa to a need, or looks for a molmtioa, as the 
dwtrlme of sin seems to do* lenee we should perhaps ssy that the 
limit-quaationa 'how did the world begin*? or *w% is there something 
and not nothing*? are formulated by man and are msyergd hy the 
doctrine of ereatiom#
This understanding of the doctrine of creation is mot as 
satisfactory as it might first appear, however* for the doctrine 
oannot be a simple straight-forward answer to %W question ’why is 
there a world*?, the anamr being ’heaauso God made it*# If this 
were the way to understand this doe trine, then fillioh would have 
to admit that sometimes revelation does give us some piece of 
otherwise unobtainable information# For here wm would have been 
given a, piece of information, and this information answers a question 
whioh seems to transcend the very limits of possible knowledge 
(and which for this reason some people would say oannot even be 
asked let alone answered) * But it seems very doubtful whether the 
assertion that God created the world is giving any very clear 
information of an explanatory nature at all# Yet if the doctrine 
of creation is not to be understood as giving information, how 
should it be understood? Perhaps the best answer to this is that 
It ia in fact transforming our questions about ’being’ into the 
question of God# Hence it ceases to be a question of metaphysical 
speculation and becomes a question of the meaning of the universe
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for ma# And inasmuch me the deotrlne ia already determined by the 
to the question, it is itself a positive affi»ation that
&m may look for meaning and algnifioanee In the universe, and one 
ia not abandoned to a fatuous Insignifioanoe#
If this ia how we understand the doatrine of creation, then 
it does stand in need of oompletion, in the positive revelation of 
God and his purposes, without whioh the mere assertion that God 
created the heavens and the earth remains empty; and in this sense 
the dootrine mey surely he understood as being a formulation of 
the Question, of being*
0f course, this does not really mean that we have 
inoorporated ontology* into the theological method# It might on the 
contrary suggeet that the question of being is not to be answered, 
nor indeed even to be fommlated, by ontologieal speoulation, but 
in one sense at least it arises as a formulated question within the 
theological oirol# and is femulated in the light of re%"elation#
It is not suggested her# that fillioh would agree with this 
oonoluslon, though his treatment of the traditional arguments for 
the existence of God suggests that he might not be altogether 
un#mpathetlo to our argument here# But what is suggested is that 
if we aooept the method he proposes for theology', then this is the 
way in whioh the question of being should be understood#
Having thus dealt with the question of being as it arises 
within the theology of aorrelation, does this mem that we have now 
finally answered the question about the place of ontology in
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theolagleal 4iaousiaioB|. im^ % wm Mmit tkat ike meeâ foa? some 
kind of nnderetanding of %»ealiiy m  a whole atilX remains with uat 
We have mggesied ihat in the light of revelation the limiting 
question ahont the origin of the universe| while met exaotlar 
dismissed as meaningless*, is nevertheless transformed into the 
existentiel problem of 0od, whioh is the problem of finding meaning 
for my own life (i*e* Kierkegaard* s problem of finding an 
* Arohimedean point*)« fhe doctrine of creation certainly does not 
enable us to discover the origin of the universe in the sense that 
Barwin may claim to have discovered the origin of #ecles; yet we 
may nevertheless claim to have discovered that it makes sense to 
look for * significance* or * meaning* in existence,. But does not 
this affirraation itself demand some kind of vision of reality as 
a whole? Oan we really escape the problems associated with the 
re,Elity of #od by translating the concept of God into the concept 
of ultimate concern* as Tillich sometimes seems to do? Surely
it is clear that the believer is asserting more than the mere 
possibility of man finding a po.int of ultimate concern; he is 
saying that it is of the nature of things that there is such a 
point to be found# At least this much must surely be included in 
the assertion that this is a God-created universe# At least there 
seems to be included here some kind of universal sanction for our 
faith and it is precisely this universal sanction which distinguishes 
the belief in creatiom from a humanistic belief in finding man* s 
ultimate concern within purely contingent social structures. And 
this belief in a universal sanction does seem to call for a
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particular kind of vision of the universe# It may be compatible* 
for example* with a vision of the universe aa being like a work of 
art* whieh la being ahapad and moulded by a divine artist* while 
it is much leas obviously oompatible with a vision of the universe 
m  being like a random collection of energy aonaentratione* reacting 
blindly in determinate patterns#
It is at this kind of point that the conversât ion between 
the theologian and the scientist or the philosopher may still seem 
to be inevitable. It may be o&lled in (pestion whether any vision 
of a aod*oreated universe is possible, even as a slgnifioant symbol, 
in the face of what we know about physical structures.# And again, 
the theologian may have to face the question of the spistemologioal 
signifioana© of any symbolio vision of the world as a whole #
And here the whole question of the epistemologloal slgnlfioanoo of 
any theological talk at all cannot be escaped#
All these problems must be taken seriously by the theologian 
and clearly they are taken seriously by #illioh* And perhaps to 
take them seriously will demand of the theologian that he answers 
questions about how he does in fact visualise reality as a whole#
Yet if Tillich* B method is to be accepted by the theologian, moh 
questions will not be the primary questions of hie theology# 
fheology starts with the message of revelation and the way this 
message addresses man in his existence and only subsequently oan we 
ask how this fits into our understanding of universal reality#
It is the revelation and its signifloano© for mm*$ life, which is
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omclal for tW theologian and any attempt to relate this to our 
* universal understanding* (or even our attempts to decide whether 
any * univereal under standing* is possible) must take into account 
this revelation which is of fundamental importance to our existence* 
In this I find it difficult to accept %urd$@g* s contention that 
because * experience is determined by what we are, that is to 
by our particular oomvlotlone** it *does not offer at all the kind 
of insight which would enable us to know or the
universKbeing* h0ing4.ltself or God#* Perhape ^ urdeeg*e 
point depends on the fact that the words 'know* and * understand* 
are inappropriate to areas suoh as the area of personal oonviotlonB* 
or to attempts to eharaaterl^ e the universe m  a whole* Be would 
wish to reserve suoh words, perhaps, for * objective* Imowledge#
But while this would certainly mean that our universal visions are 
not to he regarded as * knowledge* or * under standing* it does not 
mean that such visions can ever he formulated independently of 
aonviotlona# Indeed ^ uurdeeg clearly thinks that they cannot and 
it seems to me likely that lillioh would, in the end, agree with 
him# For surely fillioh would agree that one of the facts his 
understanding of reality must take into account is the fact of the 
shocking ecstatic experience which grasped him in the moment of 
revelation, and the way in which this enlightened and renewed his 
personal existence* Wo matter how he may envisage reality, or 
even if he is to decide that it cannot he * envisaged*, his whole
guurdeeg op# cit# p*15t
199#
réaction to the werlâ muet take this fact of revelation and his 
response to revelation that Is his oonviotlona «* into aooount#
^his means that the theologian* b attempt to answer 
questions about how he understands reality is not an a..priori 
activity which is prior to his doolaration of the message of 
revelation, declared as m  mswer to man* s predicament, but it is 
m  a.posteriori activity which begins only after the faith itself 
has been expounded; and expounded, in aooordanea with that method 
of correlation whiohj, we have argued, finds no place for ontological 
systems* Ihls in turn means that this a posteriori, discussion is 
not of crucial importance to dogmatics as such# %at Is to say, 
it is not necessary to our right understanding of the faith that 
we should find answers to the epistemological or metaphysical 
questions of the philosophers# fhose who find different answers 
to these questions or oven who find no answers may remain united 
in matters of faith and doctrine ** that is in relation to the 
message of revelation and their reception of it#
2 0 0 ,
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account of the method of oorrelatlon given here may
he open to the objection that it takes too little account of Tillich*s
actual theological writings# It leans heavily on his disouesion
of method without giving due attention to the way in which the
method is in fact applied# Tillich himself in discussing the
problem of theological method has said that *no method can be found
in separation from its actual exercise; methodological considerations
are abstractions from methods actually used,** And again he says
that * methodological awareness always follows the application of a
**
method, it never precedes it.* In view of these remarks can we 
discuss his methodological proposals without looking at the shape 
of the theology from which the method is presumably abstracted?
To this I would reply that the study of method, like many other 
abstract studies, may surely be worked out in terms of its own 
inner logic. This does not mean, of course, that an abstract study 
of method can be carried on without any regard to the project to 
which the method relates, but it does mean that the actual methodology 
may be examined, and its implications worked out, without considering 
in any detail whether the proposer of the method actually accepts 
these implications in his own work. Thud Tilliçh* s proposals
* Quoted from a paper on the Problem of Theological Method re-printed 
in Four Existentialist Theologians (Ed.) Will Herberg
Doubleday Hew York 195&* See p.238.
** ST I p.39
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in relation to thoologioal method may certainly he abstracted from 
his theological work as a whole, hat it is surely possible for us 
to exaioine the methodological proposals themselves, even though 
this could point towards theological writings different from 
Tillich*0 own.
In saying this we do not want to make any judgment as to 
whether Tillich does in fact depart from his own methodology. We 
are only trying to clarify the aim and the scope of the present 
discussion. The examination of Tillich's system is not our present 
concern. We are concerned with the rather specific problem of 
methodology as it concerns the theologian*
To fill out our account, however, something more should 
he said about Tillich* s disouesion of the source and the norm of 
systematic theolo^# Gertain suggestions have already been made 
as to what sources the theologian will draw on, both in our 
discussion of the message of revelation, mid in our discussion of 
existential analysis, but now m  will look at Tillich* a own 
discussion of these questions.
At the beginning of the second chapter of his systematic 
Theology Tillich puts three questions* What are the sources of 
systematic theology? What is the medium of their reception?
What is the norm determining the use of the sources? Answering 
the first of these questions Tillich points in the first place
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to the hlhlloal documente aa the hasio aouroe, einoe they are the 
original documents about the event upon which Christianity is based# 
This applies in particular to the Hew Testament of course. But we 
must also include the Old Testament documents in our source material, 
as these bear witness to the same definitive event# On the other 
aide of the event we should also include the reception of this 
message by the Ohuroh# The recognition of these acuroes has 
already been included in our discussion of revelation, and the main 
thing to be added here is some account of the way in which Tillich 
sees these sources as being received and interpreted within the 
realm of theology#
First of all the biblical material must be taken up into 
the construction of ’biblical theology* # At first sight this may 
seem to imply that biblical theology ia a kind of historical- 
critical study, using the methods of what has sometimes been called 
* scientific history* * Thus the task of constructing a biblical 
theology would be a fairly straight-forward matter of considering 
all the thought-forms and images in the work of this or that 
biblical writer, understanding them in their historical setting, 
and drawing out some kind of unified picture of the writer* a 
understanding of the faith# Having done this with different 
biblical writers it might then become possible to attempt some kind 
of unified picture which did justice to the whole of the Hew 
Testament# In any case one could at least aSk what was common to 
these different writings# Such an understemding seems to imply
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that Mblioal theology proooeds according to the methods of both 
historical and literary critioimm# But Tillioh see© a further 
dimension in what the biblical theologian is doing. •The hihlioal 
theologian, * he writes, *to the degree to whioh he is a theologian 
(which includes a eyetematio point of view) does not present pure 
facts to us; he gives us theologically interpreted facts, • *
How then does this * systematic point of'view* fit into the work of 
the biblical theologian? Perhaps it means that while the biblical 
theologian must certainly begin with an hlstorical-oritioal study, 
he cannot rest there; he must go on to bring his historical 
findings into conformity with his own theological system# This does 
not necessarily mem that the historical findings must be distorted 
in order that they may be made to agree with theological 
pro suppositions, for it may well be held that the relationship 
between the system and the biblical souroe material must be 
dialectical, with each in turn being corrected in the light of the 
other. Thus the system will be formulated, and constantly revised, 
in the light of the historical critical study of the bible, and 
the facts discovered %  this study will be interpreted in the light 
of the system#
This kind of dialectic may certainly be included in 
Tillich's understanding of biblical.theology, but it would seem that 
in the end he sees the situation as being rather more complex than
* ST. I p,40
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this would suggest# For the subjective comîïdtment of the
believer does not seem to have a necessary place in the structure
of this dialectic* It might well proceed according to a more or
less explicitly formulated logic, according to which each new
interpretation Was examined and evaluated* But for Tillich the
commitment, or the devotion, of the theologian is an essential
element in any adequate biblical theology* Thus the exegesis of
the biblical theologian is •pneumatic (spiritual) or, as we should
call it today, ’'existential**# • And so he holds that • systematic
theology needs a biblical theology which is historical-critical
without any restrictions and, at the same time, devotional-
interpretative, taking aocount of the fact that it deals with matters
#
of ultimate concern* • Unfortunately theology seems presently to 
be suffering from the fact that there is an unbridged gap between 
•scientific* exegesis and •pneumatic-existential' exegesis, but 
it Is only as this gap is bridged that an adéquate biblical theology 
will emerge, Tillich believes*
Having presented this understanding of the theologian's 
relation to the biblical source material, Tillich goes on to present 
a similar view of the theologian* s relation to Ohuroh history.
Here again it is not just a matter of laying bare the facts of 
church history with the greatest possible * scientific' accuracy,
* ST.I p.41
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but It also mean# expressing those fact© in their Inner relation 
to the theologian* e * ultimate oonoern*# Time we may say that the 
theologian should look for the development of what we might call 
an 'hietorioal theology» parallel to 'Mhlioal theology», Tet the 
phrase •hietorioal theology» would probably be very mieleading, 
einoe it may well be taken to euggeet a theology of history* W© 
are not oonoemed here with history in this general sense however, 
but with the history of the Ghuroh, or the history of Christian 
thought. Yet Tillich thinks the phrase 'history of Christian 
thought’ may also mislead, as it oould mean a detached description 
of theologioal thinkers through the centuries* He therefore thiidss 
it preferable to describe this 'historical theology» by the 
traditional term 'dogmatics»#
Having thus dealt with what wo might call the » revelatory* 
Sid© of the theologian’s souroe material, we might now expect him 
to go on to what we have called the * existential* side* Thus we 
might expect him to add to his exposition of ’ source material* 
the material supplied by the practical explorers of man's predicament. 
In this preliminary discussion of the matter he does not talk in 
quite these terms, however* Instead he says that *a broader source 
of systematic theology than all those mentioned so far is the 
material presented by the history of religion and culture#* ^
* ST,I p,43
206,
This may seem at sight %o- be. mggesting that- we find in
religious and culturel phenomena m  independent revelation or source 
of Infomiation about our ultimate oonoern, Yet our previous 
discussions of the nature of final revelation, as fill lob understands 
it, makes it clear that be does not believe that any revelation can 
really be independent of the event of Jesus as the Ghrlst. His 
own disouesion of this material presented by the history of 
religion and oultura suggests that it must be talien up by the 
theologian in order that he may understand it in its relationship 
to the being of man, and the Hew Being made known in Jesus, the 
Ohriat# fhis material thus beooraes part of the material out of 
which our understanding of the human predicament should emerge,
Thus we are rendnded hers that the practical exploration of man's 
predicament must take into accotint the communal, and historical 
dimensions of human existence. We cannot be satisfied with 
p^ohologioal studies, but we must include studies of cultural and 
religious atr^ wtures as well. Indeed we might ss^ that there is 
no human activity which can be left out of account here, Man's 
scientific theorising, his technical activities and even his casual 
amusements, all these may have to be included in our developing 
understanding of the phenomenon and the predicament of personal 
existence*
Bo much for the sources of systematic theology, which 
Tillich says display an almost unlimited richness# What of his 
second question as to the medium of the reception of these sources?
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It is in experience that he finds this medium# île distinguishes 
three senses in which the term ' experience* may be used in this 
Connection. It mcqr he used in what he calls the ♦ ontological sense* 
in which the pragmatists us© it# In this sense reality is 
identical with experience. It may he used in a scientific sense, 
in which * experience* designates the given In its recognisable 
structure. Hot just the given as such, hut rather the given as 
constituting m  articulated world. ' Thirdly it may he used in a 
my stical sense, in which exporienoe is understood In terms of 
participation# Of those throe senses of the term it is the third 
which Tillich finds of interest to the thoelcgian# All theologies 
of experience, he maintains, must in the end com# to using the 
word in reference to participation# And it is this partioiimtion 
which is the medium through which w# receive the xwelation which 
is the source of our theology# The participation itself is not a 
source of theological'thinking, but ia only the mode in which all 
sources are received#
In answer to his third question about the norm of 
systematic theology we might expect Tillich to point to the final 
revelation itself #s the norm* But he holds that something more 
precise is needed# In every age he seems to thînîc some definitive 
formulation of the meaning of this final revelation must he discovered; 
in relation to mam*s present awareness of his predioaraont. I aey 
that this formulation must he discovered# because Tillich says that
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'the growth of these norme is a histories! proeesa, which in spite
of many oonsoious decisions, is on the whole unoonsolous. •
Tillich establishes the norm of his own system in relation to the
fact that 'today man experiences his present situation in terms of
disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness and despair
'Ha
in all realms Of life. This leads him to the conclusion that
the material norm most adequate to the present apologetic situation 
is the Hew Being in Jesus as the Christ.
This whole discussion forms a background to our discussion 
of the method of correlation itself and should help us to see 
better the whole scope of this method. Thus we are reminded that 
the problems associated with biblical theology and dogmatics are 
not to be avoided, but in fact they must appear as soon as we begin 
to enquire more closely into the sources of the theologian's work * 
sources which are presupposed in all our discussions of method#
* ST.! p.54
** ST I p.55
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oommsioH
In the light of our disouesion so far can we now make 
good our olaim that Kierkegaard's 'existentialism' seems to point 
the theologian on to a method of correlation suoh as that proposed 
hy Tillich? This olaim has been supported by our insistence that 
Tillich must he understood as proposing a correlation of revelatory 
elements with genuinely 'existential' elements* Yet in saying this 
we did not in the end succeed in banishing the ontological question* 
for we were still left with the question of the truth of theology 
in its relation to reality as a whole (as distinct from the value 
it may have in its relation to the existence of the believer)#
In view of this remaining ontological question can we really olaim 
that this theology of correlation stands in the tradition of 
Kierkegaard? Does it not in the end reject the principle that 
truth is subjectivity and recogni&e the need for some kind of 
objective understanding?
Even though we accept that the method of correlation 
undertakes to develop theology out of an 'existential* attitude 
akin to Kierkegaard*s, there seem to be good grounds for suggesting 
that in the end Tillich would hold that Kierkegaard has overstated 
his case to a point where he is in danger of becoming lost in mere 
subjectivism. And so in order to protect ourselves from this 
subjectivism we must make some claim to a truth which goes beyond 
the subjectivity of satisfying our own inward needs. On this
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interpretation m  should say that Tillich has indeed recognised 
the importance of the existential starting point for theology. He 
has recognised the need for a truly existential theology* Yet he 
cannot rest in this, for he sees also the need to relate his faith 
to reality itself* Thus having been grasped by the power of 
revelation and having comprehended this revelation in relation to 
the human predicament we cannot escape from attempting to discover 
the truth of this revelation in the setting of reality as a whole.
Before accepting this account however we must ask whether 
Kierkegaard* s own position is open to a development of this kind*
If Kierkegaard’s 'existential* analysis is accepted, does it really 
leave the way open to complementing it with any kind of ontology.
If Kierkegaard did no more than remind us that faith is, by its very 
nature, concerned with meeting the inward need of the existent - 
the need to find a basis for his eternal happiness - then we could 
argue in this way# For, if this is the way in which we understand 
him then it msy certainly mean that any exposition of faith must 
relate it to the structure of personal existence and show how it 
renews our existence* But there is no real need to stop there*
Ho doubt Kierkegaard was right to object to a philosophical trend 
which would suggest that the theologian should turn straight to the 
ontological or metaphysical problems of understanding revelation 
in its relation to the structure of reality as a whole t a method 
which would thus by-pass the crucial issue of faith as an inward
m i
personal response to revelation* &toh a trend had to be resisted 
because It would lead us to discussing-the metaphysioal implloations 
of revelation without ever facing its •existential* ehallenge# But 
ones the point had been clearly established that the reality of 
faith was to be found preoisely in its existential challenge and 
its power of existential renewal, what then? Having thus acknowledged 
the reality of faith might we not then go on to ask how this fitted 
in to our understanding of the whole of reality?
But we oannot so easily assume that Kierkegaard’s thought 
is open to this kind of interpretation* In fast it often seems 
that he wants to do more than merely to remind us that faith Is 
oonoernod with our existential predioament# Indeed he seems to 
suggest that our only possibility of undersetmdin^ reality Is also 
to be found in our own self-awareness - our awareness of reality 
in our own existenoe*
If this is part of Kierkegaard* a claim then his 
insistence that truth is subjeotivity is more than just a reminder
that the challenge of revelation must be grasped in our inwardness*
f '
It also means that our understanding of reality must be 'grasped inW'
this same way* And this would seem to suggest that Kierkegaard 
simply abandoned the ontological enterprise as impossible and 
pointed us back to faith as the authentia mode of our own existence 
and said that that ia the fullest * truth* we can ask for. Yet we 
may think he was pointing towards a more positive oonolusion than 
this, namely the oonolusion that the truth which is subjectivity
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is in some sense that very * truth* which the ontoXogiet seeks%
That is to sey- that the knowledge of being which forms the subject 
of the ontoXogioal quest can really be discovered in authentio 
existence*
Wo suggested in our disouesion of ontology that the 
ontologioal quest oould be understood in three ways » as a quest for 
the most general structures or categories disoovorable among 
phenomena, as a quest for a vision or image of reality as a whole
or as a quest to experience reality as a whole# Our present 
interpretation of Kierkegaard seems to suggest that he would have 
seen the possibility of knowing 'being itself* (had he used this 
language) in neither of the first two ways, but possibly in a way 
more like the third* But this does not mom that he held that 
we could 'understand* or ' oomprehond* reality through a mystical 
reflection or a ^ s^tical participation* It was rather through an 
'existential pathos' which 'passes into action*, or in Karl Jaspers' 
phrase an inner action through thinking*
Yet however positive our interpretation of Kierkegaard 
might be at this point, the fact remains that he does seem to deny 
the possibility of understanding reality as a whole through any 
kind of systematic cognition* Whether or not he is proposing some 
kind of 'existential ontology* (though certainly not an existentialist 
one in Tillich' e sense) to replace all traditional conceptual 
ontologies, he does at least seem to deny that reality can be
comprehended oonoeptually (that Is in a oonaaptual system)* Hence 
he would aurely deny the possibility of giving any straightforward 
.anyer to ontologioal oMeetions# about revelation. If this should 
mean answering questions about the syatematla underatsnding of faith 
and reality# For Kierkegaard, the question of the truth of revelation 
oan only be answered in the inward reality of faith# It may 
certainly be possible to develop an aooount of revelation in 
oorrelatlon with m  existential analysis, but there is then no 
farther possibility of showing that this revelation has any real 
signifioana© beyond its power to grasp (as some might say to obsese) 
the life of the believer* Yet Kierkegaard might reply that the 
only way one oould possibly comprehend the relationship of revelation 
to reality is in the actual inward conviction of faith#
If we think that there remains a sense in which Kierkegaard 
interprets existential conviction as having a genuine 'ontologioal* 
significance,, Tillich on the other hand might be said to interpret 
rational ontology as having m  existential basis#- He would 
probably say that any complete existential analysis of the human 
predicament would have to take into account the rational side of 
man's existence# It is part of man's predicament that he wants to 
understand reality rationally# He wants some kind of rational 
ground for understanding the truth of his faith* Tillich certainly 
acknowledges that this ground cmnct be discovered in the form of 
logical or empirical urpofg of the faith, as in the classical proofs 
of the existence of God# Yet he does seem to think that some kind
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of ontology oan be formulât eel which will supply a ground (perhaps 
one might oall it a 'background*) within which the reality of 
faith oan be undoretood* And the need for suoh a ground, he 
would perhaps say, is given in existence itself*
To this Kierkegaard might retort that even if one sees 
this need as a * question implied in existence*, or perhaps precisely 
when one sees this need as a 'question implied in existence', one 
is forced to the realisation that it is a 'question* whioh can only 
be answered in the inner passion of faith# The problem of the 
truth of faith indeed appears as an existential problem, but perhaps 
for that verj*' reason the only possible solution to the problem ia 
also existential# There seema to be no objective ground beyond 
the reality of faith itself whioh oan be used to establish the 
truth of the gospel or the authenticity of revelation# This 
authenticity can only be realised inasmuch as faith is realiaed 
in the life of the believer#
To this no doubt Tillich would agree* Faith is not 
identical with knowledge. It is not an intellectual hypothesis.
Yet the question remains, in the light of a revelation whioh is 
authenticated In faith, can one avoid trying to understand this 
faith in rational terms? Is not this precisely the concern of 
theology? AM if one refuses to go beyond the reality of faith in its
# Kierkegaard would surely agree with the Elder Zossima, in 
Dostoevsky* s The Brothers Karamazov who, when faced with the 
questions; 'How then am I to get back ny faith? How is one to
prove it? How is one to be convinced?*, replies 'It is something 
one cannot prove* One can be convinced of it though ... by 
the experience of active love.'
215*
relation to the human prodioamont, one mey certainly arrive at 
a rational understanding of faith as a phenomenon of personal 
existence, hut it may he questioned whether to rest in suoh a 
phenomenology will satisfy the believer* a desire to olaim 
authenticity for the revelation to which he would hear witness#
We have already noted that Tillich himself sometimes 
seems to suggest that we should he satisfied with such phenomenology, 
inasmuch as he sometime# seems satisfied to limit the meaning of the 
word *#od* to that which concerns us ultimately# In one of his 
sermons he say# that if the word God * ha# not much meaning for you, 
translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source 
of your being, of your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously 
without any reservation#' And one can find the same note 
sounded in his talk of 'the God above God* in his book The Oourage 
to He sometime# seems to suggest that if one is seriously 
concerned, then this oomoerm is in itself m  affirmation, and in the 
presence of this affirmation of concern it is appropriate to say •Ood.*
We shall have to disouse this relating of 'God* to 
'ultimate concern' more fully later on, but we shall only notice 
here that Tillich doe# not present this concept of 'ultimate concern' 
a# being free from ontological implication## in hi# affirmation 
of concern the doubter be affirming the 'God above God', and
# The 'Shaking of the Foundations, p#-§î# Uompmre Kierkegaard* s 
remark that 'one who dietinguishea absolutely has a relationship 
.to the absolute teles and ipso facto also a relationship to God'* 
(Postscript pwM9lf^
if W0 eay that ho is, then perhaps we shall already imply that 
thi# is tm affirmation of 'the power of being which works through 
those who have no nmm for it*' And if wo draw any suoh conclusion 
from the concern itself, as fillioU aoema to do, then wo are still 
grounding the caimept of Ged- in an ontologioal affirmation about 
♦the power of being'#
All thia may be taken to suggest that in the end Tillich 
does inaiat that theology must go on from the existential account 
of faith to give rni ontological account* Hanao if one accepts our 
•existential* account of the method of correlation, one must add that 
the development of suoh a correlation is not the whole of theology, 
but le only m  initial stage, whioh must be followed by some kind 
of ontological claim relating to the reality, or th6 ontological 
significance, of the faith which has been described* This vifould 
moan calling in question whether Tillich otandm in the tradition of 
Kierkegaard at all* For Kierkegaard the existential account of 
faith is surely the only way of access to its authenticity* For 
Tillich, on the other hand, it begins to look as if this existential 
account Is only a methodological preliminary which still leaves the 
task of displaying the e^al authenticity of that faith, whioh has 
so far only been declared as a subjective phenomenon*
This last conclusion about Tillich's thought will not do, 
however, for it takes too little account of his belief in the reality
# The phrase is Tillich's* See 3*f* #, p#14
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of revelation* It Is surely clear that Tlllioh does bold that 
It ia 1e this reality that the mutbemtloity of faith rla grounded#
The theologian must work within the oirole of faith, on the haela 
of the revelation whioh has grasped and illuminated hia- ©xiatenoe#
He is not prlmariiy oonoerned to establish the mithentioity of that 
revelation, hut only. to^ War witnoaa to it, and to-prooent a 
' aystematlo* meoumt of it a reality# In view of this we marely 
maintain our claim that Tillich* e theology is fWxdamentally 
existential in its h&sle and in its method* And we may go on to 
suggest that his search for m  ontologioal compréhension is not in 
any case an attempt to disc over a final systemati© ooraprehension of 
reality as a whole* It is rather an aeknowledgment of the fact 
that in our existenee as thinkers we need (and Tillich would say we 
inevitably pre-suppose) some kind of understanding, or conceptual 
model of reality, as a background to our thinking* This does not 
mean that any suoh understanding oan in any sense olaim to be the 
right one, (or for that matter the Qhrietia  ^one) but it means we 
should tacy to develop the meet adequate ontology we oan*
The difference between this olaim of Tillich md the 
ontologioal of Hegel against which Kierkegaard directed his
attack may not seem very great* It may seem that though Tillich 
does not olaim that we mn discover a final or absolute ontology, 
he is neverthsleam committed to the same quest for a systematic
y
comprehension of the absolute* Yet the difference between Hegel
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and Tilliph is greater than this, if our interpretation of Tillich 
is correct* For he site much more lightly to ontologioal 
conetruotions than Hegel seems to have done. For Tillioh no suoh 
construction is more than a partially effeotive device for meeting 
the need to see reality as a whole and to see faith in its relation 
to reality* It therefore makes no final claim to have grasped 
the absolute, but is simply the way of understanding whioh at present 
seems to be more adequate than any other that is offering. On this 
understanding it is doubtful whether an ontology could in any final 
sense be called the 'right* one or the 'true' one* It oan at best 
make the more modest claim to being the most adequate one.
It is in view of this understanding of ontology that we 
deny its primary place in theology. Given a final system which 
could comprehend the absolute, then surely the theologian might be 
faced with the task of accounting for his faith within the framework 
of the system* But if no ouch system is possible then the position 
is rather different, for ontologioal pronouncements cannot claim 
the same right to shape or control one's confession of faith*
The theologian is in the first place concerned with 
defining the Gteistian message, the message of revelation, and this 
hé must do in relation to his own faith and the present faith of the 
Ohuroh* This means he must be prepared to draw on the whole 
historical witness to the event of revelation on the one hand and 
the reception of that event in the %)crsonal historical existence of
oontemporary man or the other* It le in this way that the message 
of the Ohuroh, the definitive doctrine of the Ohuroh, may he 
understood* Discussion may suhsequently go on as to the most. 
adequate ontological framework for comprehending this message in 
its relation to reality, hut such discussion will not control the 
definitive understanding of the message itself# Indeed such 
discussion may seem in the end to belong within the province of 
philosophy rather than that of theology# 'The philosophical basis 
is the ontologioal analysis of the structure of being* If the 
theologian needs this analysis either he must take It from a 
philosopher or he must himself become a philosopher', Tillich writes, 
And we laight add that even the question as to whether any suoh 
analysis Is possible is a philosophical rather than a theologioal 
question#
Understood in this way Tillich's method of correlation 
frees the theologian from the metaphysical ta>^ of presenting the 
Christian message within the framework of a total Christian 
comprehension of being* And this means that in defining its 
dogmas, the Church should be committed to existential rather than 
ontologioal formulations* The significance of this last point 
might be made clearer if we considered its implications in relation 
to one or two classical examples of theological disputation. One
* e* X, p#30*
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suoh example oonoerns the presence of Christ in the euoharist.
This has understandably figured in theologioal debates as an issue 
of vital importance to the dogmatic self-understanding of the Ohuroh* 
But in terms of our present understanding this dogmatic issue should 
not be formulated in ontological terms such as ' transubstantiation' 
or 'consubstantiation'; for this would be to make the issue a matter 
of ontology* The doctrinal formulation on the other hand, must 
simply present the euoharist as realizing the power of the gospel, 
and in some sense presenting the gospel and Christ himself to the 
y believer; in a way which meets the believer's present need# One 
may go on to ask metaphysical questions as to how this comes about, 
but any answer one gives to these questions, whether It be in terms 
of substance or a spirit-matter dualism or any other terms at all, 
cannot be of crucial significance for the definition of the dogma 
itself#
The same kind of thing might be said about the doctrine of 
the person of Christ* Here is an issue at the very heart of the 
Church' a message* But if our understanding of doctrinal formulation 
should be accepted, then our dogma cannot be developed out of a 
metaphysical discussion of how the divine and human realities oould 
co-exist in the man Jesus# The doctrine of the person of Christ 
mu#t affirm the Church's belief in the saving and renewing 
signifieanoe of Jesus' life, death and resurrection* And this must 
be framed in its reference to our understanding of man's predicament.
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0?his might oe^ tainly laad urn to aooopt 0?illiah’a formulation that 
^OBua is the hearer of the Hew Being (following 3t* Paul's word 
'If anyone is in Ohrist he is a new creature') as long as we 
understand this as referring to a renewal of our own existence or 
our own lives. If this reference to New Bein^ is thought to have 
ontological implications, however, we seem to have left the realm 
of dogma and turned to the realm of speculative philosophy#
If this understanding of theology is accepted, then it 
seems to follow that at least some of the disputes which have 
divided the Church on matters of doctrine may in fact have been baaed 
on a mi sunder standing of the nature of doctrinal issues. Yet such 
historical jud^enta should not be passed too easily. If we take 
our first example we may be tempted to say that inasmuch as the 
reformers were divided from the thomiste on the question of the 
presence of Ohrist in the euoharist this was a metaphysical division. 
Henoe they were both seeing a metaphysical issue (the issue of 
transubstantiation) as having crucial doctrinal significance. Yet 
perhaps this interpretation would be lacking in real perception* 
Perhaps the point at issue had a far more 'existential* significance * 
than we are allowing. Perhaps the reformers real concern was that 
the official %cmist doctrine was failing to point to the euoharist 
as a rs"presentation, or a realisation, of the power of the gospel
# that is a significance touching the believer's personal 
response to the euoharist.
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Within the lives of men. Perhaps the real complaint was precisely 
that this doctrine no longer had relevance to the present human 
predicamentt and so it tended to reduce the euoharist to a mechanical 
operation rather than allowing it to he a dependent revelation.
Clearly a careful historical investigation would he needed before 
we could reach a firm conclusion on this issue. Yet at least we 
Can say that contemporary disputes about the euoharist would completely 
forsake the proper ground of theological debate if they became 
involved in ontological questions such as the question of 
transubstantiation.
One could argue in a very similar way in relation to the 
disputes of the first centuries of Church history about the person 
of Jesus. Whatever may be the right understanding of those debates 
in their historical ^ fetting, for us to renew such debates in our 
own time would surely he a very questionable procedure. Whatever 
mey have been the real significance of disputes between monopbysite 
Ohurohes and other parts of the Ohuroh in their origins, such 
divisions in the present appear to he divisions between Christians 
who develop different ontological structures for understanding their 
faith in its relation to reality. And if this is so we may question 
whether these are really divisions on matters of doctrine, as we 
understand the term, at all*
Perhaps the most difficult question to be faced by a 
theologian adopting this understanding of his work is the question
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of the reality of God. Can the theologian really oonfine hie 
formulation of the doctrine of God to the categories of the Ohrietian 
message in its relationship to man' » predicament? This is of o our Be 
to raise again the question we raised earlier in relation to the 
meaning of the word 'God'* Gan we really maintain that this word 
has a purely existential connotation, free from all ontological 
reference? We pointed out earlier that this might he done if we 
defined the word 'God' as meaning 'that which concerns us ultimately' 4 
If we stick rigidly to this definition we may then say that the 
theologian is concerned in his doctrine of God to outline what it is 
that provides this point of ultimate concern for the Christian *
But this need include no speculative questions about the ontological 
status of such a point* And so it becomes a matter of philosophical 
speculation, rather than theological formulation, to ask any further 
questions about God's reality* Much of our discussion so far
certainly seems to point to this kind of conclusion. Yet this seems 
to call in question the theistio basis of Christian theology* It 
seems to open th# way for a tliéok>gy which certainly finds its 
ultimate concern in the Christian message but which remains either 
radically agnostic or even atheistic in relation to the question 
of God* s being.*
Perhaps in terms of cur present discussion it might be better not 
to speak of a theology remaining atheistic^  since we are suggesting 
questions of G'od"'s b'^ng are outside the province of theology,
We should perhaps better speak of the theolo&ian as remaining 
atheistic in his philosophical ontology.
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At first sight such an atheistic theologian might seem
unthinkable* Indeed strictly speaking it might seem like a
contradiction in tewas* How can anyone work out a theology without
the os? Yet the possibility of such theological work certainly seems
to be posed by Professor &.B. Braithwaite in his lecture An empiricist's
view of the nature of Religious Belief, Of course it may be
claimed that if the word 'God' is really defined in terras of
'ultimate concern' then the question of an atheist theology does not
really arise, Ginoo every theologian acknowledges a point of
ultimate concern, he acknowledges, by definition, a God, Whatever
he may say about the relation of this foous of concern to reality,
or whatever he believes about the ontological status of hie concern,
he nevertheless he^ s this concern and hence he has ipso facto a 
*
belief in God. But can the theologian’s doctrine of God really 
be reduced to these terras? It has already been suggested that for 
Tillich the interpreting of the concept 'God' in terms of 'ultimate 
concern* can never be final. It is true that Tillich is prepared 
to say that 'the atheists are those that deny the God of the theiste, 
but they do not deny the God above the God of the theists#**^  they 
cannot, even if they try seriously to do so. For their seriousness 
in trying to be atheists witnesses against their claim to be atheists*
 ^ We have already noted that for Kierkegaard to be related to an 
an absolute telos (actually to the absolute telos) is ipso facto 
to be related to God*
Quoted from a talk given on the B*B*0* under the title
The God above God and printed in The Listner of August 3rd I96I.
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And this might ho taken to mean that the 'God above God* oan at 
least be identified with 'ultimate oonoern* without remainder*
But even here Tlllloh* s position is not so simple* X do not believe 
Tillioh's position here oan be summed up by saying that the atheist 
in denying God is denying that he is oonoerned, but in making the 
denial he shows that he je concerned, (i*e* oonoerned enough to 
make the denial) and hence the denial is eelf-^ ontradiotory* I 
believe that Tillich is rather arguing that the seriousness of the 
atheist's concern points beyond itself, to the ground of all 
seriousness, which is God, Thus he is giving an ontological 
significance to the seriousness of the atheist.
Whether he is justified in thus rejecting the unbeliever* s 
claim to be an atheist need not oonoera us here. Our point is that 
he does not really give us grounds here for a purely existential 
doctrine of God* a doctrine which leaves the ontological question 
open.
But having posed this question of the reality of God as 
the most difficult qtwstion which a truly existential theology has 
to face, it would seem appropriate to tako this argument still 
further* Suppose we wore to take up this relationship between 'God* 
and 'ultimate oomcern' and work it out more radically and less 
ambiguously than Tillich seems to have done. Would this meet the 
difficulty? In order to explore this possibility it might be 
Valuable to examine an analysis by H* Richard Niebuhr which seems
to push the under standing of ## as the object of man* a concern 
even further than Tillich' b diaauselona âot
In his hook The Idea of Radloal Monotheiem Professor Niebuhr
suggests that while the word 'God* has many meanings the theologian
should use it only in its referenoe to the possibility and reality
of the faith which grasps the life of the believer* And this
reality of faith he defines as • dependence on a value centre and
loyalty to a cause* # Henoe he says that 'when we speak of "gods**,
*
we mean the gods of faith# namely# such value*H»entres and causes' •
Here we have a definition of 'god' which even avoids the 
absolute concept of ultimate concern for it leaves open the 
possibility of life being orientated towards a plurality of relative 
concerns# all of which are thus 'goda' for him ivho accepts them all*
And in the face of this definition of 'god* it does indeed seem 
plausible to deny the possibility of atheism# for it seems unlikely 
that anyone could deny the reality of god in this radically 
existential sense of the word* 'To deny the reality of a supernatural 
being called God is one thing'# writes Niebuhr# 'to live without 
confidence in some centre of value and wivhout loyalty to a cause 
is another* * Here# we may feel, is an understanding of the 
term 'god* which really works out the implioati#s of m  equation 
of God# with personal 'concern' in a manner more radical and single- 
minded tha%% anything we um find in fillich' s writings*
# Radical Monotheism# p.24 
s# ibid p.29
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Yet if we follow Niebuhr through his diaoussiou of 
polytheism and what ho calls •honotholsm* (l,e# finding one's good 
or one's valuo-oontra within some particular social structure or 
even some natural etruoture within the world) to hie disoueeion of 
radical monotheism we find him oonoluding that 'for radical monotheiem 
the value-centre is neither closed society nor the principle of such 
a society, hut the principle of being itself.'* This may suggest 
to us that in the end the radically existential connotation of the 
word 'God' has not been maintained since the radical monotheist 
doctrine of God is in the end linked to an ontological formulation* 
a formulation in terms of the principle of being# We are not here 
confronted first with a gospel of God and then left to give an 
ontological justification of the reality of the God we believe in*
We seem rather to be told that whatever the radical monotheist 
finds to be the principle of being* that will be his godi This 
would certainly seem to land us back in a position not unlike 
Hegel's* first we must find the absolute and then we shall have our 
God# But Niebuhr says this is not what he means* 'Radical 
monotheism is not in the first instance a theory about being and 
then a faith* as though the faith orientation toward the principle 
of being as vmlue-centre needed to be preceded by an ontology that 
established the unity of the realm of being and. its source in a 
single power beyond it#' It is rather that 'the principle of being 
is identified with the principle of value and the principle of value
* ibid p*32
with the priEOiple of being#'* This last phrase to the effect
that the principle of value 1$ identified ^ with the principle of
being might he taken to mean that the object of faith# whatever 
It may he# -la invested hy the radical monothoiet with an ■ultimate 
ontological ei#ifio;moe#- But this is oountor-h#lm%oed hy its 
dlâleotiaal■opposite that the prinalplo of being is identified with 
the principle of value* But as to how these principles are to h^  
discovered we not he quite clear# Niebuhr does later suggest 
that radical faith is elicited In the situation of revelation# and
this may mean that the radical monotheist's use of the word 'God'
remains within the theological circle'and he speaks of God in terms 
of the message of revelation and man's reception of that message* 
Tot this monotheist is still necessarily committed to ontologloal 
formulations it would stem# But this leaves us %vlth the question 
whether Professor Niebuhr's radical monotheism is an appropriate 
description of #rlstim faith# In terms of his understanding of 
faith as a value centre and Icsyalty to a cause# where does such a 
centre lie for the Ohrlstian? EUrely it lias# as Tillich insists* 
in the -final revelation* the revelation of Jesus as the Qhrist* 
^rely it is to the constellation^ of revelation* (of value and 
commitment) which was inaugurated by this revelation which is for 
the Christian both value centra and cause# demanding loyalty#
But for Niebuhr'e radical monotheist the whole realm of being seems 
to be this centre and cause# Therefore on# m #  wmt to question
* IMd pp,32-33.
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whether the Ohristien faith oan he desorihed as radical monotheistio 
faith at alii Inaantuch as the Ohristian finds his value oentre in* 
and gives his loyalty to* a speolfio revelatory oonstellation within 
the historical process it may seem that Christianity is, in Niebuhr's 
terms* more like a henotheism* Perhaps if the Ohrlstlaa sees in 
this revelatory oonstellation a message of renewal for the whole 
creation then this henothelstio faith has a relation to being itself. 
But this would surely be better presented in Kierkegaard's terms of 
paradox rather than under Niebuhr* s oategory of radioal monotheim»# 
Kierkegaard at least reoognisea that there is something paradoxical 
about claiming an absolute ai#ifioanoe for a pmptioular revelatoiy 
constellation*
Professor Niebuhr suggests that 'insofar as the Ohrist 
event elicits radical faith it is seen as demonstration of Being's 
loyalty to all beings'* but how this absolute principle is 
demonstrated by the particular event* he does not say* except that 
it is demonstrated through the eliciting of radical faith. Perhaps 
we should understand him as suggesting that the Ohrist event does 
not supply a value centre in itself but rethor points one to Being 
as the true value centre* And this seems closely parallel to 
Tillich's insistence that the Christ always points beyond himself.
Having so far explored H.R. Niebuhr's di sou salon of the 
concept of 'God' in Christian theology we seem to have been led
* ibid, p.44
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straight back into all the problems of ontological formulations.
Yet it is not suggested here that the theologian, having first 
presented a self-understanding of faith in its relationship to the 
predioament of personal existenoe, must then go on to develop an 
ontological system to account for his belief* It is rather 
suggested that the understanding of faith in its relation to being 
is part of the very sol f-under at ending of faith. By this I mean 
that the very symbols of faith themselves carry some kind of 
ontological significance, and the separate development of a separate 
account of the structure of being is not called for# Indeed we 
might say that Niebuhr is simply drawing attention to the faot that 
the Christian concern is a concern about reality; the Christian 
commitment is a commitment to reality itself seen as a meaningful 
whole. And this is something which we have already suggested is 
Included in the doctrine of creation, or in the correlation between 
the 'question' of creation and the 'answer* of the logoe-signifloanoe 
of Ohrist.
It may be questioned at this point whether the introduction 
of Niebuhr's analysis at this stage of the ar^ment has really done 
anything more than further complicate our problem by introducing 
a new viewpoint which has not been fully explored. And yet I think 
that Niebuhr's attempt to work out his position on the basis of a 
radically 'existential* definition of the terms 'faith* and 'god* 
has enabled us to take our own investigation iUrther. And in his
m *
understanding of the relationship between faith and ontology we 
may well find a clue which will help us to under at and Tillich's 
position better# For Niebuhr the account wq give of our faith 
must include the fact that this faith in some meets our need 
to comprehend reality as a whole, and in this sense it stands in 
relation to the question of being* With this we might surely 
expect Tillich to agree# But the question which we have still 
failed to resolve is the question whether this very understanding 
of faith imposes an ontological task upon the theologian. Does it 
or does it not mean that the theologian* s exposition of the faith 
must show how this faith is related to bein^
Our own answer, in terms of our exposition of the method 
of correlation, has boon that although the theologian cannot avoid 
th© question of the relation of faith to reality, this is not his 
primary concern# His primary concern is to set out in something 
like a phenomenological way the nature of the constellation of 
revelation in its correlation with man's predicament# It is at 
this level, we have argued, that the gospel is to be declared and 
the dogmas of the Church are to be formulated# Yet we have not 
denied that it will be necessary to go on from here to face questions 
about the ' ontological significance* of this faith and clearly such 
questions may become a matter of debate among theologians# If 
this Is so it might be better to propose the method of correlation 
as a method for dogmatics (that is the formulation of dogma)
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rather-than ma a method of-all the ©logic al work# If metaphyoloal
•1^
disons el on has any eignifioano© at all then we may expect mioh 
dlQOusoion to be of real inter©et to the theologian even if it is 
not relevant to his dogmatic formulation, so perhaps the division 
wo have drawn botwéon philoeophy.and theology has boon too sharp*
We may in any ease suggest that the dlstinotion we have 
drawn between the ontologloal and the existential is much sharper 
than we can find in Tillich's work. Indeed this opens to us the 
most vulnerable aspect of the whole of the present discussion of 
Tillich* Is it not true that the present discussion has depended 
upon taking certain statements and certain sections out of Tillich's 
writings —  sections and statements in which the distinction between 
existential and ontological thought is most sharply drawn —  and 
from them extracting an account of Tillich's method? And does 
this account not ignore many other passages in which his work 
presents a markedly different aspect? Is it not strange that we 
can develop a theological method which is Independent of philosophical 
considerations, cut of the work of a man who has written that 'no 
theologian should be taken seriously as a theologian, even if he is 
a great Christian and a great soholar, if his work shows that he 
does not take philcsophy seriously’?
To answer these oharges I oan only that it would be to
w the question as to whether it has or not is left open in the 
present discussion*
** Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, pp.?-8.
233.
misunderstand thé intention of this whole dieoussion if it were 
taken to he an exposition of the thought of Raul Tillich. In 
proposing the method of oorrelation, Tillich has pointed the way 
down a road, and it has been the intention in the present work 
to go down that road and explore it. %Vhether flllioh would go with 
us, or how far Tilliah would go with us, is something which perhaps 
we cannot finally decide* In any case a eonstant attempt has been 
made to remind ourselves of the reservations and disagreements which 
he would bo likely to express with our S'onolusions* Yet we are 
still able to maintain that there are discernible in Tillich's 
methodological proposals the seeds of thoroughly existential theology#
It is in this that we have discerned the relationship 
between Kierkegaard and Tillich* Perhaps Tillich would not accept 
Kierkegaard*s claim to have laid bare the impotence of abstract 
speculative thinking# And perhaps Kierkegaard would not have 
accepted Tillich's preoccupation with systematic ontology. Yet 
Kierkegaard's work does seem to discover the demand for an existential 
rather than a metaphysical theology and Tillich's methodology does 
seem to give of developing such a theology# It is this
methodology, we maintain, which might guide the Ohurch in the 
formulation of its doctrine, while ontological questions should be 
handled with freedom in the unity of faith rather than being seen 
as definitive of faith itself#
This may not seem to a very momentous conclusion to have
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reached# It may mem to amount to mo more ihmt a shifting of the 
boundary between theology mà philosophy* The theologian is not 
in the end relieved of the need to grapple with ontological problems, 
hut they are now to b# regarded- as falling outside the sphere of 
dogmatic theology* Blther they should he regarded'as philosophical 
problems, or perhaps us problems concerning a special philosophical 
branch of theology itself*'^
Yet cm conclusions may have a rather more positive 
significance than this would suggest* In particular they surely 
have important implications for the discussions which are carried 
on between believers and unbelievers* Traditionally much of this
discussion has centred around the ontological questions of theism 
and atheism* If our conclusiona are accepted, however, it would 
lead to a significant shift in this frontier* The question of 
belief and unbelief becomes a question as to whether the 
constellation of Qhristlan revelation, as m  historical phenomenon, 
really has the power to renew and fulfil human life; whether it 
demands an absolute commitment and has the power to'anmar' the 
deepest needs (to use Tillich's word the 'predicament') implied 
in our existence* It is this issue 'ifhioh is crucial in the 
declaration of the gospel and in the moment of faith or of unbelief 
it is this existential message of renewal which is accepted or
* There is no intention here to pro-judge the issue as to whether 
ai5y rational ontolo#' is possible at all# The logical question 
as to the very meaning or possibility of the ontological quest 
is obviously a question of primary importance for the 
philosophical discussion, but not for dogmatic theology*
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rejected* The question of the ontological eignifioanoe of the 
faith muet he aaked euheequently and the decisive response to the 
message itself need not he affected hy the anhwer given to this 
question# Indeed it need not he affected even if it is decided 
that no satisfactory answer can he given# The argument as to 
whether the universe is to he understood theistlqally or atheistically 
is an ontological issue and as such is hot of crucial importance to 
the decision for or against the Christian gospel# Christian dogma 
does not include even the claim that any correct, or finally true, 
ontolo^ can ever he emhraced hy man's reason# (Whatever the 
affirmation 'I helleve in God the Father almighty* may mean, it 
surely does not mean *X have developed a satisfactory theistio 
ontological system!%)
If our existential understanding of dogmatic theology 
really implies this attitude to ontological questions then it would 
seem to he a conclusion of some significance for the Church hoth 
in its understanding of its own unity in faith and in its 
understanding of its evangelistic task.
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